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RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES
In the aftermath of the sweeping changes in the federal Estate,
Gift and Income Tax laws enacted by Congress over the past few
years, it is not surprising that the re-learning of these important
and basic areas has been foremost on the agenda of most estate
practitioners. As a consequence, however, other less publicized
changes in the law may have gone unnoticed. One such change oc-
curred in 1977 with the enactment of chapter 77-23 of the Florida
Laws.1 This complex addition to our laws added Florida to the
growing list of jurisdictions that have reformed and modified the
orthodox common-law Rule Against Perpetuities.' In this article I
offer a long overdue examination of Florida's statutory Rule
Against Perpetuities with special emphasis on the practical impli-
1. 1977 Fla. Laws 31. Chapter 77-23 created FLA. STAT. § 689.22 (1981) (effective January
1, 1979). To make this article more readable, reference to the statute in text is to chapter
77-23. Reference to individual sections in text is to "subsection (1)," "subsection (2)(a)," etc.
2. Perpetuities reform statutes have been enacted in 22 states. 1983 Alaska Sess. Laws
ch. 51 (to be codified at ALASKA STAT. § 34.27.010); CAL. Civ. CODE §§ 715-716 (West 1982);
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 45-95 to -100 (West 1981); IDAHO CODE § 55-111 (1979); ILL. ANN.
STAT. ch. 30, §§ 192-196 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1983-1984); Act of Apr. 22, 1983, S.F. 433, 1983
Iowa Legis. Serv. 90 (West) (to be codified at IOWA CODE § 558.68); Ky. Rav. STAT. §§
381.215-.223 (1970); Ma. lav. STAT. ANN. tit. 33, §§ 101-106 (1964); MD. EST. & TRUSTS
CODE ANN. §§ 11-102 to -103 (1974); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 184A, §§ 1-6 (West 1977);
Mo. ANN. STAT. § 442.555 (Vernon Supp. 1983); Act of May 19, 1983, ch. 380, § 4, 1983 Nev.
Stat. 927, 928 (to be codified at NEV. REv. STAT. ch. 111); 1983 N.M. Laws 246; N.Y. EST.
Powass & TRuSTr LAW §§ 9-1.1 to -1.8 (McKinney 1967 & Supp. 1982-1983); OHIO RaV.
CoDE ANN. §§ 2131.08-.09 (Page 1976); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 60, §§ 75-78 (West Supp. 1982-
1983); 20 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 6104-6105 (Purdon 1975 & Supp. 1983-1984); TEx. Rav.
Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 1291b (Vernon 1980); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 27, §§ 501-503 (1975); VA.
CODE §§ 55-13.2 to -13.3 (1950 & Supp. 1982); WASH. Rav. CODE ANN. §§ 11.98.010-.050
(1967 & Supp. 1983-1984); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 700.16 (West 1981).
The legislative remedial trend has been accompanied by a judicial trend in the same di-
rection. Courts in Hawaii, Kansas, Mississippi, New Hampshire and West Virginia have ei-
ther declined to apply the orthodox common-law Rule or have judicially reformed it. See
Estate of Chun Quan Yee Hop, 469 P.2d 183 (Hawaii 1970); In re Foster's Estate, 376 P.2d
784 (Kan. 1962); Phelps v. Shropshire, 183 So. 2d 158 (Miss. 1966); Carter v. Berry, 140 So.
2d 843 (Miss. 1962); Merchants Nat'l Bank v. Curtis, 97 A.2d 207 (N.H. 1953); Edgerly v.
Barker, 31 A. 900 (N.H. 1891); Berry v. Union Nat'l Bank, 262 S.E.2d 766 (W. Va. 1980).
See also Story v. First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 156 So. 101 (Fla. 1934) (discussed infra note
132).
Additionally, England and nine other Commonwealth jurisdictions have enacted perpetu-
ities reform legislation. Perpetuities and Accumulations Act, 1964, c. 55 (England); Perpetu-
ities and Accumulations Ordinance, 1970, No. 26 (Hong Kong); Perpetuities Act, 1964, No.
47 (New Zealand); Perpetuities Act, 1966, c. 2 (Northern Ireland); Perpetuities Ordinance,
1968 (second session), c. 15 (Northwest Territories, Canada); The Perpetuities Act, 1966, c.
113, as amended by The Perpetuities Amendment Act, 1968, c. 94 (Ontario, Canada); Per-
petuities and Accumulations Act, 1972, 21 Eliz. 2, No. 9 (Queensland, Australia); Perpetu-
ities and Accumulations Act, 1968, 17 Eliz. 2, No. 7750 (Victoria, Canada); Law Reform
(Property, Perpetuities, and Succession) Act, 1962, 11 Eliz. 2, No. 83 (Western Australia);
Perpetuities Ordinance, 1968 (second session), c. 2 (Yukon Territory, Canada).
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cations of those provisions which differ from prior law.
I. THE NATURE, PERIOD AND SCOPE OF THE STATUTORY RULE
A. An Overview of Chapter 77-23
Before considering the various parts of chapter 77-23 individu-
ally, a brief overview of the statute might be helpful. Apart from
the meaning of "vest" and the consequences of a perpetuities vio-
lation, chapter 77-23 codifies every aspect of the Rule Against Per-
petuities in Florida. The statute begins with a restatement of the
Rule.' The terminology employed here is orthodox; it should be
familiar to anyone having even a passing familiarity with this area
of the law. Following this restatement is an intricate set of provi-
sions relating to the scope of the codified Rule. Some of these pro-
visions, such as those dealing with the treatment of revocable
trusts4 and foreign trusts containing Florida real estate,5 merely
clarify what is believed to be prior law. Most, however, work sub-
stantial changes.
Chapter 77-23 completely revises the Rule as it applies to com-
mercial transactions. The basic approach is to remove them from
the reach of the Rule. Thus, exemptions exist for trusts with trans-
ferable trust certificates (e.g., real estate investment trusts),6 for
non-disturbance agreements between lessors and lessees, and for a
variety of purchase options,8 including pre-emptive options in the
nature of a right of first refusal, options appendant to leasehold
interests, and options in gross. These latter options, however, are
subjected to a new restriction. They may last only for a period of
forty years. 9 Somewhat similarly, leases limited to commence in
the future are exempt, although here again the statute imposes a
forty-year restriction. In futuro leases must take in possession
within forty years of their creation. 10
Fiduciary powers are also given special treatment in chapter 77-
23. The administrative powers of a trustee," the powers a trustee
3. FLA. STAT. § 689.22(1) (1981).
4. FLA. STAT. § 689.22(3)(b) (1981).
5. FLA. STAT. § 689.22(6) (1981).
6. FLA. STAT. § 689.22(7) (1981).
7. FLA. STAT. § 689.22(3)(a)6 (1981).
8. FLA. STAT. § 689.22(3)(a)7 (1981).
9. Id.
10. FLA. STAT. § 689.22(3)(a)5 (1981).
11. FLA. STAT. § 689.22(3)(a)2 (1981).
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has to advance income or principal to a beneficiary whose interest
in principal is indefeasibly vested in quality and quantity,"' and
the allocation or discretionary spray powers of a trustee"3 are all
exempt from the statutory Rule. However, chapter 77-23 restricts
the time period in which allocation or discretionary spray powers
may be validly exercised to the period of the Rule Against Perpe-
tuities. Attempted exercises after that time are void."
Apart from the provisions which define the scope of the statu-
tory Rule Against Perpetuities, chapter 77-23 makes a variety of
changes in the way the Rule is to be applied by courts. The harsh-
ness of the common-law requirement of absolute certainty of
timely vesting is mitigated by a series of four rules of construc-
tion.15 Additionally, the common-law "might have been" test under
which validity is determined on a prospective basis only is substan-
tially altered by the limited acceptance of the controversial "wait
and see" doctrine." And for one frequently recurring type of viola-
tion-that caused by an age contingency in excess of twenty-
one-chapter 77-23 provides that the age condition is to be auto-
matically reduced to twenty-one if to do so would save an other-
wise invalid interest. 7
Finally, chapter 77-23 makes a radical and arguably unwise
change in the treatment of interests created by the exercise of
powers of appointment. The common-law Rule draws a distinction
between presently exercisable general powers and all others. Chap-
ter 77-23 eliminates this distinction; all powers of whatever type
are now covered by the rules previously reserved for presently ex-
ercisable general powers.' 8 More importantly, chapter 77-23 sub-
jects all powers to a new restriction that raises serious questions
about the validity of some frequently used trust provisions.' 9
B. The Nature of the Rule
The common-law Rule Against Perpetuities evolved gradually by
case decision in the seventeenth, eighteenth and nineteenth centu-
12. FLA. STAT. § 689.22(3)(a)3 (1981).
13. FLA. STAT. § 689.22(3)(a)4 (1981).
14. Id.
15. FLA. STAT. § 689.22(5)(a)-(d) (1981).
16. FLA. STAT. § 689.22(2)(a) (1981).
17. FLA. STAT. § 689.22(4) (1981).
18. FLA. STAT. § 689.22(2)(b) (1981).
19. Id. For a discussion of this new restriction, see infra pp. 848-56 (particularly pp.
856).
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ries as one of several rules of property law designed generally to
further the alienability of property.Y° Historical treatments of the
Rule establish that it evolved in response to judicial concerns over
potential accumulations of wealth and power through the creation
and perpetuation of large family dynasties. 21 Today, the Rule is
believed to serve three slightly different objectives. First, it strikes
a necessary balance between the natural desires of present genera-
tion property owners to extend control over their property into the
future for family, tax or other reasons, and similar desires of future
owners to own and control "their" property free of the restrictions
of past owners. Second, it is instrumental in limiting dead-hand
control of property, thereby assuring that the wealth of the world
will be controlled by the living. Third, and to a lesser extent, the
Rule serves to keep property productive by keeping it alienable.22
Despite some early confusion on the point, it is now well settled
in Florida and elsewhere that the Rule Against Perpetuities is a
rule against remoteness of vesting.23 It is therefore functionally dis-
tinguishable from the common-law Rule Against Restraints on
Alienation which applies to direct restraints on alienation whether
or not the interests to which they are appended are vested.24 More-
20. Prior to the enactment of chapter 77-23, the common-law Rule was in force in Flor-
ida. E.g., Adams v. Vidal, 60 So. 2d 545, 549 (Fla. 1952); Story v. First Nat'l Bank & Trust
Co., 156 So. 101, 104 (Fla. 1934).
21. The history of the common-law Rule is traced in 5 R. POWELL, REAL PROPERTY 11
759-760 (P. Rohan rev. ed. 1981); L. Simns & A. SMITH, THE LAW OF FuTuRE INTERESTS §§
1211-1221 (2d ed. 1956).
22. Simes, The Policy Against Perpetuities, 103 U. PA. L. REv. 707, 721-26 (1955). See
also J. GRAY, THE RULE AGAINST PRPiETurriEs § 2.1 (R. Gray 4th ed. 1942); RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF PROPERTY, Div. I, Pt. I, Introductory Note, at 8-10 (1983) (Donative Transfers).
Professor Simes argued that in contemporary society where most wealth is represented by
corporate securities or other forms of intangible personal property rather than by land, and
where most future interests are equitable rather than legal, the Rule Against Perpetuities
cannot be justified solely on the basis of alienability for the sake of productivity. The pro-
ductivity of property held in corporate form is not impaired when contingent future inter-
ests are created in corporate stock. Similarly, equitable contingent future interests do not
impair the productivity of property held in trust as long as the trustee has a power of sale.
Most trust instruments grant such a power and, even when the instrument is silent, a power
of sale is frequently granted as a matter of law. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. §§ 737.402, 738.12
(1981); Simes, supra, at 712-21. But cf. Schuyler, Should the Rule Against Perpetuities
Discard Its Vest?, 56 MICH. L. REv. 683, 691 (1958) (some of the productivity rationale may
remain because not all trust instruments include a power of sale, not all jurisdictions grant
such powers as a matter of law and, when these situations co-exist, courts are reluctant to
imply a power of sale).
23. Story v. First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 156 So. 101 (Fla. 1934); 6 AMERICAN LAW OF
PROPERTY § 24.3 (A.J. Casner ed. 1952) [hereinafter cited as A.L.P.]; J. MORRIS & W. LEACH,
THE RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES 1-2 (2d ed. 1962).
24. See generally 6 A.L.P., supra note 23, at §§ 26.1-.132; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
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over, the Rule Against Perpetuities differs from the statutory
Rules Against Suspension of Alienation enacted in some states"' in
that the perpetuities Rule, unlike these other rules, is not satisfied
merely because there exists a group of persons who by concert of
action can convey a fee simple title.'
Because of its emphasis on vesting, the Rule is said to be con-
cerned with the time when interests commence, not when they ter-
minate. This is somewhat misleading, however, because "vested" is
not synonymous with "possession." A remainder limited in favor of
an ascertained and living person and which is not subject to any
condition precedent is "vested in interest" as opposed to "vested
in possession." Such an interest satisfies the Rule even though it
might not take in present possession until after the expiration of
the perpetuities period.'7 For somewhat similar reasons, it is now
generally agreed that the Rule does not directly limit the duration
of trusts. A trust with a potential maximum duration in excess of
the perpetuities period is valid provided the beneficial interests
vest in time.'" As a practical matter, however, the Rule indirectly
PROPERTY §§ 3.1-4.5 (1983) (Donative Transfers); L. Sims & A. SmrrH, supra note 21, at §
1111-1117, 1136-1171.
25. As part of its perpetuities reform in 1830, New York introduced a statutory Rule
Against the Suspension of Alienation. Although much of the 1830 legislation was subse-
quently repealed, the Suspension Rule remains a part of New York law. As currently consti-
tuted, the New York statutory Rule Against Suspension of Alienation provides:
(a)(1) The absolute power of alienation is suspended when there are no persons
in being by whom an absolute fee or estate in possession can be conveyed or
transferred.
(a)(2) Every present or future estate shall be void in its creation which shall
suspend the absolute power of alienation by any limitation or condition for a
longer period than lives in being at the creation of the estate and a term of not
more than twenty-one years.
N.Y. EST. POWERS & TiuSrs LAW § 9-1.1(a)(1), (2) (McKinney 1967).
Several states have enacted statutes modeled after the New York suspension statute, but
the precise meaning of most of the provisions of these statutes is in doubt. See generally 5
R. POWELL, supra note 21, at 11 808-827; L. Simas & A. SmrrH, supra note 21, at §§ 1411,
1425-1436.
26. J. GRAY, supra note 22, at §§ 268-278.4; L. Sams & A. Surr, supra note 21, at §
1249. On the distinction between the Rule Against Perpetuities and the Rules Against Re-
straints on Alienation and Suspension of Alienation, see 6 A.L.P., supra note 23, at § 24.6; J.
Moius & W. LEACH, supra note 23, at 1-3; Newman, Perpetuities, Restraints on Alienabil-
ity, and the Duration of Trusts, 16 VAND. L. Rv. 57 (1962).
27. 6 A.L.P., supra note 23, at § 24.3; J. GRAY, supra note 22, at § 205; accord Reimer v.
Smith, 142 So. 603 (Fla. 1932).
28. J. GRAY, supra note 22, at §§ 121.1-.5; 5 R. PoWELL, supra note 21, at 772; Rz-
STATEMENT (SEcoND) OF PROPERTY § 2.1 (1983) (Donative Transfers); L. Stas & A. SMITH,
supra note 21, at § 1391. Honorary trusts and trusts for unincorporated associations are
exceptions. See J. GRAY, supra note 22, at §§ 894-909.2; 5 R. PoWEL, supra note 21, at 1
773; RESTATEMENT OP PROPERTY §§ 379-380 (1944); L. Simzs & A. SmITH, supra note 21, at
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limits the duration of most usable trusts to the perpetuities
period. 9
Nothing in chapter 77-23 alters the nature of the Rule Against
§J 1394-1395.
In England, a trust may be terminated at any time at the request of its beneficiaries. In
the United States, however, the prevailing rule follows the holding of Claflin v. Claflin, 20
N.E. 454 (Mass. 1889), that a trust may not be terminated by the consent of its beneficiaries
as long as some material purpose of the trust remains to be served. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND)
OF TRUSTS § 337 (1957); 4 A. Scorr, THE LAW OF TRusTs §§ 329A, 337 (3d ed. 1967). Accord
Byers v. Beddow, 142 So. 894 (Fla. 1932); Featherston v. Tompkins, 339 So. 2d 306 (Fla. 3d
DCA 1976). Consequently, in most states, including Florida, a trust may be made "inde-
structible" merely by placing a provision to that effect in the trust instrument.
In commenting on "indestructible" trusts, Gray predicted the evolution of a common-law
rule directly limiting their duration. J. GRAY, supra note 22, at § 121.7. There is evidence of
the emergence of such a rule, although its exact parameters are not clear. See RESTAT umEN
(SEcoND) OF PROPERTY § 2.1 (1983) (Donative Transfers); L. SIMMS & A. SMrr, supra note
21, at §§ 1391, 1393.
A few states have enacted statutes which directly limit the duration of private trusts. See,
e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 501.11(6) (West Supp. 1983) (applicable to trusts other than pen-
sion or similar trusts); NEv. REv. STAT. § 166.140 (1979) (applicable to spendthrift trusts
only). Furthermore, the practical effect of the statutory Rule Against Suspension of Aliena-
tion in force in New York and several other states is to limit the duration of spendthrift
trusts. See supra note 25 for a discussion of statutory Rules Against Suspension of
Alienation.
Several Florida cases where the issue of trust duration is mentioned illustrate the confu-
sion that can be caused through the use of imprecise vocabulary or overly broad dicta. Two
cases may be read to refer to a rule limiting trust duration. See Porter v. Baynard, 28 So. 2d
890 (Fla. 1946), cert. denied, 330 U.S. 844 (1947); Pelton v. First Say. & Trust Co., 124 So.
169 (Fla. 1929), overruled by implication in Pattillo v. Glenn, 7 So. 2d 328 (Fla. 1942).
However, these decisions may also be explained as following the common-law Rule Against
Accumulations where the duration of a trust can be critical. See infra note 112.
Two other cases imply that private trusts cannot last longer than the perpetuities period.
Montgomery v. Carlton, 126 So. 135 (Fla. 1930) (containing dicta that private trusts can
endure only for lives in being plus 21 years); Green v. Lewis, 151 So. 270 (Fla. 1933) (imply-
ing a "law against perpetuities" that limits trust duration). These contrary indications not-
withstanding, the weight of Florida case authority follows the prevailing view. Thus, in
Story v. First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 156 So. 101, 105 (Fla. 1934), the Florida Supreme
Court stated:
The weight of authority in this country also supports the rule that an estate
vested does not necessarily include a right to possession. In other words, if the
estate vests within the time, it is not subject to the rule against perpetuities, even
if the time may be remote when it comes into possession. The doctrine of remote-
ness being concerned solely with the question of vesting, would in no sense be
violated by a will creating a trust, if the estate therein created vests within the
time allowed under the rule against perpetuities though possession be deferred
and the trust continued after the time fixed for vestiture. This rule is almost uni-
versal, and much error has resulted from failure to bear it in mind. (citations
omitted)
Accord In re Will of Jones, 289 So. 2d 42 (Fla. 2d DCA 1973). But see In re Estate of Jones,
318 So. 2d 231 (Fla. 2d DCA 1975) (discussed infra note 109).
29. See RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY, ch. 26, topic 2, Introductory Note, at 2212-13 (1944).
See also infra note 111.
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Perpetuities. The statutory Rule remains a rule against remoteness
of vesting. Chapter 77-23 does not require interests to become pos-
sessory within the perpetuities period and nothing in the statute
purports to limit the duration of trusts. Likewise, the policies
served by the statutory Rule are identical to those served by the
common-law Rule. Chapter 77-23 does, however, reflect a greater
awareness of the numerous instances where the common-law Rule
has been applied to transactions where the policies it seeks to serve
are not germane. This greater awareness serves as the basis for the
previously mentioned exemption provisions.
C. The Perpetuities Period
Gray's universally accepted formulation of the common-law Rule
states that "[n]o interest is good unless it must vest, if at all, not
later than twenty-one years after some life in being at the creation
of the interest."30 In the interest of accuracy, two footnotes to this
formulation are in order. First, in applying the Rule, a person in
ventra sa mere is treated as if he were alive as of his conception.31
In other words, a person conceived before but born after the crea-
tion of an interest is a life in being. And an interest limited in
favor of an unborn person is not invalid because of the possibility
he might be conceived within the perpetuities period but be born
thereafter. In this latter situation, the period of the Rule simply
expands to take into account the actual period of gestation
involved. s
The second footnote involves the rules relating to the selection
30. J. GRAY, supra note 22, at § 201. In Adams v. Vidal, 60 So. 2d 545, 549 (Fla. 1952),
the Florida Supreme Court stated the Rule Against Perpetuities to be "that an estate or
interest in order to be good must vest within the period of life or lives in being at testator's
death or within twenty-one years thereafter with the term of gestation added in case of
posthumous birth."
The fixed in gross period of 21 years can be traced to early decisions upholding the valid-
ity of limitations in which the vesting of interests was postponed until the takers attained
the age of majority. J. GRAY, supra note 22, at §§ 171-175. Subsequently, courts extended
the period of the Rule to include some "reasonable period" beyond lives in being even
though no actual period of minority was involved. Lloyd v. Carew, 137, 1 Eng. Rep. 93 (H.L.
1698). Gray believed this extension could not be defended on principle. J. GRAY, supra note
22, at §§ 186-188. Nevertheless, it occurred, and with the decision of Cadell v. Palmer, 6
Eng. Rep. 956 (H.L. 1833), "reasonable period" became a set in gross period of 21 years.
31. 6 A.L.P., supra note 23, at § 24.15; J. GRAY, supra note 22, at § 220; J. MORRIs & W.
LEACH, supra note 23, at 64-65; RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 374 comment p (1944); L.
SIMEs & A. SMITH, supra note 21, at § 1224.
32. The gestation rule does not permit an extension of the perpetuities period by an
additional nine or ten months in gross. See authorities cited supra note 31 (particularly J.
GRAY at § 222).
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of the permissible measuring lives. In his statement of the com-
mon-law Rule, Gray referred to the singular "life in being." Not-
withstanding this, it is well settled that the period of the Rule is
not confined to the duration of a single life plus twenty-one years.
More than one person's life may be used to measure the period.83
Moreover, the permissible measuring lives are not restricted to
those of the transferor, the beneficiaries of the transfer or even the
relatives of either. Any person's life may be considered." Accord-
ingly, an interest made contingent until the last to die of a desig-
nated group of persons, all of whom are alive at the creation of the
interest, is valid even though some or even all of the designated
group bear no nexus to the transferor or his beneficiaries other
than the fact that they are referenced in the limitation. The only
restriction is a practical one. The designated group may not be so
numerous as to make proof of its end unreasonably difficult to
ascertain. 5
Throughout the modern perpetuities reform movement, several
proposals for modifying the period of the common-law Rule have
been advanced.36 In general, these proposals have focused on that
aspect of the common-law Rule which permits an artificial exten-
sion of the perpetuities period through the use of unrelated extrin-
sic measuring lives. In England, for example, courts have sanc-
tioned the use of "royal-lives" clauses. These clauses are
sometimes used in English settlements to postpone vesting to the
33. Scatterwood v. Edge, 91 Eng. Rep. 203 (K.B. 1699).
34. 6 A.L.P., supra note 23, at § 24.13; J. MORRIS & W. LEACH, supra note 23, at 62;
RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 374 & comment 1 (1944); L. SIMES & A. SMITH, supra note 21,
at § 1223.
35. Thellusson v. Woodford, 32 Eng. Rep. 1030 (H.L. 1805).
36. The number of violations of the Rule which occur because of age contingencies in
excess of 21 years suggests that most settlors believe that financial maturity comes after
that age. Professors Morris and Leach have suggested that an extension of the 21 year pe-
riod to 25 or 30 years would allow settlors to postpone termination of their trusts until their
beneficiaries are more mature. See J. MORRIs & W. LEACH, supra note 23, at 68-69. Accord
Dunn, An Attack on the "Twenty-one Year Rule," 18 MD. L. REv. 34 (1958). Only two
states, however, have enacted legislation on this point. Both have abolished the common-law
Rule Against Perpetuities and have substituted a statutory Rule Against the Suspension of
Alienation. IDAHO CODE § 55-111 (1979) (lives in being plus 25 years); WIs. STAT. ANN. §
700.16 (West 1981) (lives in being plus 30 years).
Perhaps the paucity of legislative action in this area may be explained by the fact that the
desires of most settlors can be accomplished within the framework of the common-law pe-
riod. See Schuyler, The Statute Concerning Perpetuities, 65 Nw. U.L. REv. 3 (1970). With a
judicious selection of extrinsic measuring lives, most settlors can postpone vesting for as
long as their reasonable needs require. Also, if a beneficiary's interest is vested at age 21,
possession may be postponed until some later date. See infra notes 103-07 and accompany-
ing text.
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outer limits of society's tolerance. The clauses provide that inter-
ests are to remain contingent until the last to die of a group of
living persons consisting of all of the lineal descendants of some
member of the Royal family such as Queen Victoria. 7 Quite obvi-
ously, such clauses distort the essential objectives of the Rule.
Through them, property owners can fashion private perpetuities
periods of excessive length. As a matter of public policy, this prac-
tice has few defenders. Its effective elimination, however, has
proven to be difficult.
Tax and other considerations frequently make it advisable to
postpone vesting for the lives of living beneficiaries plus a period
of sufficient length to span the minority of secondary takers.
Whatever its weaknesses, the period of the common-law Rule ac-
commodates this reasonable objective in all cases. In contrast, a set
period in gross or a statutory definition of permissible measuring
lives, both of which were alternatives considered by the English
Law Reform Committee, 8 would not. The former would be too ar-
bitrary and the latter would prove meaningless. Any definition of
measuring lives would of necessity include beneficiaries, and over-
reaching property owners could, as a result, circumvent the objec-
tive of a statutory definition by creating illusory or de minimus
interests.
In the absence of a workable solution to a problem that it recog-
nized existed, the English Law Reform Committee recommended
that the common-law period be retained.3 a Their recommendation
was subsequently incorporated in reform legislation in England
and several other Commonwealth nations.40
In the United States, the case for retaining the status quo is
37. See, e.g., In re Villar, [1929] 1 Ch. 243.
38. LAW REFORM COMMItrEE, FOURTH REPORT, Cmd. 18, at 5-7 (1956) [hereinafter cited
as LAw REFORM COMM. REP.].
39. Id. at 7.
40. In an effort to wean draftsmen from the use of royal-lives clauses, the Law Reform
Committee recommended the enactment of legislation permitting conveyancers to specify an
alternate in gross perpetuities period not to exceed 80 years as a substitute for the common-
law period of lives in being plus 21 years. Id. The Committee's recommendation has been
incorporated in the statutes of several Commonwealth jurisdictions. See Perpetuities and
Accumulations Act, 1964, c. 55, § 1(1) (England); Perpetuities and Accumulations Ordi-
nance, 1970, No. 26, § 6(1) (Hong Kong); Perpetuities Act, 1964, No. 47, § 6(1) (New Zea-
land); Perpetuities Act, 1966, c. 2, § 1(1) (Northern Ireland); Perpetuities and Accumula-
tions Act, 1972, 21 Eliz. 2, No. 9, § 5(1) (Queensland, Australia); Perpetuities and
Accumulations Act, 1968, 17 Eliz. 2, No. 7750, § 5(1) (Victoria, Canada); Law Reform (Prop-
erty, Perpetuities, and Succession) Act, 1962, 11 Eliz. 2, No. 83, § 5 (Western Australia). In
this country, only California has followed this approach. Cf. CAL. CIV. CODE § 715.6 (West
1982) (60 years).
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even stronger. Royal-lives clauses are seldom used in this coun-
try.41 Accordingly, of those states that have recently enacted re-
form legislation, all have chosen to retain the common-law period,
at least insofar as the rules relating to the choice of measuring lives
are concerned.42
Chapter 77-23 adopts the same approach. Subsection (1) of the
statute restates the common-law Rule Against Perpetuities in
terms which are substantively identical to Gray's formulation as it
has been interpreted and applied by English and American courts.
Subsection (1) provides:
No interest in real or personal property is valid unless it must
vest, if at all, not later than 21 years after one or more lives in
being at the creation of the interest and any period of gestation
involved. The lives measuring the permissible period of vesting
must not be so numerous or designated in such a manner as to
make proof of their end unreasonably difficult.
D. Interests to Which the Rule Applies
1. Background: The Scope of the Common-Law Rule
If only from the dim memory of long past law school classes,
most attorneys possess some familiarity with the types of interests
to which the common-law Rule applies. Briefly, it applies to legal
and equitable contingent future interests in real or personal prop-
erty.' Where a transfer is in trust (the usual case in contemporary
society), the Rule requires the vesting of the beneficial interests
even though the trust instrument or local law gives the trustee an
unqualified power to sell trust property and to reinvest the pro-
ceeds. 4 Additionally, the Rule applies to the creation and exercise
of certain powers which permit their holders to shift the beneficial
enjoyment of trust property. Powers of this type include: powers of
41. Royal-lives clauses should be contrasted with the "perpetuities-savings" clauses fre-
quently used in long-term trusts in this country. Typically, these later clauses call for the
termination of a trust no later than 21 years after the death of the last to die of the trust
beneficiaries living at the creation of the trust. Perpetuities-savings clauses refer only to
persons having a reasonable relationship to the trust. Therefore, they do not present the
same policy concerns as royal-lives clauses which reference persons totally unrelated to the
transfer with the objective of extending the duration of the perpetuities period for as long as
possible.
42. See statutes cited supra note 2.
43. J. GRAY, supra note 22, at § 202; L. SIMEs & A. SMrrH, supra note 21, at § 1235.
44. J. GRAY, supra note 22, at § 269; J. Moius & W. LRACH, supra note 23, at 15; L.
SIMES & A. SMITH, supra note 21, at § 1254.
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appointment,'" powers associated with discretionary trusts," and
in England, but not generally in the United States, certain admin-
istrative powers of fiduciaries such as powers to sell, lease or mort-
gage trust property. 7
To the occasional surprise of some unwary attorney, the jurisdic-
tion of the Rule Against Perpetuities is not confined to gratuitous
dispositions of property. It extends to some commercial transac-
tions as well.
Normally, contractual arrangements are exempt from the Rule
because no property interests are involved.48 Specifically enforcea-
ble contracts are the exception. The prevailing view is that these
involve equitable interests to which the Rule applies.49
The most frequently encountered example of this situation in-
volves an in gross option to purchase or repurchase land. Typically,
options of either type are contingent on the giving of notice or on
the tendering of the option price. Accordingly, courts have voided
them under the Rule if their duration is not expressly or by impli-
cation limited to the perpetuities period.60 A similar result has
45. 6 A.L.P., supra note 23, at §§ 24.32-.33; J. MORRIS & W. LEACH, supra note 23, at
140-52; L. SimEs & A. SMITH, supra note 21, at §§ 1271-1274.
46. J. MoRis & W. LEACH, supra note 23, at 143-44; L. SimEs & A. SMITH, supra note
21, at § 1277.
47. 6 A.L.P., supra note 23, at § 24.63; J. GRAY, supra note 22, at §§ 486-509.19; J.
MORRIS & W. LEACH, supra note 23, at 232-42; L. Simus & A. SMITH, supra note 21, at §
1277.
Gray's initial position was that the English cases subjecting administrative powers to the
Rule were correctly decided. Professor Leach, however, argued that fiduciary administrative
powers should be exempt because they increase, rather than impede, the trustee's ability to
keep trust property productive. Leach, Powers of Sale in Trustees and the Rule Against
Perpetuities, 47 HARv. L. Rxv. 948 (1934). Professor Leach's views have prevailed in the
United States, a development which is cited with favor in the latest edition of Gray's book.
J. GRAY, supra note 22, at § 509.18. And recently, the English cases subjecting fiduciary
administrative powers to the Rule have been modified by statute. See Perpetuities and Ac-
cumulations Act, 1964, c. 55, § 8 (England).
48. 6 A.L.P., supra note 23, at § 24.55; J. GRAY, supra note 22, at § 329; J. MoRRIs & W.
LEACH, supra note 23, at 219; RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 401 & comment a (1944).
49. There is dicta to the contrary in Florida. See Warren v. City of Leesburg, 203 So. 2d
522 (Fla. 2d DCA 1967). But the court in Warren was clearly mistaken. Since the leading
English case of London & S.W. Ry. v. Gomm, 20 Ch. D. 562 (1882), where the Rule Against
Perpetuities was held to apply to an option to repurchase land, the overwhelming weight of
authority in England and in this country has been that specifically enforceable purchase
contracts create equitable property interests. 6 A.L.P., supra note 23, at § 24.56; J. MORRIS
& W. LEACH, supra note 23, at 219-20; RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 393 & comment c, § 401
& comment b (1944). Moreover, the dicta in Warren is inconsistent with subsequent Florida
decisions. See Iglehart v. Phillips, 383 So. 2d 610 (Fla. 1980) (dicta that repurchase option
creates interest in land subject to Rule Against Perpetuities); Watergate Corp. v. Reagan,
321 So. 2d 133 (Fla. 4th DCA 1975) (Rule held applicable to right of first refusal).
50. 6 A.L.P., supra note 23, at § 24.56; RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY §§ 393, 394 (1944); L.
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been reached in the case of pre-emptive options at least insofar as
the option price does not fluctuate with the market value of the
underlying property.5
In limited circumstances a commercial lease transaction may
also cause perpetuities problems. A present possessory lease, re-
gardless of its duration, is valid. It is vested in possession.52 Like-
wise, according to the weight of authority, the Rule is not violated
by a right to renew a lease, even if it is perpetual.53 The justifica-
tion for this is said to be that a renewal right makes a lease more
attractive. It therefore tends to increase rather than retard the
productivity of the property and the alienability of the leasehold."
A similar rationale is applicable to options to purchase appendant
to long-term leases. Appendant purchase options render property
more productive because leasehold owners are more willing to in-
vest in necessary capital improvements when they own such op-
tions. Consequently, courts in the United States have held appen-
dant options to be exempt from the Rule."
Simzs & A. SMrr, supra note 21, at § 1244. An option to repurchase is subject to the Rule
even though it is similar to the possibility of reverter and right of entry for condition bro-
ken, both of which are exempt. 6 A.L.P., supra note 23, at § 24.56; RESTATEMENT OF PROP-
PRTY § 394 comment a (1944).
In the United States, an option which violates the Rule is totally void. No action for
specific performance or for damages may be brought. RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 393 com-
ment h (1944). In England, however, courts have held that the Rule does not prevent an
action for specific performance between the original parties to the option contract. Further,
an action for damages may be maintained even where an action for specific performance
may not. J. MORRIs & W. LEACH, supra note 23, at 221-22. Recently, the treatment of op-
tions in England has been modified by statute. See Perpetuities and Accumulations Act,
1964, c. 55, §§ 3(1), 9 (England).
51. See 6 A.L.P., supra note 23, at §§ 26.66-.67. But cf. Watergate Corp. v. Reagan, 321
So. 2d 133 (Fla. 4th DCA 1975) (Rule held applicable to pre-emptive option at market price
on date of exercise).
52. See, e.g., Cawthon v. Stearns Culver Lumber Co., 53 So. 738 (Fla. 1910).
53. 6 A.L.P., supra note 23, at § 24.57; J. GRAY, supra note 22, at §§ 230.0-.2; J. MoRms
& W. LEACH, supra note 23, at 223; L. SIMES & A. SMrrH, supra note 21, at § 1243. The
available Florida authority appears to support the prevailing rule. See, e.g., Fonact Corp. v.
Superior Apartments, Inc., 251 So. 2d 537 (Fla. 3d DCA 1971) (easement renewable from
month to month without time limitation upheld). But cf. Sisco v. Rotenberg, 104 So. 2d 365
(Fla. 1958) (covenant to renew lease held satisifed by one renewal because of law's disfavor
of perpetuities and perpetual leases).
54. L. SimEs & A. SMITH, supra note 21, at § 1243. Although Gray indicated his favor
with the view that renewal options satisfy the Rule, he could never completely rationalize
this result. J. GRAY, supra note 22, at §§ 230.0-.2.
55. 6 A.L.P., supra note 23, at § 24.57; RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 395(a) (1944); L.
SIMEs & A. SMITH, supra note 21, at § 1244. Accord Wing, Inc. v. Arnold, 107 So. 2d 765
(Fla. 3d DCA 1958). The English case law is to the contrary. J. GRaY, supra note 22, at §
230.3. The only American decision adopting the English view, First Huntington Nat'l Bank
v. Gideon-Broh Realty Co., 79 S.E.2d 675 (W. Va. 1953), was quickly reversed by statute. W.
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The above exemptions presuppose a present lease. Contingent
leases" limited to take in the future, however, such as "on-comple-
tion" leases used in office building and shopping center construc-
tion projects, have given rise to perpetuities problems in some
jurisdictions.6 7
Because the Rule Against Perpetuities is concerned with when
interests vest, it does not apply to reversions, their equitable coun-
terparts, resulting trusts, or indefeasibly vested remainders. These
interests satisfy the Rule; they are vested as of their inception.8
Moreover, in the United States, possibilities of reverter and rights
of entry for condition broken have generally been held to be ex-
empt from the Rule." Unlike the previously mentioned exemp-
tions, however, the exemption for reverters and rights of entry for
condition broken cannot be justified on the basis of sound perpetu-
ities policy. These interests tie up the use of property in a manner
similar to contingent executory interests." Their exempt status,
therefore, is apparently the result of a historical aberration. For
this reason, Florida and a number of other states have enacted
VA. CODE § 36-1-24 (1966). The English cases have been modified by statute as well. See
Perpetuities and Accumulations Act, 1964, c. 55, § 9(1) (England).
56. If a lease is not contingent there is authority that it is valid even though it is limited
to take in possession at a point beyond the permissible perpetuities period. L. SIMES & A.
SMITH, supra note 21, at § 1242. But see J. GRAY, supra note 22, at § 320.1.
57. An "on-completion" lease was held to violate the Rule Against Perpetuities in Hag-
gerty v. City of Oakland, 326 P.2d 957 (Cal. Ct. App. 1958). The California appellate court
rejected the argument that the court should read into the agreement the unstated condition
that the building must be completed within a reasonable time-a period which counsel ar-
gued would necessarily be less than 21 years. Id. at 965-66. This argument was subsequently
accepted in Wong v. DiGrazia, 35 Cal. Rptr. 241 (Cal. 1963). In that case, the California
Supreme Court eviscerated the earlier Haggerty decision by disapproving that decision's
rejection of the reasonable time argument. Id. at 250. Similar results have been reached in
other contingent lease cases. See, e.g., Isen v. Giant Food, Inc., 295 F.2d 136 (D.C. Cir. 1961)
(lease contingent on favorable zoning held to require that zoning occur within a reasonable
period of less than 21 years); Singer Co. v. Makad, Inc., 518 P.2d 493 (Kan. 1974) (lease
contingent on completion of shopping center held to include implied condition that comple-
tion occur within a reasonable period of less than 21 years). But see First & C Corp. v.
Wencke, 61 Cal. Rptr. 531 (Cal. Ct. App. 1967); Southern Airways Co. v. De Kalb County,
115 S.E.2d 207 (Ga. Ct. App. 1960), rev'd on other grounds, 116 S.E.2d 602 (Ga. 1960).
58. J. GRAy, supra note 22, at § 205; L. SIMEs & A. SMITH, supra note 21, at § 1235.
59. 6 A.L.P., supra note 23, at § 24.62; RESTATEmENT OF PROPERTY § 372 (1944); L. SiMES
& A. SMITH, supra note 21, at §§ 1238, 1239.
In England, the right of entry for condition broken was made subject to the Rule by the
Law of Property Act, 1925, § 4(3). Even before that, however, these interests had been sub-
jected to the Rule by case decision. See J. GRAY, supra note 22, at §§ 300-302; J. MoRRIs &
W. LEACH, supra note 23, at 210-11. In 1964, the Rule was similarly extended to possibilities
of reverter. Perpetuities and Accumulations Act, 1964, c. 55, § 12 (England).
60. See, e.g., Leach, Perpetuities in Perspective: Ending the Rule's Reign of Terror, 65
HARv. L. REV. 721, 739-45 (1952).
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statutes placing temporal restrictions on the duration of reverters
and rights of entry for condition broken."'
Finally, charitable transfers are also said to be exempt from the
Rule Against Perpetuities. Perhaps it would be more accurate to
say that they are partially exempt. The Rule requires even a chari-
table transfer to vest initially in the transferee within the permissi-
ble perpetuities period. However, once this occurs, a gift may be
validly limited from one charity to another charity upon the hap-
pening of a remote event or contingency. 2
2. Statutory Exemptions from the Florida Rule
Portions of three of the seven subsections of chapter 77-23 are
concerned exclusively with the scope of Florida's statutory Rule
Against Perpetuities. Of all of chapter 77-23, these provisions
promise to be some of the most important. Within them are found
exemptions for all interests that were valid under prior law, ex-
emptions for a variety of commercial transactions, exemptions for
most discretionary powers held by trustees and a conflict of laws
provision which ensures that Florida's Rule Against Perpetuities
applies to foreign trusts containing Florida real estate.
a. Interests Valid Under Prior Law
(3) APPLICATION OF RULE.-
(a) The rule against perpetuities does not apply to:
1. Any disposition of property or interest therein, which dis-
position, as of the effective date of this section, does not violate,
or is exempted by statute from the operation of, the common-law
rule against perpetuities.
61. The most common time limit is 30 years. Ky. RFv. STAT. § 381.219 (1972) (applying
to rights of entry only); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 184A, § 3 (West 1977); MICH. CoMP.
LAWS ANN. §§ 554.61-.62 (Supp. 1982-1983); NeB. REv. STAT. § 76-2102 (1981). In two states
the duration of these interests is limited to 30 years only if the limitation creating them
does not expressly require the condition to occur, if at all, within the perpetuities period.
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 45-97 (West 1981); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 33, § 103 (1964).
Florida and Rhode Island have time limitations shorter than 30 years. FLA. STAT. § 689.18
(1981) (21 years); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 34-4-19 (1969) (20 years). Illinois has a longer time
period. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 30, § 37e (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1983-1984) (40 years).
The Florida statute has been declared unconstitutional to the extent that it applies to
interests created before its enactment. Biltmore Village, Inc. v. Royal, 71 So. 2d 727 (Fla.
1954).
62. 6 A.L.P., supra note 23, at §§ 24.38-.40; J. GRAY, supra note 22, at §§ 592-597; J.
MORRIS & W. LEACH, supra note 23, at 188-91; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY § 1.6
(1983) (Donative Transfers); L. SIMeS & A. SMITH, supra note 21, at §§ 1280, 1281.
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This subsection ensures the remedial nature of chapter 77-23 by
exempting from the statutory Rule any interest that, as of January
1, 1979, does not violate the common-law Rule. This of course in-
cludes those interests previously discussed that either were exempt
from or satisfied the requirements of the common-law Rule
Against Perpetuities. Additionally, Florida presently has four sepa-
rate statutory provisions which provide exemptions for various
types of transactions. The exempted transactions include: (1) con-
veyances of corporate stock by a corporation created for, and en-
gaged solely in, the operation of a hospital; 3 (2) honorary trusts
created for the care of burial grounds and church yards;6"' (3) trusts
created as part of employee deferred compensation plans;65 and (4)
rights given any person or entity by a declaration of condominium
for the purpose of allowing unit owners to retain reasonable control
over the use, occupancy, and transfer of condominiums.6
b. Transactions Arising in a Commercial Setting
As previously indicated, specifically enforceable contracts create
equitable property interests to which the common-law Rule
Against Perpetuities has been applied. Nevertheless, most of these
contracts arise in a commercial setting where policies of the Rule
relating to the balancing of the interests of living and past genera-
tions have no relevance. Accordingly, the only policy justification
for applying the Rule to a commercial transaction would be one
founded on the furtherance of alienability for the sake of produc-
tivity. Recognizing this, courts in this country have fashioned the
aforementioned exemptions for options to purchase appendant to
leases and for options to renew leases. These options, although spe-
cifically enforceable, further the commercial use of property rather
than restrict it. Apart from these well-established exemptions,
however, courts have been more myopic in their approach to the
Rule as it relates to commercial transactions. Most have adhered
to the overly formalistic view that specifically enforceable con-
tracts are interests in property; ipso facto the Rule applies to
them. 7
This process is graphically illustrated by the recent Florida deci-
63. FLA. STAT. § 155.02 (1981).
64. FLA. STAT. § 689.13 (1981).
65. FLA. STAT. §§ 441.01-.02 (1981).
66. FLA. STAT. § 718.104(5) (1981).
67. See Leach, supra note 60, at 736-39.
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sion Watergate Corporation v. Reagan,68 in which the Fourth Dis-
trict Court of Appeal held a pre-emptive purchase option subject
to the Rule Against Perpetuities even though the court found that
it did not restrain alienability. With respect, these conclusions are
patently incongruous. If an agreement does not adversely impact
on alienability, it should be upheld regardless of its duration. To
the extent that the Rule Against Perpetuities applies to this type
of agreement, it needlessly interferes with a freely bargained-for
arrangement. If, on the other hand, an agreement does hamper
alienability, some form of judicial restriction on its duration may
be warranted. It is doubtful, however, that the Rule Against Perpe-
tuities is an appropriate tool for this purpose. The ability of a com-
petent draftsperson to extend the permissible perpetuities period
through the use of unrelated measuring lives makes the perpetu-
ities period arbitrary and, at its maximum potential length, exces-
sive for transactions arising in a commercial setting.69 What is
needed is an easily understood rule which balances the benefits to
society that arise from commercial contractual arrangements with
the potential evil they produce through restrained alienability.
Wherever the line is to be drawn, it would only be by chance that
the Rule Against Perpetuities would draw it at the correct place.
There is a second reason why the Rule Against Perpetuities is a
poor tool for monitoring the duration of commercial arrangements.
It is established dogma that when the orthodox Rule is violated,
the offending interest is void ab initio.7o Whatever merit this ap-
proach has in other situations, there is nothing that can be said for
it when the subject is a freely bargained-for commercial agreement.
Assuming arguendo that a particular commercial arrangement im-
pairs alienability, it should be valid for as long as its commercial
utility outweighs its adverse impact on alienability and invalid
only after that time. 1
Chapter 77-23 includes four separate provisions dealing with
commercial arrangements. In general, these provisions exempt the
arrangements to which they apply from all restrictions as to dura-
tion. There are two exceptions. Because they have some potential
68. 321 So. 2d 133 (Fla. 4th DCA 1975).
69. See 6 A.L.P., supra note 23, at § 24.56; LAW REFORM COMM. REP., supra note 38, at
19; Leach, supra note 60, at 737-38.
70. L. SI s & A. SMITH, supra note 21, at § 1256. Accord 6 A.L.P., supra note 23, at §
24.47; J. GRAY, supra note 22, at §§ 247-248; J. MoRRis & W. LEACH, supra note 23, at 164.
71. 6 A.L.P., supra note 23, at § 24.56, LAW REFORM COMM. REP., supra note 38, at 19-
20; L. SIMES & A. SMITH, supra note 21, at § 1244; Schuyler, supra note 22, at 707.
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adverse impact on alienation, a forty-year restriction applies to the
duration of in gross options to purchase property and to the period
during which leases limited to commence in the future must take
in possession.
1) Leases Commencing in Futuro
(3) APPLICATION OF RULE.-
(a) The rule against perpetuities does not apply to:
5. Leases to commence in the future or upon the happening of
a future event, but no such lease is valid unless the term thereof
actually commences in possession within 40 years from the date
of execution of the lease.
Suppose an owner of undeveloped real property plans to build
an office building or a shopping center and, once completed, to
lease it to commercial tenants. It is likely that the person provid-
ing the risk capital for construction will want early assurance that
the venture will prove to be financially successful. One method by
which this assurance can be effectuated would be for the owner to
enter into "on-completion" leases with potential tenants.72 The
leases would be made contingent on the completion of the building
or shopping center complex. However, some courts have voided
leases of this type unless they are certain to commence in posses-
sion within the permissible period of the Rule.7 s
Properly analyzed, contingent leases are "Janus-faced." The un-
certainty that surrounds the contingent leasehold estate has a po-
tential for impairing the alienability of the fee interest. At the
same time, it must be recognized that most such leases arise in a
commercial setting and the very transaction that impairs the alien-
ability of the fee estate increases the ability of the owner to make
his property productive. Accordingly, while some restriction on
their duration may be warranted, they should not be void ab initio
72. As an alternative, the lease agreement could be structured as a present lease with
possession and the obligation to pay rent contingently postponed until the completion of the
project. As a present lease, this agreement would be "vested in interest" as of the date of its
creation. It would be valid even though possession of the leasehold and the rent obligation
were postponed beyond the perpetuities period. E.g., Francis v. Superior Oil Co., 102 F.2d
732 (10th Cir. 1939). Accordingly, the voiding of contingent leases commencing in futuro
exalts form over substance by "punishing" property owners whose attorneys are not suffi-
ciently familiar with the intricacies of the Rule to draft lease agreements that comply with
its technical requirements. Leach, Perpetuities: New Absurdity, Judicial and Statutory
Correctives, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1318, 1321 (1960).
73. See supra note 57.
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merely because they might last too long.
Under subsection (3)(a)5, leases commencing in futuro are ex-
empt from the statutory Rule. Because these leases do involve
some restraint on alienation, however, the subsection requires
them to commence in possession within forty years7 4 of their exe-
cution. Regardless of their maximum potential period of contin-
gency, leases which actually commence in possession within the
forty-year period are valid. Only those which actually remain con-
tingent for longer than forty years are void. Because forty years is
more than enough time for the construction of even the most am-
bitious project, virtually all "on-completion" leases should be
effective.
2) Non-Disturbance Agreements
(3) APPLICATION OF THE RULE.-
(a) The rule against perpetuities does not apply to:
6. Commitments by a lessor to enter into a lease with a sub-
tenant or with the holder of a leasehold mortgage or commit-
ments by a lessee or sublessee to enter into a lease with the
holder of a leasehold mortgage.
Subsection (3)(a)6 is modeled after a substantially identical pro-
vision of the Illinois perpetuities reform statute.7 It is concerned
with a type of agreement employed in commercial lease transac-
tions to which even the relaxed rule of subsection (3)(a)5 is too
strict.
Often it is to the advantage of owners of leased property to allow
their tenants to enter into favorable subleases. However, any po-
tential sublessee is likely to want some assurance from the fee
owner or his tenant that his possession will remain undisturbed
upon termination of the original lease or upon a foreclosure of an
unsubordinated mortgage on the fee or leasehold interests. This as-
surance is typically provided through an agreement between the
fee owner, his lessee, or the holder of any potential subleases, as
the case may be, providing that the possession of the sublessees
will remain undisturbed if the lessee's lease terminates or if an un-
74. See infra note 87 for a discussion of the appropriateness of a 40-year limitation as
opposed to some other, such as 21 years.
75. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 30, § 194(a)(6) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1983-1984). The Illinois provi-
sion is discussed in Schuyler, supra note 36, at 36-37. Points made in the text concerning
the justification and application of subsection (3)(a)6 are based on Professor Schuyler's
article.
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subordinated mortgage is foreclosed.
The drafters of the Illinois provision recognized that these so-
called "non-disturbance agreements" probably present no perpetu-
ities problems.7 6 Nevertheless, they are specifically enforceable,
and it is possible that a court might view them as creating future
interests in property contingent on the lessee's execution of a sub-
lease. Were this view adopted, a non-disturbance agreement would
be void under subsection (3)(a)5 where the original lease had a du-
ration in excess of forty years and the attempt to execute a sub-
lease occurred after that time.
This is too harsh a result. Neither the alienability of the fee in-
terest nor that of the leasehold interest is more restricted when a
non-disturbance agreement is executed than when there is no such
agreement. Actually, alienability is furthered in the former case be-
cause advantageous subleases are more likely to occur with one
than without. Therefore, subsection (3)(a)6 exempts this type of
agreement from both the statutory Rule and from the forty-year
limitation otherwise applicable to leases commencing in futuro.
3) Purchase Options
(3) APPLICATION OF RULE.-
(a) The rule against perpetuities does not apply to:
7. Options to purchase in gross or in a lease or preemptive
rights in the nature of a right of first refusal, but no option in
gross is valid for more than 40 years from the date of its creation.
Whether an option to purchase property restrains alienability
depends on the type of option involved and, in some cases, on the
relationship of the option price to the value of the subject property
at the time of exercise. As has been noted, options to purchase ap-
pendant to a leasehold interest render property more productive.
They enable leasehold owners to make necessary capital improve-
ments free from the fear of forfeiture at the end of the lease. As a
result, these options have not been subjected to the Rule Against
Perpetuities in this country.
In contrast, options in gross clearly restrict the alienability of
the property to which they apply. As long as the option remains
outstanding, the class of potential purchasers is effectively limited
to the option holder. Other potential purchasers may be scarce.
Who would want an interest that could be terminated unilaterally
76. Schuyler, supra note 36, at 37.
1984]
788 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 11:767
at the option of someone else?77 Moreover, if the exercise price of
an option does not fluctuate with increases in the value of the sub-
ject property, productivity is potentially impaired. An owner may
not be inclined to invest in the capital improvements necessary to
make his property productive.7 Nevertheless, because options in
gross serve useful objectives and because they are invariably used
in commercial transactions to which both the result of the Rule
and its permissible perpetuities period are inappropriate, subsec-
tion (3)(a)7 exempts them from the statutory Rule. At the same
time, because these options do involve some restraint on alienabil-
ity, their duration is limited to a period of forty years from their
creation. Under the subsection, options in gross are not void ab
initio merely because they might be exercised beyond the forty-
year period. They are invalid if, and only to the extent, they re-
main unexercised beyond that time.
Subsection (3)(a)7 also exempts pre-emptive rights, thereby re-
versing the holding of Watergate Corp. v. Reagan, referred to pre-
viously. While some pre-emptive rights are "in gross" in the sense
that they are not appendant to an interest in land, a careful read-
ing of subsection (3)(a)7 makes it clear that the forty-year limita-
tion applicable to options in gross is limited to nonappendant op-
tions in the nature of a call. According to the subsection, pre-
emptive rights "in the nature of a right of first refusal" are treated
separately. They are exempt both from the statutory Rule Against
Perpetuities and from the forty-year limitation.79 This more leni-
ent treatment is justified on the basis that, as long as the exercise
price of a pre-emptive right is equal to fair market or appraisal
value on the date the right is to be exercised, the existence of the
right has no adverse impact on productivity or alienability.80
Knowing that any resulting increase in value would be reflected in
the price he would receive at exercise, an owner of property subject
to such a right would freely make necessary capital improvements.
Similarly, the property owner would not be impeded from selling.
If the option holder chose not to exercise his pre-emptive right, the
77. A purchaser might be interested if he could also buy the option itself. However, un-
certainty about the identity and whereabouts of the option holder may make this difficult.
LAw REFORM COMM. REP., supra note 38, at 18-19; Browder, Restraints on the Alienation of
Condominium Units (The Right of First Refusal), 1970 U. ILL. L.F. 231, 238.
78. 6 A.L.P., supra note 23, at § 24.56; Berg, Long-Term Options and the Rule Against
Perpetuities, 37 CALIF. L. REV. 419, 422 (1949).
79. The identical Illinois provision has been similarly interpreted. See Schuyler, supra
note 36, at 38.
80. Berg, supra note 78, at 439.
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property could be sold at full value to some other purchaser.
There is one situation where the above analysis does not ap-
ply-where a pre-emptive right does impair alienability. If the con-
tract calls for an exercise price that is not equal to market or ap-
praisal value at the time of exercise, some restraint on alienability
occurs."' If the property increases in value, the owner would not
offer it for sale; to do so he would run the risk that the option
holder would exercise his right to buy at the less-than-market
price. Additionally, this type of pre-emptive right impairs produc-
tivity. A property owner would not be inclined to make additional
capital investments where the value of those investments could not
be recovered when the property is sold.
The economic self-interest of contracting parties normally en-
courages either exercise prices equal to the full value of the prop-
erty at the time of exercise or pre-emption contracts of short dura-
tion. However, fixed-price pre-emptive right contracts of unlimited
duration are not uncommon. Considering the fact that all pre-
emptive rights, not just those calling for a market or appraisal
value exercise price, are exempt from Florida's statutory Rule
Against Perpetuities, the question arises whether pre-emptive
rights should have been subjected to the forty-year limitation ap-
plicable to options in gross.
Were the total exemption provided by subsection (3)(a)7 to leave
pre-emptive rights completely uncontrolled in our legal system, the
answer to the proffered question might be yes. However, the com-
mon-law Rule Against Unreasonable Restraints on Alienation also
applies to some pre-emptive rights. Florida law on this point fol-
lows the Restatement of Property. If a pre-emptive right has an
exercise price necessarily equal to the market value of the property
at the time of exercise, it does not constitute an unreasonable re-
straint on alienation."2 Where, however, the exercise price is not
necessarily equal to the market value at the time of exercise, the
option is void under the Rule Against Restraints unless its dura-
tion is limited to a reasonable period.83 Hence, there is no need for
81. Id. See also 6 A.L.P., supra note 23, at § 26.65.
82. See Watergate Corp. v. Reagan, 321 So. 2d 133 (Fla. 4th DCA 1975); Blair v. Kings-
ley, 128 So. 2d 889 (Fla. 2d DCA 1961); RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 413(1) (1944). RE-
STATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY § 4.4 (1983) (Donative Transfers) implies that a pre-emp-
tive right at market value might constitute an unreasonable restraint on alienation if the
time allowed for its exercise is unreasonable.
83. Iglehart v. Phillips, 383 So. 2d 610 (Fla. 1980); accord RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY §
413(2) (1944).
Normally, a direct restraint on a legal fee interest is void regardless of its duration. 6
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a separate forty-year restriction.
At this point, the need for a forty-year limitation for in gross
options may be questioned. If the self-interests of the contracting
parties and the common-law Rule Against Unreasonable Restraints
on Alienation suffice to protect society's interests with regard to
pre-emptions, why do they not suffice for options in gross? Profes-
sor Leach suggested they might. " However, there are important
differences between pre-emptions and options in gross. All options
in gross, even those at market or appraisal value, impair alienabil-
ity and productivity. Thus, the potential adverse impact of these
options is greater. More importantly, there are problems with rely-
ing on the common-law Rule Against Unreasonable Restraints on
Alienation to police options in gross that do not exist for pre-emp-
tive rights.
The Rule Against Restraints applies to direct restraints on alien-
ation.88 While many courts, including those of Florida, have had
little difficulty in bringing pre-emptive rights within this classifica-
tion (usually without discussion), far fewer courts have held that
options in gross constitute a direct restraint within the purview of
the Rule Against Restraints." Thus, the safer course would appear
A.L.P., supra note 23, at §§ 26.16, .19, .24; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY §§ 4.1-.3
(1983) (Donative Transfers); L. SIMES & A. SMITH, supra note 21, at §§ 1143, 1149. Pre-
emptive rights are an exception. Most authorities consider the duration of a pre-emptive
right as a factor to be taken into account in determining whether the restraint is reasonable.
See, e.g., Iglehart, 383 So. 2d at 610; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY § 4.4 (1983)
(Donative Transfers); L. SiMEs & A. SMITH, supra note 21, at § 1154.
Although subsection (3)(a)7 of chapter 77-23 permits options in gross to endure for 40
years, it does not necessarily follow that fixed-price pre-emptive rights which are limited in
duration to 40 or less years would be valid under the common-law Rule Against Unreasona-
ble Restraints on Alienation. Chapter 77-23 does not concern this latter rule and the Florida
case law on what constitutes a reasonable restraint in this context is not clearly defined. The
only certain way to ensure the validity of a pre-emptive right is to specify an exercise price
that will equal the market or appraisal value of the property at the time of exercise.
84. Leach, supra note 60, at 737.
85. See generally 6 A.L.P., supra note 23, at §§ 26.1-.132; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
PROPERTY §§ 4.1-.5 (1983) (Donative Transfers); RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY §§ 404-417
(1944); L. SIMES & A. SMITH, supra note 21, at §§ 1111-1117, 1131-1171. According to Simes,
a direct restraint on alienation is "a provision in a deed, will, contract or other instrument
which, by its express terms, or by implication of fact, purports to prohibit or penalize the
exercise of the power of alienation." L. SIMEs & A. SMITH, supra note 21, at § 1112.
86. Four Florida cases have considered the validity of options as opposed to pre-emptive
rights. None has held squarely that the Rule Against Restraints on Alienation applies to
them. In three of these cases, the issue was either not raised at all or it was not raised in a
timely manner. See MacArthur v. North Palm Beach Util., Inc., 202 So. 2d 181 (Fla. 1967);
Warren v. City of Leesburg, 203 So. 2d 522 (Fla. 2d DCA 1967); Wing, Inc. v. Arnold, 107
So. 2d 765 (Fla. 3d DCA 1958). In the fourth case, Genet v. Florida E. Coast Ry., 150 So. 2d
272 (Fla. 3d DCA 1963), the court was faced with the validity of an option to repurchase in
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to be that taken in subsection (3)(a)7-to limit the duration of
these transactions to a set period. 7
c. Mandatory and Discretionary Powers of Trustees
A power which enables its holder to alter the beneficial enjoy-
ment of property is subject to the Rule Against Perpetuities.s8
Where the power is exercisable only in favor of a group of persons
that is not unreasonably large and which does not include its
holder, it is void from its inception at common law unless the pe-
riod in which it may be exercised is circumscribed to the permissi-
ble perpetuities period.8' To most readers, the special power of ap-
the form of a condition subsequent-that is, a right of entry. The agreement in question
provided in part:
As a part of the consideration for this deed it is mutually agreed between the
parties that the land hereby conveyed will be used for the construction of a ware-
house and business facilities for grantees [sic] own use and for no other purpose.
In the event said property is not developed for such use within two years.. ., said
property shall become at the option of grantor, re-sold to the grantor for the origi-
nal purchase price, plus the amount of all ad valorem taxes paid by grantee on
said property.
Id. at 273.
In the course of its opinion the court indicated that it believed that the option agreement
might have violated the Rule Against Unreasonable Restraints. Id. at 274-75. Upon close
examination, however, it was the requirement that the land be used only by the grantees
and only for a restricted purpose which gave the court concern, not the potential impact
that the option itself had on alienability. Id. at 274. That is, there is nothing in the opinion
to suggest that the court believed that an option agreement without the restriction on own-
ership and use would have raised an issue under the Rule Against Unreasonable Restraints
on Alienation.
87. An in gross limitation for all options other than those appendant to leases was one of
the recommendations of the English Law Reform Committee. See LAW REFORM COMM. REP.,
supra note 38, at 18-20.
Assuming some restriction on the duration of in gross options is warranted, the appropri-
ateness of a 40-year limitation may be raised. Under chapter 77-23, the same period is used
for options in gross as is used for contingent future leases. In the abstract, the limitation in
both cases should be sufficiently long to ensure the validity of these arrangements for as
long as their commercial utility outweighs their adverse impact on alienability, but not so
long as to permit abuse by overreaching property owners. The framers of the Illinois perpe-
tuities statute from which subsections (3)(a)5 and (3)(a)7 were derived, chose a 40-year pe-
riod. See ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 30, § 194(a)(5), (7) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1983-1984). The choice
of 40 years was influenced by the similar restriction Illinois places on the duration of pos-
sibilities of reverter and rights of entry. See Schuyler, supra note 36, at 36. On this basis a
21-year period would have been more appropriate for Florida. See FLA. STAT. § 689.18
(1981).
88. See generally 6 A.L.P., supra note 23, at §§ 24.30-.36; J. MORRIs & W. LEACH, supra
note 23, at 134-63; RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY §§ 390-392 (1944); L. SIMES & A. SMITH,
supra note 21, at §§ 1271-1272.
89. 6 A.L.P., supra note 23, at § 24.32; J. GRAY, supra note 22, at § 473; L. SIMEs & A.
SMITH, supra note 21, at § 1273.
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pointment will be the most familiar power of this type. At this
juncture, however, our concern is limited to other less familiar ex-
amples. While it may not be common to view them as such, some
of the powers a trustee has to effectively execute a trust meet the
above criteria for powers to which the Rule applies.
Fiduciary powers are either administrative or distributive in
character. Powers to sell, lease or mortgage trust property or to
allocate receipts and expenditures between the income and princi-
pal accounts fit within the administrative category.90 Distributive
powers include discretionary as well as mandatory powers to allo-
cate trust income and principal. Both categories of fiduciary pow-
ers are exercisable only for the benefit of a limited group of per-
sons (the trust beneficiaries) which usually does not include the
powers' holder (the trustee). Additionally, both types of powers
permit a trustee to alter the beneficial interests of trust property
to varying extents.91 Accordingly, in this country and elsewhere,
fiduciary allocation powers are void in their inception if it is possi-
ble that they might be exercised beyond the period of the Rule." A
similar result has been reached in the English decisions involving
fiduciary administrative powers.s
Normally, when a power is given to a person who is alive at the
time the instrument creating it takes effect, no perpetuities viola-
tion can occur. A power is generally personal to its holder. It termi-
nates at his death. A fortiori, where a power is given to a living
person, it cannot be exercised at a remote time. However, fiduciary
powers involve unique considerations. These powers usually attach
to the fiduciary office, not to the particular person occupying that
office at any given time." As a result, the potential duration of the
90. Broad administrative powers are authorized by statute in many states. In Florida, for
example, absent a provision in the trust instrument to the contrary, a trustee has the au-
thority to sell trust assets and to reinvest the proceeds, to mortgage or lease trust property
and to allocate items of receipts and expenditures between the income and principal ac-
counts of the trust. FLA. STAT. § 737.402(f), (h), (k) & (v) (1981).
91. To the extent that administrative powers allow a trustee either directly or indirectly
to shift receipts and expenses between the income and principal accounts, the interests of
the trust beneficiaries may be altered.
92. 6 A.L.P., supra note 23, § 24.32; J. MoRRs & W. LEACH, supra note 23, at 134-35; L.
SImEs & A. SMrrH, supra note 21, at § 1277.
93. The cases are discussed in J. GRAv, supra note 22, at §§ 487-509.11 (see particularly
§§ 509.1-.11). Recently, the treatment of fiduciary administrative powers in England has
been modified by statute. Perpetuities and Accumulations Act, 1964, c. 55, § 8 (England).
94. 3 A. ScoTrr, THE LAw OF TRuSTS § 196 (3d ed. 1967); RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF
TRUSTS § 196 (1957). By statute in Florida, a successor personal representative has all the
powers of his predecessor in office except those that are made personal to the initial office
holder. FLA. STAT. § 733.614 (1981). There is no similar statute for trustees. But the identi-
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trust in which they are included can be critical to their validity.
The voiding of fiduciary powers under the Rule Against Perpetu-
ities solely because they are included in a trust instrument having
a maximum potential duration in excess of the permissible perpe-
tuities period is yet another example of a situation where the com-
mon-law Rule has exceeded its legitimate jurisdiction. A careful
analysis of the policies the Rule seeks to advance demonstrates
that fiduciary powers should not be subject to the Rule at all. The
appropriate analysis varies somewhat with the type of power under
consideration. At the outset, however, it is important to recognize
that when a fiduciary power violates the Rule, the usual result is
that only the power is void; the trust itself remains otherwise
valid.9 5 It is therefore difficult to justify an application of the Rule
to any fiduciary power on the basis of policies relating to dead-
hand control; the consequence of the application would be largely
irrelevant to that policy. It would not necessarily eliminate the
principal vehicle for the perpetuation of that control-the trust
itself.
That leaves as potential policy justifications either a policy in
favor of the alienability of the specific property held in trust or a
similar policy in favor of the alienability of the equitable interests
in the hands of the trust beneficiaries. For reasons explained more
fully below, it is the premise of three of the exemption provisions
in chapter 77-23 that neither of these policies is sufficient to war-
rant subjecting fiduciary powers to the Rule Against Perpetuities.
1) Administrative Powers
(3) APPLICATION OF RULE.-
(a) The rule against perpetuities does not apply to:
2. Powers of a trustee to sell, lease, or mortgage property or
which relate to the administration or management of trust assets,
including, without limitation, discretionary powers to determine
which receipts constitute principal and which receipts constitute
income and powers to appoint a successor trustee.
The first of the three exemption provisions covers the adminis-
trative powers of a trustee. In the third edition of his book, Gray
cal rule has been judicially accepted. Unless a power was given to a trustee because of the
personal confidence the settlor had in him, powers attach to the fiduciary office and may be
exercised by a successor trustee. Van Roy v. Hoover, 117 So. 887 (Fla. 1928); Stearns v.
Fraleigh, 23 So. 18 (Fla. 1897); In re Serrill's Estate, 159 So. 2d 246 (Fla. 2d DCA 1964).
95. See J. MORRIS & W. LEACH, supra note 23, at 143-46.
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likened these powers to special powers of appointment. In his view,
a trustee's power to sell or to lease trust property or to appoint a
successor trustee was void in its inception unless its duration was
circumscribed either directly or by proper construction to the per-
missible perpetuities period." This position was subsequently ac-
cepted by courts in England and other Commonwealth
jurisdictions."
Fortunately, Gray's treatment of administrative powers has not
gained acceptance on this side of the Atlantic. Courts in several
American states have held these powers to be exempt from the
Rule. 98 These holdings are reflected in American treatises, all of
which state categorically that in this country the Rule Against Per-
petuities does not apply to fiduciary administrative powers."s As
Gray's nephew ultimately conceded,100 this is clearly the preferable
view.
No viable policy objective is served by subjecting administrative
powers to the Rule. Any impact these powers might have on the
alienability of the equitable interests would be de minimus. Ad-
ministrative powers do not permit a trustee to alter the relative
interests of trust beneficiaries to any significant extent. Further-
more, the authority a trustee has to exercise administrative powers
is circumscribed by his overall fiduciary duty to manage the trust
property in a manner that is fair to all beneficiaries. More impor-
tantly, when attention is focused on the alienability of the specific
assets in the trust, rather than on the equitable interests, it seems
clear that these powers facilitate rather than impede alienability
by making it easier and less expensive for a trustee to effectuate a
desirable sale or to otherwise make trust property productive.10
Prior to the enactment of chapter 77-23, the status of adminis-
trative powers in Florida was unclear. While no Florida court had
subjected them to the Rule, no Florida court had squarely ex-
empted them either. The importance of the question and the lack
96. See J. GRAY, THE RuLE AGAINST PmPgruriTss §§ 473-506 (3d ed. 1915).
97. E.g., In re Allott, 2 Ch. D. 498 (1924) (power of leasing); Davis v. Samuel, 28 N.S.W.
1 (1926) (power of sale). These and other administrative power cases are discussed in J.
GRAY, supra note 22, at §§ 509.1-.11.
98. Butler v. Butler, 114 N.W.2d 595 (Iowa 1962); Melvin v. Hoffman, 235 S.W. 107 (Mo.
1921); Kendall v. Kendall, 261 P.2d 422 (Wash. 1953).
99. See, e.g., 6 A.L.P., supra note 23, at § 24.63; 5 R. POWELL, supra note 21, at 1 772[4];
RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 382 (1944); L. SimEs & A. SMITH, supra note 21, at § 1277.
100. J. GRAY, supra note 22, at § 509.18. The fourth edition of Gray's work was pub-
lished after his death. It was edited by his nephew, Roland Gray.
101. See Leach, supra note 47, at 952-53.
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of authority in Florida made it desirable to settle the issue. Any
possible doubt has now been eliminated by subsection (3)(a)2. This
exemption provision expressly mentions all those powers which
previously concerned courts and perpetuities scholars. Moreover,
the wording of the provision is sufficiently broad to demonstrate a
legislative intent to exempt all purely administrative powers from
Florida's statutory Rule Against Perpetutities.102
2) Powers to Distribute to Beneficiaries Having Indefeasibly
Vested Interests
(3) APPLICATION OF RULE.-
(a) The rule against perpetuities does not apply to:
3. Mandatory powers of a trustee to distribute income, or dis-
cretionary powers of a trustee to distribute principal, prior to ter-
mination of the trust, to a beneficiary having an interest in the
principal, which interest is irrevocably vested in quality and
quantity.
Suppose T dies with a will in which he leaves the residue of his
estate in trust to pay the income to his wife for life; then to pay
the income to such of his children as are from time to time living;
and at the death of the last child, to distribute the trust principal
per stirpes to T's then-living lineal descendants. The end limita-
tion to T's lineal descendants is valid.103 It will "vest in possession"
at the death of T's last child, who by definition would be a life in
being at T's death. For similar reasons, this trust must terminate
before the permissible perpetuities period expires. However, the
termination of this trust may involve consequences which run
counter to the natural desires of many settlors. By calling for a
distribution to lineal descendants at the death of the last of T's
children, the termination distribution may occur when one or more
of Ts lineal descendants is a minor or, even though of legal age, is
not sufficiently mature to assume the responsibilities of outright
ownership. Thus, in many trust instruments it is common to find
an additional provision designed to prevent this possibility. As-
suming the settlor wishes to postpone distribution until the takers
attain the age of twenty-five, the provision might read something
102. Similar statutory provisions may be found in Illinois, Pennsylvania, and in several
Commonwealth nations. See, e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 30, § 194(a)(2) (Smith-Hurd Supp.
1983-1984); 20 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6104(b)(4) (Purdon 1975); Perpetuities and Accumu-
lations Act, 1964, c. 55, § 8 (England).
103. RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 386 & comment g (1944).
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like this:
If, under the previous provisions of this trust instrument, the
Trustee is directed to distribute a share of trust principal to a
beneficiary who is under the age of twenty-five years when the
distribution is to be made, the share shall vest in interest in the
beneficiary indefeasibly, but the Trustee may in his discretion
continue to hold the share in trust until the beneficiary attains
age twenty-five. In the meantime, the Trustee shall distribute the
net income currently, together with so much of the principal of
the share as he deems necessary for the beneficiary's comfortable
support, care, and benefit.
A clause of this type solves the problem of premature distribu-
tions. It also has the effect of extending the maximum potential
duration of r's trust to a point beyond which the Rule Against
Perpetuities requires interests to vest. 10 Nevertheless, the end lim-
itation in favor of T's descendants remains valid.105 The suggested
provision specifically provides that the interest of each taker is to
indefeasibly "vest in interest" at the death of the last child of T (a
life in being). Vesting is therefore timely; only possession is
postponed.
On the other hand, the validity of the powers given to the trus-
tee in the above clause is less certain. It is possible that some court
might subject them to the Rule Against Perpetuities.'" If so, the
powers would be void from their inception at common law. There
is a possibility that they might be exercised beyond the perpetu-
ities period. This would be an inappropriate result. The powers
given to the trustee do not transgress the underlying policies of the
Rule. They do not impair the alienability of the specific property
in the trust. (The trustee is no less able to alienate the trust prop-
erty when these powers exist than he would be were they to be
declared void under the Rule.) Nor do these powers impair the
alienability of the beneficial interests. (They do not permit the
trustee to alter the respective interests of the beneficiaries.)
In the absence of any discernible policy justification for subject-
ing these types of fiduciary powers to the Rule, and in recognition
104. The duration of T's trust would exceed the period of the rule if at the death of the
last child of T a share was set aside for a lineal descendant who was born after T's death
and who was less than four when T's last child died.
105. RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 386 comment j (1944).
106. For a suggestion that the powers in the clause are exempt from the Rule, see J.
Moius & W. LEACH, supra note 23, at 144.
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of their usefulness, subsection (3)(a)3 creates an exemption for
them.10 7 It is immaterial what period of postponed enjoyment is
used; the exemption is unlimited as to time. But note that subsec-
tion (3)(a)3 does not apply to any power which permits a trustee to
shift the beneficial enjoyment of trust principal from one benefi-
ciary to another. The existence of such a power would mean that
the beneficial interests are not "irrevocably vested in quality and
quantity." Instead, powers of this type are treated separately in
subsection (3)(a)4, discussed next. Nor does the exemption appear
to extend to mandatory spray powers, that is, to powers which re-
quire the trustee to distribute all trust income currently but which
give him the discretionary authority to determine the share each of
several beneficiaries is to receive. While mandatory spray powers
over income can be included in an instrument without altering the
fact that the beneficial interests in the principal are "irrevocably
vested in quality and quantity," these powers fit more logically in
subsection (3)(a)4. Therefore, as used in subsection (3)(a)3, the
term "mandatory" should be interpreted to mean that the income
be mandatorily distributable in fixed shares.
3) Discretionary Allocation Powers
(3) APPLICATION OF RULE.-
(a) The rule against perpetuities does not apply to:
4. Discretionary powers of a trustee to allocate income and
principal among beneficiaries, except that any exercise of such
power after the expiration of the period of the rule against perpe-
tuities is void.
Subsection (3)(a)4 is the third of the triumvirate of exemption
provisions dealing with fiduciary powers. 08 According to its terms,
the subsection covers "powers of a trustee to allocate income and
principal among trust beneficiaries." In the more familiar vernacu-
lar of estate planners, subsection (3)(a)4 deals with the distributive
fiduciary powers incident to the discretionary trust. Considering
the significance of the discretionary trust in contemporary estate
planning and the certainty that the common-law Rule applies to
them,'09 subsection (3)(a)4 promises to be the most important of
107. Accord ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 30, § 194(a)(3) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1983-1984).
108. Subsection (3)(a)4 is based on and is virtually identical to ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 30, §
194(a)(4) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1983-1984).
109. See 6 A.L.P., supra note 23, at §§ 24.30, .32; J. GRAY, supra note 22, at §§ 246,
410.1-.5; J. Moinus & W. LACH, supra note 23, at 134-35, 143-44, 177 (Illustrations 16, 17);
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the fiduciary power exemptions.
Like administrative powers and powers to distribute income and
principal to beneficiaries having indefeasibly vested interests, allo-
cation powers do not impair the alienability of specific trust assets.
With legal title in the trustee, the alienability of trusted assets is
unaffected by the existence, duration or extent of the trustee's dis-
cretionary allocation powers. However, unlike other fiduciary pow-
ers, allocation powers do tend to restrict the alienability of the
beneficial interests in trusted property. Predictably, potential pur-
chasers of these interests would be hesitant to purchase any inter-
est that could be diminished or eliminated altogether in the discre-
tion of a trustee.
Because of their adverse impact on alienability, it is tempting to
conclude that fiduciary allocation powers ought to be subject to the
Rule Against Perpetuities. Such a course would not, however,
make beneficial interests any more alienable. The absence of a rec-
ognized market for these interests would render them inalienable
in any event. Moreover, even if a market existed, few beneficial
interests could be alienated; most are subject to valid spendthrift
provisions.110
In recognition of the above, subsection (3)(a)4 removes fiduciary
allocation powers from the reach of the statutory Rule Against
Perpetuities. In doing so, the subsection insures that no fiduciary
allocation power will be void ab initio merely because its maximum
potential duration exceeds the period of the Rule. Correspond-
ingly, the reasonable desires of settlors and decedents will not be
frustrated merely because their attorneys failed to comply with the
needless rigors of the common-law Rule. At the same time, the
final clause of subsection (3)(a)4 seeks to prevent abuses'11 by cir-
L. SIMES & A. SMrrH, supra note 21, at § 1277.
In re Estate of Jones, 318 So. 2d 231 (Fla. 2d DCA 1975), cert. denied, 334 So. 2d 606
(Fla. 1976), involved the residuary trust of Emma Jones. The terms provided inter alia that
at least four percent of the original trust assets were to be distributed each year among a
group of beneficiaries most of which were charities but some of which, under the court's
interpretation of the will, were not. The court held that the trust violated the common-law
Rule Against Perpetuities because its duration (25 years) exceeded the 21-year period in
gross of the Rule.
The result in Jones is correct, but the reasoning is faulty. The trust did not offend the
Rule because of its duration per se. Rather the violation existed because the trustee's power
to select trust beneficiaries was exercisable beyond the permissible perpetuities period.
110. Spendthrift trusts are recognized in Florida. Waterbury v. Munn, 32 So. 2d 603
(Fla. 1947). See also D. LowELL, FLORDA LAW OF TRusTs § 27-1 (2d ed. 1976).
111. When the common-law Rule Against Perpetuities was in force in Florida, an effec-
tive deterrent against unreasonably long trusts existed. Settlors who might have initially
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cumscribing the period in which fiduciary allocation powers may
be exercised. These powers may be exercised only during the per-
petuities period; subsequent exercises are void.
In addition to the power to allocate trust property among benefi-
ciaries, the trustee of the typical discretionary trust has the power
to accumulate income and to add it to the principal. To the extent
that an accumulation power permits a trustee to shift the benefi-
cial enjoyment of trust income among trust beneficiaries, the
power could be said to fall within the reach of the common-law
Rule Against Perpetuities. If so, it would be consistent with the
remedial objective of chapter 77-23, in general, and of subsection
(3)(a)4, in particular, to liberally interpret the term "allocate" as
used in the subsection to include this type of power. However, even
this suggested interpretation would not guarantee the validity of
an accumulation power that is placed in a trust having a maximum
potential duration in excess of lives in being and twenty-one years
because such powers are also subject to the common-law Rule
Against Accumulations." 2 Thus, when drafting trust instruments
where the trustee is to be given authority to accumulate income,
attorneys must take care to ensure that the instrument complies
entertained the idea of continuing their trusts for as long as legally possible found them-
selves deterred by the impact the common-law Rule would have on the primary source of
their trusts' flexibility-the allocation powers of their trustees. To insure compliance with
the common-law Rule, settlors had either to terminate their trusts or their trustees' discre-
tionary allocation powers no later than the end of the permissible perpetuities period. The
latter option frequently resulted in a trust that was too rigid for routine estate planning use.
Had the Florida Legislature merely exempted fiduciary allocation powers from the statu-
tory Rule, without further restricting the period in which these powers could be validly
exercised, the deterrent element of prior law would have been eliminated. The apparent
objective of the final clause of section (3)(a)4 is to prevent this. Even with the restriction,
settlors continue to have the option of extending their trusts beyond the period of the Rule
where other estate planning objectives outweigh the loss of flexibility caused by the termina-
tion of their trustees' allocation powers. But it is to be expected that the loss of flexibility
will deter most settlors from doing this, just as it did under the common-law Rule.
112. The Rule Against Accumulations is in force in Florida although its exact parame-
ters have yet to be definitively settled. See, e.g., Porter v. Baynard, 28 So. 2d 890, 895 (Fla.
1946), cert. denied, 330 U.S. 844 (1947); Pattillo v. Glenn, 7 So. 2d 328, 332 (Fla. 1942),
overruling by implication, Pelton v. First Say. & Trust Co., 124 So. 169 (Fla. 1929); Brown
v. Saake, 190 So. 2d 56, 58 (Fla. 2d DCA 1966).
Assuming Florida follows the common-law Rule Against Accumulations in its orthodox
form, a mandatory or discretionary authority to accumulate income is void in its inception if
the period over which it may be exercised might exceed the period in which interests must
vest under the Rule Against Perpetuities. It is immaterial that the beneficial interests of the
trust in which the accumulation authority is included are vested. See generally 6 A.L.P.,
supra note 23, at § 24.65; RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY §§ 439-444 (1944); L. Siars & A.
SMITH, supra note 21, at §§ 1461-1468.
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with this rule as well.
113
d. Miscellany
In addition to the provisions of subsection (3) dealing with prior
valid interests, commercial transactions and fiduciary powers, two
other subsections of chapter 77-23 are concerned with the scope of
Florida's statutory Rule Against Perpetuities. Subsection (6) clari-
fies what law is to govern foreign trusts that acquire Florida real
property and subsection (7) covers the treatment of real estate in-
vestment trusts. These two provisions are noteworthy only in that
they codify generally accepted law for which there is no specific
prior authority in Florida.
1) Foreign Trusts Containing Florida Real Estate
(6) ACQUISITION OF REAL PROPERTY BY FOREIGN
TRUST.-
If real property situated in this state is acquired by a trust val-
idly created under the law of another jurisdiction, the law of this
state in effect at the time of the acquisition of such property de-
termines whether there is a violation of the rule against perpetu-
ities or whether a direction for the accumulation of rents and
profits is valid.
Under generally accepted conflict of laws principles, the validity
of a devise or conveyance of land is determined by applying the
law of the jurisdiction where the land is situated.114 There is sup-
port for this view in Florida" 5 although no case has been found
involving the validity of an equitable interest in Florida realty
under the Rule Against Perpetuities. Consequently, prior Florida
law is unclear on whether our courts would apply the Florida Rule
Against Perpetuities to Florida real property held in a non-Florida
trust, particularly if there were a choice-of-law clause to the con-
trary in the trust instrument.
113. This problem does not exist under the Illinois counterpart to subsection (3)(a)4. In
Illinois, directions to accumulate are invalid if and only to the extent they last beyond the
period of the Rule Against Perpetuities. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 30, § 153 (Smith-Hurd Supp.
1983-1984). Accord RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY § 2.2(1) (1983) (Donative
Transfers).
114. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 223 (1969).
115. E.g., Connor v. Elliott, 85 So. 164, 165 (Fla. 1920), cert. dismissed, 254 U.S. 665
(1920); Thomson v. Kyle, 23 So. 12, 16 (Fla. 1897); Frazier v. Boggs, 20 So. 245, 248 (Fla.
1896).
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Subsection (6) should settle the issue. It provides that the Flor-
ida Rule Against Perpetuities is applicable to interests in Florida
real estate held in foreign trusts."" The subsection should be con-
strued as a pre-emptive statement of public policy; a choice-of-law
clause to the contrary should not be given effect.
Subsection (6) also makes it clear that it is the law of Florida in
effect at the time that the trust acquires the Florida real property
that is determinative. Thus, the remedial provisions of chapter 77-
23 are applicable to foreign trusts created before January 1, 1979,
to the extent they acquire Florida real property after that date.
2) Trusts with Transferable Trust Certificates (e.g., Real Es-
tate Investment Trusts)
(7) TRUST WITH TRANSFERABLE CERTIFICATES.-
A trust with transferable certificates, heretofore or hereafter
created, is not invalid as violating the rule against perpetuities,
but such trust may continue for such time as is necessary to ac-
complish the purpose for which the trust was created if the in-
strument creating the trust provides that the trust may be termi-
nated at any time by action of the trustees or by affirmative vote
of the beneficiaries having a specified percentage of interest in the
trust. This subsection applies to an investment trust, which is an
unincorporated trust or association managed by trustees, and
which does not hold any property for sale to customers in the
ordinary course of its trade or business, and the beneficial owner-
ship of which trust is evidenced by transferable shares or by
transferable certificates of beneficial interest, which shares or cer-
tificates are offered for sale to the public.
Subsection (7) applies to trusts authorized to do business in
Florida"' that also meet certain additional requirements. Among
these are the requirements that the trust not hold any property for
sale to customers in the ordinary course of a trade or business, that
the beneficial ownership of the trust be evidenced by transferable
shares or certificates and that the shares or certificates be offered
for sale to the public. These requirements derive from the New
116. Subsection (6) is based on and is virtually identical to N.Y. EST. PowERs & TRUSTS
LAW § 9-1.4 (McKinney 1967). Accord 6 A.L.P., supra note 23, at § 24.5A; J. GRAY, supra
note 22, at § 259.1; J. MORRIS & W. LEACH, supra note 23, at 20-21; RESTATEMENT (SEcoND)
OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 278 (1969).
117. See FLA. STAT. §§ 609.01-.08 (1981) for the statutory requirements for such
authorization.
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York statute upon which subsection (7) is based.118
When the New York statute was enacted, the above require-
ments reflected some of the then-applicable conditions for
favorable tax treatment as a real estate investment trust under the
federal Internal Revenue Code.1 9 In 1976, the federal tax laws
were amended to eliminate the absolute prohibition against hold-
ing property for sale in the ordinary course of a trade or busi-
ness.12 0 Hence, this requirement of subsection (7) is somewhat
dated from a tax standpoint. It does, however, continue to serve its
primary function of ensuring that subsection (7) applies only to
"investment" trusts. The subsection was not intended to apply to
trusts created in a donative or estate setting.12 1
Subsection (7) also requires that the trust provide for termina-
tion at any time by action of the trustees or by the affirmative vote
of the beneficiaries owning a specified percentage of interest in the
trust. This is not a requirement of the tax laws. Rather, it is
designed to ensure that there is some method by which the trust
can be terminated before its full business purpose has been accom-
plished.1 22 If the mechanism used is that of an affirmative vote of
the trust beneficiaries, no maximum percentage of interest is set by
subsection (7). A provision stating that termination requires an af-
firmative vote of beneficiaries owning one hundred percent of the
trust would appear to satisfy the subsection. It is to be anticipated,
however, that some lesser percentage would invariably be used as a
means of minimizing the leverage of holdouts.
118. N.Y. EST. PowERS & TRUSTS LAW § 9-1.5 (McKinney 1967). MINN. STAT. ANN. §§
318.01, .02(3)(1) (West 1961); Miss. CODE ANN. § 79-15-21 (1972); S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-53-30
(Law. Co-op. 1976) are similar. Cf. GA. CODE ANN. § 53-12-51 (1982) (in the absence of a
provision in the trust instrument restricting the duration of business trusts to the lives of
designated persons plus 21 years, their duration is restricted to a period of 25 years with a
possible extension for an additional 25 years); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 60, § 172 (West 1971)
(the duration of business trusts must be limited to a period measured by the lives of its
beneficiaries who are alive at its creation or to a definite period not to exceed 21 years with
a possible extension for another definite period of up to 21 years).
119. For the current law relating to Real Estate Investment Trusts, see I.R.C. §§ 856-860
(CCH 1982), discussed in detail in Real Estate Investment Trusts, TAX MGMT. (BNA) 107-
5th (1982).
120. See Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, § 1603(a), 90 Stat. 1748 (1976)
(repealing I.R.C. § 856(a)(4) (1954)).
121. See FOURTH REPORT OF THE NEW YORK TEMPORARY STATE COMMISSION ON MODERNI-
ZATION, REvISION AND SIMPLIFICATION OF THE LAW OF ESTATES 360-61 (1965).
122. This ensures that termination at the request of all trust beneficiaries would not be
prevented by an application of the Claflin doctrine, discussed supra note 28. But see L.
SiMss & A. SMITH, supra note 21, at § 1393 (indicating that the Claflin doctrine does not
apply to business trusts).
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Assuming a trust meets the requirements of subsection (7), it is
exempt by virtue of that provision from Florida's statutory Rule
Against Perpetuities. This exemption is not particularly signifi-
cant. The beneficial interests of a business trust are vested as of
their creation. Accordingly, the authorities are unanimous that
even a perpetual business trust would not violate the common-law
Rule.128 There is concern, however, that such a trust might violate
a somewhat related rule that is sometimes cast under the rubric of
the Rule Against Perpetuities.11"
Business trusts differ from most other trusts in two important
respects. First, because they involve only presently vested interests
represented by transferable trust certificates, their duration is not
even indirectly restricted by the Rule Against Perpetuities. Sec-
ond, their numerous beneficial interests 25 are subject to frequent
changes as share certificates are bought and sold. This decreases
the likelihood that a business trust could be terminated at the re-
quest of its beneficiaries. There would be obvious difficulties in ob-
taining the unanimous consent that the common-law rules on trust
termination require. Thus, in a very practical, if not a legal, sense,
business trusts can be perpetually indestructible.
It is this feature that has led to concerns that business trusts of
unlimited duration may offend some as yet ill-defined rule against
perpetually indestructible trusts."16 There is authority in other
contexts for the existence of such a rule."" Hence, the prevailing
wisdom has been that the duration of these trusts should be ex-
pressly restricted to twenty-one years or to the duration of desig-
nated lives in being.1 28
This is an inadequate solution to a problem that does not exist.
123. 6 A.L.P., supra note 23, at § 24.67; G. G. BOGERT & G. T. BoOmrr, TRUSTS AND
TRUSTEES § 247(p) (rev. 2d ed. 1977); RESTATEmENT OF PROPERTv § 378 (1944); RSTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TRusTS § 62N (1957); 1 A. Scor, THE LAw oF TRUSTS § 62.10(2)(c) (3d ed.
1967).
124. See authorities cited supra note 123.
125. To qualify as a Real Estate Investment Trust, for example, there must be a mini-
mum of 100 beneficiaries. I.R.C. § 856(a)(5) (CCH 1983).
126. See Whiteside, Restrictions on the Duration of Business Trusts, 9 CoRMLg L.Q.
422, 430-31 (1924).
127. The right of a settlor to make a trust indestructible by the consent of its benefi-
ciaries is restricted by such a rule. See RESTATEMrT OF PRoPEMTY § 381 (1944); L. SIMEs &
A. SMrrH, supra note 21, at §§ 1391, 1393.
128. A clause restricting the duration of a business trust to a period longer than lives in
being at its creation may not be valid. See the caveat following REsTATEzENr OF PROPERTY §
381 (1944). But see RESTATEmENT (SECOND) OF PRoPEMRT § 2.1 (1983) (Donative Transfers)
(trusts may be made indestructible for full period of the Rule; validity determined on "wait
and see" basis).
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The solution is inadequate because twenty-one years or the dura-
tion of designated measuring lives may not be sufficiently long in
all cases to permit a business trust to accomplish its purpose. The
problem does not exist because business trusts further, rather than
restrict, the productive use of property. There is no policy justifica-
tion for restricting their duration at all. Accordingly, the major sig-
nificance of subsection (7) is not the exemption from the statutory
Rule it provides, but the assurance the subsection gives that eligi-
ble trusts may validly exist in this state for as long as is necessary
to accomplish their business objectives.
II. PROVISIONS RELATED TO APPLYING THE RULE-GENERAL
So far we have considered the nature, period and scope of Flor-
ida's statutory Rule Against Perpetuities. We now move to a con-
sideration of the several provisions of chapter 77-23 that concern
how the Rule applies to transactions within its reach. These in-
clude the "wait and see" doctrine of subsection (2)(a), the statu-
tory rules of construction found in subsection (5) and the reduc-
tion of age contingencies provision of subsection (4). Together,
these several subsections constitute the heart of Florida's statutory
Rule as it applies to donative transactions. If they do not simplify
prior law, 129 as they most assuredly do not, they at least make it
less treacherous for attorney and client alike.
129. The complexities of the common-law Rule are legendary. Thus, in Lucas v. Hamm,
15 Cal. Rptr. 821 (Cal. 1961), the California Supreme Court held that an attorney who
drafted a testamentary trust in violation of the Rule Against Perpetuities was not liable for
negligence. The court held as a matter of law that the Rule is so difficult to understand that
the drafting attorney could not be held accountable for violating it. This decision prompted
one of my students to pen the following in partial response to a perpetuities question on his
exam:
These ancient rules with all their might
have given me a terrible fright.
I only hope that on this test,
I've given you my very best.
BUT! Should you decide that's not the case,
Remember Lucas v. Harnm.
It set the pace.
A dangerous instrumentality is all I ever hope to be.
Goodnite Mrs. Palsgraf - Wherever you are.
By Thomas M. Burke, Esq. of Rumberger, Kirk, Caldwell, Cabaniss & Burke, P.A., Orlando,
Florida.
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A. The "Wait and See" Doctrine
1. Introduction
(2) BASIS FOR DETERMINING VALIDITY OF
INTEREST.-
(a) Except as provided in subparagraph (5)(d) L.a., in deter-
mining whether an interest violates the rule against perpetuities,
the validity of the interest is determined on the basis of facts ex-
isting at the end of the lives in being used to measure the permis-
sible period or, if no life in being is used, the facts existing at the
end of the twenty-one-year period.
Subsection (2)(a) is a "wait and see" provision similar to those in
effect in fifteen other American states8 0 and ten Commonwealth
jurisdictions.8 1 While these various statutes differ significantly in
scope and detail, they share the common underlying policy premise
that interests which actually vest within the permissible perpetu-
ities period do not offend public policy. This should be contrasted
with the contrary policy premise of the common-law Rule. That
130. 1983 Alaska Seass. Laws ch. 51 (to be codified at ALASKA STAT. § 34.27.010); CONN.
GEN. STAT. ANN. § 45-95 (West 1981); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 30, § 195 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1983-
1984) (applicable to trusts only); Act of Apr. 22, 1983, S.F. 433, 1983 Iowa Legis. Serv. 90
(West) (to be codified at IOWA CODE § 558.68); Ky. RzV. STAT. § 381.216 (1972); ME. Rav.
STAT. ANN. tit. 33, § 101 (1964); MD. EsT. & TRusTS CODE ANN. § 11-103 (1974); MASS. GEN.
LAWS ANN. ch. 184A, § 1 (West 1977); Act of May 19, 1983, ch. 380, § 4, 1983 NEV. STAT. 927,
928 (to be codified at Nev. Rev. Stat. ch. 111); 1983 N.M. Laws 246; Omo REv. CODE ANN. §
2131.08 (Page 1976); 20 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6104(b) (Purdon 1975); VT. STAT. ANN. tit.
27, § 501 (1975); VA. CODE § 55-13.3 (Supp. 1982); WASH. Rav. CODE ANN. § 11.98.010 (Supp.
1983-1984). The "wait and see" doctrine has also found acceptance in RESTATEmENT (SFc-
OND) OF PROPERTY § 1.4 (1983) (Donative Transfers) as well as in judicial decisions in Mis-
sissippi and New Hampshire. See Phelps v. Shropshire, 183 So. 2d 158 (Miss. 1966);
Merchants Nat'l Bank v. Curtis, 97 A.2d 207 (N.H. 1953). Additionally, Story v. First Natl
Bank & Trust Co., 156 So. 101 (Fla. 1934) (discussed infra note 132), is frequently cited by
"wait and see" advocates as indicating that Florida has judicially accepted the doctrine. But
see Waggoner, Perpetuities Reform, 81 MIcH. L. Rav. 1718, 1760 n.111 (1983) where Profes-
sor Waggoner indicates that in none of these decisions did courts knowingly and unambigu-
ously accept "wait and see."
131. Perpetuities and Accumulations Act, 1964, c. 55, § 3(1) (England); Perpetuities and
Accumulations Ordinance, 1970, No. 26, § 8 (Hong Kong); Perpetuities Act, 1964, No. 47, §
8 (New Zealand); Perpetuities Act, 1966, c. 2, § 3 (Northern Ireland); Perpetuities Ordi-
nance, 1968 (second session), c. 15, § 5 (Northwest Territories, Canada); Perpetuities Act,
1966, c. 113, as amended by The Perpetuities Amendment Act, 1968, c. 94, § 4 (Ontario,
Canada); Perpetuities and Accumulations Act, 1972, 21 Eliz. 2, No. 9, § 6 (Queensland, Aus-
tralia); Perpetuities and Accumulations Act, 1968, 17 Eliz. 2, No. 7750, § 6 (Victoria, Ca-
nada); Law Reform (Property, Perpetuities, and Succession) Act, 1962, 11 Eliz. 2, No. 83, §
7 (Western Australia); Perpetuities Ordinance, 1968 (second session), c. 2, § 5 (Yukon Terri-
tory, Canada).
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premise dictates that public policy is offended by the mere exis-
tence of any possibility of remote vesting. Whether or not an inter-
est actually vests in time is irrelevant. More importantly, under
the "might have been" test, the required certainty of vesting must
exist as of the date the interest is created. If after considering only
those facts known to exist at the date the interest is created there
is any possibility that it might vest remotely, the interest is void in
its inception.3 2
132. 6 A.L.P., supra note 23, at § 24.21; J. GRAY, supra note 22, at § 214; J. MORRIS & W.
LEACH, supra note 23, at 70; RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 370 comment K (1944); L. SIMES
& A. SMITH, supra note 21, at § 1228. Interests created by the exercise of special or testa-
mentary powers of appointment are subject to a special rule. See infra text accompanying
notes 222-228.
The recently adopted RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY repudiates the common-law
"might have been" test in favor of the "wait and see" doctrine. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
PROPERTY § 1.4 (1983) (Donative Transfers). Reporter's Note 6, comment F to that section
cites several case decisions as judicial support for the Restatement's position. Among these
decisions are two Florida cases, Adams v. Vidal, 60 So. 2d 545 (Fla. 1952), and Story v. First
Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 156 So. 101 (Fla. 1934).
It is difficult to see why Adams was cited in this context. That case involved the validity
of a gift over on the failure of issue. Since the court adopted a definite failure of issue
construction under which the gift over would vest, if at all, at the death of initial takers all
of whom were lives in being, it is difficult to see how the gifts could have vested remotely. In
any case, the court was unable to envisage such a possibility. Adams, 60 So. 2d at 550.
Accordingly, the case hardly stands for a judicial acceptance of the "wait and see" doctrine.
The implications of the Story case are less clear. In that case, the Florida Supreme Court
was asked to hold that certain interests created in the testamentary trust of W. L. Story
were violative of public policy. One of the contentions was that the share of the trust limited
in favor of Mr. Story's daughter, Kate, offended the Rule Against Perpetuities. As to that
share of the trust, the instrument provided that the trustee was to retain the share in trust
for Kate's life, paying the income to her together with such amounts of principal as the
trustee believed necessary for the support and education of her children. When Kate died,
the trustee was to divide her share among her children "share and share alike, upon the
youngest of her said children arriving at the age of thirty (30) years." Story, 156 So. at 104.
In the interim, the trustee was to use such income and principal as he believed necessary for
the support and education of Kate's children.
The nature of the interest limited in favor of Kate's children in Story is not free from
doubt. It has been suggested, for example, that the interest was presently vested as of
Story's death with only possession postponed until the youngest child attained age 30. See
Smith and Keathley, Future Interests in Florida: A Plea For Judicial Supremacy, 9 U. FLA.
L. REV. 123, 129-30 (1956). Under this construction, the children's interest did not trans-
gress the Rule Against Perpetuities. The Florida Supreme Court, however, did not expressly
accept this construction. It is possible, therefore, that the court viewed the interest as con-
tingent on the children attaining the specified age. If so, the interest violated the orthodox
common-law Rule. As of the death of W. L. Story, Kate might have given birth to another
child which child might not have attained age 30 within 21 years of Kate's death. Accord-
ingly, orthodox dogma required the court either to adopt the vested construction or to inval-
idate the interest as of its inception. Instead, in an opinion devoid of any indication that
they were departing from orthodox perpetuities dogma, the Florida Supreme Court simply
declined to pass on the validity of the interest. It stated:
It would be highly improper to strike a will down because of a contingency that
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To varying degrees dictated by legislative and administrative
practicalities, "wait and see" statutes modify or in some instances
abolish altogether the common-law "might have been" test. In par-
ticular, subsection (2)(a) directs that compliance with Florida's
statutory Rule Against Perpetuities is to be determined on the ba-
sis of facts known to exist at the end of the waiting period, rather
than on the facts that exist at the creation of the interest as the
common law requires. For the relatively rare limitation where
there are no measuring lives involved, the applicable waiting pe-
riod corresponds to the twenty-one year in gross period of the
Rule. More commonly, vesting will be related to the duration of
one or more specified lives in being. For these limitations, the wait-
ing period extends to the end of the last eligible measuring life. In
either case, interests are no longer void in their inception merely
because, as of their creation, they might vest remotely. Rather, an
interest is valid under subsection (2)(a) if, at the expiration of the
waiting period, the interest has already vested or, in the absence of
actual vesting, if the facts show that the interest can no longer vest
remotely. Invalidity occurs under subsection (2)(a) only if remote
vesting remains a possibility at the expiration of the waiting
period.
CASE-i: T bequeaths $250,000 to Bank as trustee to pay the in-
come to his daughter M for life, then to distribute the trust prin-
cipal in fee to such of M's children as live to attain the age of
twenty-five. M is twenty years old, unmarried and childless at T's
death.
At common law, the remainder in M's children is void in its in-
may never arise, and, if it should arise, it may do nothing more than accelerate the
enjoyment of the gift.
156 So. at 107.
In commenting on the "wait and see" doctrine, Professor Leach, like the RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF PROPERTY, cited the Story decision as authority that the Florida Supreme
Court had rejected the common-law "might have been" test. Leach, supra note 60, at 730.
This may be. But the failure of the court to definitively construe the interest as contingent
together with the fact that no other Florida court has referred to Story as embracing the
"wait and see" concept sheds doubt on this point. Moreover, even assuming these interpre-
tations of Story are correct, subsequent decisions would appear by negative implication to
limit the application of any judicial "wait and see" doctrine in this state to donative trans-
actions involving interests limited to take in possession after one or more life estates. In
cases litigated after Story, Florida courts have continued to apply the common-law "might
have been" test to commercial transactions as well as to donative transfers where no life
estates are involved. See Watergate Corp. v. Reagan, 321 So. 2d 133 (Fla. 4th DCA 1975)
(commercial); In re Estate of Jones, 318 So. 2d 231 (Fla. 2d DCA 1975) (donative).
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ception. After T's death, M might give birth to a child who would
not attain age twenty-five until more than twenty-one years after
M's death. The fact that M is childless at T's death is not relevant
to the result. In general, class gifts are either totally good or totally
bad under the common-law Rule. 193 Thus, the remainder is invalid
even if M has children at T's death and even if one or all of such
childrens' interests are individually certain to vest in time. The
possibility that an afterborn child's interest would vest remotely
invalidates the entire gift.""
Under chapter 77-23, class gifts remain either totally valid or to-
tally invalid. 138 However, because of subsection (2)(a), the remain-
der in CASE-1 is not necessarily void. A court may "wait and see"
to ascertain what facts exist at M's death when the waiting period
specified in the subsection expires. " ' If M dies without having had
any children or if all of her children are at least age four at her
death, the remainder will be valid. In the former case it will never
vest. In the latter, it may be said as a matter of certainty that the
interest will vest, if at all, within twenty-one years of ]'s death.
Only if M is survived by an afterborn child who is under the age of
four at her death would remote vesting remain a possibility at the
expiration of the waiting period. In this event the age contingency
133. Leake v. Robinson, 2 Mer. 363, 35 Eng. Rep. 979 (Ch. 1817), criticized in Leach,
The Rule Against Perpetutities and Gifts to Classes, 51 HAnv. L. REv. 1329 (1938). Per
capita class gifts and gifts to sub-classes are exceptions. See infra note 206. But see Carter
v. Berry, 140 So. 2d 843, 850 (Miss. 1962) (rejecting Leake).
134. 6 A.L.P., supra note 23, at § 24.26; J. GRAY, supra note 22, at § 373; J. MORRIS & W.
LEACH, supra note 23, at 101-02; RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 371 (1944); L. SIMES & A.
SMrrH, supra note 21, at § 1265.
135. The English Law Reform Committee recommended that courts be directed to con-
strue class gifts to exclude any member whose individual interest might not vest in time,
thereby validating the gift for any member whose interest complied with the Rule. LAw
REFORM COMm. REF., supra note 38, at 14. This recommendation has not been utilized in
this country, presumably because it is mandatory. There are instances where splitting a
class might not further the intent of the transferor. Leach, supra note 133, at 1337; Schuy-
ler, supra note 22, at 721. Provisions requiring courts to split classes have, however, been
incorporated in the perpetuities legislation of a number of Commonwealth jurisdictions. See
Perpetuities and Accumulations Act, 1964, c. 55, §§ 9(3), (4) (England); Perpetuities and
Accumulations Ordinance, 1970, No. 26, §§ 9(3), (4) (Hong Kong); Perpetuities Act, 1964,
No. 47, §§ 9(3), (4) (New Zealand); Perpetuities Act, 1966, c. 2, §§ 4(3), (4) (Northern Ire-
land); Perpetuities Ordinance, 1968 (second session), c. 15, §§ 9(2), (3) (Northwest Territo-
ries, Canada); Perpetuities Act, 1966, c. 113, as amended by The Perpetuities Amendment
Act, 1968, c. 94, §§ 8(2), (3) (Ontario, Canada); Perpetuities and Accumulations Act, 1972,
21 Eliz. 2, No. 9, §§ 9(3), (4) (Queensland, Australia); The Perpetuities and Accumulations
Act, 1968, 17 Eliz. 2, No. 7750, §§ 9(3), (4) (Victoria, Canada); Perpetuities Ordinance, 1968
(second session), c. 2, §§ 9(2), (3) (Yukon Territory, Canada).
136. It may not be necessary to wait the full subsection (2)(a) waiting period in order to
save the gift in CASE-1. See subsection (5)(d) (discussed infra pp. 828-36).
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would be reduced pursuant to subsection (4). 187
CASE-2: T bequeaths $250,000 to Bank as trustee to pay the in-
come to his twenty-five-year-old son S for life, then to pay the
income to S's oldest surviving child for life, and at the death of
that child (or at S's death if he is not survived by a child) in fee,
per stirpes, to S's then-living lineal descendants. At T's death, S
is married and has a two-year-old child, C-1.
In CASE-2, the remainder limited in favor of S's lineal descend-
ants might vest remotely. This would occur if C-1 predeceased S, S
then died survived by a second child and that child then survived
S by more than twenty-one years. In such a case the remainder,
which vests at the death of the second child, would vest more than
twenty-one years after the death of S, the last relevant life in
being.
Under the common-law Rule, the mere possibility that this sce-
nario might occur is fatal. Under subsection (2)(a) it is not. Instead
a court will wait until S's death to see if remote vesting remains a
possibility at that time. If S is not survived by a child, the remain-
der interest is valid. It will vest, if at all, at S's death. Likewise, the
remainder is valid if S is survived by C-1. It will vest no later than
the death of S's oldest surviving child whom the court will know to
be C-i, a life in being. Invalidity under the "wait and see" rule of
subsection (2)(a) occurs only if S's eldest surviving child is an
afterborn child. Only in that case would the required certainty of
timely vesting not be present at the expiration of the subsection
(2)(a) waiting period.
2. Who Are the Permissible Measuring Lives?
The essence of the "wait and see" doctrine is the authority it
gives courts to consider the impact post-creation events have on
the vesting or failure of interests. Events which occur within the
applicable waiting period may be taken into account; subsequent
events may not. Therefore, a question of critical importance in the
application of any "wait and see" statute is whose lives may be
used to measure the waiting period.
Subsection (2)(a) offers little direct guidance on this point. It
provides only that where lives have been used to measure the per-
petuities period, the waiting period extends to the end of the lives
137. See infra pp. 836-39.
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so used. The meaning of used in this context is not explained in
chapter 77-23 and no exact parallel exists in the legislation of any
other jurisdiction. Nevertheless, it is a virtual certainty that only
beneficiaries of the transfer were intended to qualify as subsection
(2)(a) measuring lives."' 8 The first evidence of this may be found in
the legislative history of chapter 77-23. It implies that subsection
(2)(a) was based on the Massachusetts perpetuities statute. " 9 This
is a point of considerable significance because the Massachusetts
statute was influenced in part by the criticism Professor Simes ex-
pressed of the pioneering Pennsylvania "wait and see" statute.4 0
That statute provides simply that the period of the Rule is to be
measured by "actual rather than possible events."14 1 Professor
Simes contended that this type of statute leaves no satisfactory
criteria for the selection of measuring lives.14 2
To the extent this criticism is well founded, and there is consid-
erable disagreement on the point,14 3 the problem may be elimi-
nated by better drafting. The Massachusetts statute illustrates one
possible approach.1 4 4 With few exceptions, it restricts the class of
138. For the sole exception, see infra note 154.
139. See Statement of Henry A. Fenn in support of the addition of § 689.22 to the Flor-
ida Statutes, where Professor Fenn, who drafted chapter 77-23, stated that Florida's statute
is based on the perpetuities reform statutes of Illinois, New York, Delaware and Massachu-
setts. Similarities between subsection (2)(a) and MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 184A, § 1 (West
1977) (quoted infra note 144) indicate that subsection (2)(a) is based on that provision. In
particular, subsection (2)(a) provides for a truncated waiting period, see infra pp. 811-14, a
feature that is uniquely attributable to the Massachusetts perpetuities statute. In contrast,
ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 30, § 195 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1983-1984), the only other of the source
statutes to adopt the "wait and see" doctrine, is limited to transfers in trust.
140. See Leach, Perpetuities Legislation, Massachusetts Style, 67 HARv. L. REV. 1349,
1352 (1954).
141. 20 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6104(b) (Purdon 1975). For similar statutes, see OHIO
REV. CODE ANN. § 2131.08(c) (Page 1976); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 27, § 501 (1975); WAsH REV.
CODE ANN. § 11.98.030 (1967) (applicable to transfers in trust only). See also Law Reform
(Property, Perpetuities, and Succession) Act, 1962, 11 Eliz. 2, No. 83, § 7 (Western
Australia).
142. Simes, Is the Rule Against Perpetuities Doomed? The "Wait and See" Doctrine, 52
MICH. L. REV. 179, 186 (1953).
143. For the arguments against the Pennsylvania statute, see Allan, Perpetuities: Who
are the Lives in Being?, 81 L.Q. REV. 106 (1965); Fetters, Perpetuities: The Wait and See
Disaster - A Brief Reply to Professor Maudsley, With a Few Asides to Professors Leach,
Simes, Wade, Dr. Morris, Et Al., 60 CORNELL L. REv. 380 (1975); Mechem, Further
Thoughts on the Pennsylvania Perpetuities Legislation, 107 U. PA. L. REv. 965, 969 (1959);
Schuyler, supra note 22, at 712-16. But see J. MORRIs & W. LEACH, supra note 23, at 88-92;
Cohan, The Pennsylvania Wait and See Perpetuity Doctrine-New Kernels from Old Nut-
shells, 28 TEMP. L.Q. 321 (1955); Leach, Perpetuities Legislation: Hail, Pennsylvaniat, 108
U. PA. L. REV. 1124 (1960); Morris & Wade, Perpetuities Reform at Last, 80 L.Q. REV. 486
(1964).
144. MASS. GEN LAWS ANN. ch. 184A, § 1 (West 1977) provides:
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eligible measuring lives to those persons at whose death the inter-
est to be judged is limited to take. Effectively this means that only
beneficiaries of the transfer are eligible as measuring lives. The im-
plication of the legislative history of chapter 77-23 is that the mea-
suring lives under subsection (2)(a) should be similarly restricted.
The language of subsection (2)(a) provides additional support
for this construction. Observe that the subsection (2)(a) waiting
period (measuring lives) is truncated short of the full period of the
In applying the rule against perpetuities to an interest in real or personal prop-
erty limited to take effect at or after the termination of one or more life estates in,
or lives of, persons in being when the period of said rule commences to run, the
validity of the interest shall be determined on the basis of facts existing at the
termination of such one or more life estates or lives. In this section an interest
which must terminate not later than the death of one or more persons is a "life
estate" even though it may terminate at an earlier time.
Virtually identical statutes may be found at CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 45-95 (West 1981);
ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 33, § 101 (1964); MD. EST. & TRUSTS CODE ANN. § 11-103 (1974).
An alternative approach to the measuring lives problem is illustrated by Ky. REV. STAT. §
381.216 (1972). This statute is phrased similarly to the Pennsylvania "wait and see" statute
with the added proviso that "the period shall not be measured by any lives whose continu-
ance does not have a causal relationship to the vesting or failure of the interest." Accord
1983 Alaska Sess. Laws ch. 51 (to be codified at ALASKA STAT. § 34.27.010); Act of May 19,
1983, ch. 380, § 4, 1983 Nev. Stat. 927, 928 (to be codified at NEV. REV. STAT. ch. 111); 1983
N.M. Laws 246. Legislation using a similar concept has also been enacted in several Com-
monwealth jurisdictions. See Perpetuities Ordinance, 1968 (second session), c. 15, § 7
(Northwest Territories, Canada); Perpetuities Act, 1966, c. 94, § 6 (Ontario, Canada); Perpe-
tuities and Accumulations Act, 1972, 21 Eliz. 2, No. 9, § 6 (Queensland, Australia); Perpetu-
ities and Accumulations Act, 1968, 17 Eliz. 2, No. 7750, § 6 (Victoria, Canada); Perpetuities
Ordinance, 1968 (second session), c. 2, § 7 (Yukon Territory, Canada). For an explanation of
how the causal relationship criteria would apply to various types of limitations, see J.
DUKEMINIER, PERPEurUmES LAW IN ACTION: KENTUCKY CASE LAW AND THE 1960 REFORM ACT
79-91 (1962).
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY § 1.3 (1983) (Donative Transfers) illustrates yet an-
other approach to the measuring lives problem. That section restricts the class of eligible
measuring lives to the transferor, the donee of a nonfiduciary power of appointment if an
exercise of the power could effect the interest in question and, if reasonable in number, the
beneficiaries of the transfer and the parents and grandparents of the beneficiaries. The re-
cently enacted Iowa statute is modeled after the RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY although the
Iowa provision contains a somewhat expanded definition of eligible measuring lives. See Act
of Apr. 22, 1983, S.F. 433, 1983 Iowa Legis. Serv. 90 (West) (to be codified at IOWA CODE §
558.68(2)(b)(2)). The statutes of several Commonwealth jurisdictions also include a detailed
catalogue of the persons whose lives must be used to define the duration of the "wait and
see" period. See Perpetuities and Accumulations Act, 1964, c. 55, § 3(4), (5) (England); Per-
petuities and Accumulations Ordinance, 1970, No. 26, § 8(4), (5) (Hong Kong); Perpetuities
Act, 1964, No. 47, § 8(4), (5) (New Zealand); Perpetuities Act, 1966, c. 2, § 3(4), (5) (North-
ern Ireland).
For differing views as to the merits and necessity of a catalogue of measuring lives, com-
pare Maudsley, Measuring Lives Under A System Of Wait And See, 86 L.Q. REV. 357
(1970) with Morris & Wade, Perpetuities Reform at Last, 80 L.Q. REv. 486, 495-508 (1964).
See also infra note 153.
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Rule Against Perpetuities (measuring lives plus twenty-one years).
A moment's reflection will reveal that this feature, which is
uniquely traceable to the Massachusetts perpetuities statute, com-
promises, to some extent, the underlying policy premise of the
"wait and see" doctrine. Some interests that actually vest in time
will nevertheless be invalid under the Florida statute."' The impe-
tus for this policy compromise may be found in two arguments
critics of "wait and see" have made against the doctrine as a
method of perpetuities reform. The first of these is that the doc-
trine constitutes a "long step toward the inalienability of prop-
erty."" ' Under the common-law "might have been" test, doubts
about timely vesting are resolved on the side of invalidity. Under
"wait and see," the opposite is the case. As long as the waiting
period continues, doubts are resolved on the side of validity.
Hence, the "wait and see" doctrine permits interests to restrain
alienability for a period of time after their creation while, at least
in theory, the common-law "might have been" test does not.
The second of the arguments against "wait and see" is closely
related to the first. Critics contend the inability to determine the
ultimate fate of interests during the waiting period will cause in-
convenience. They point particularly to the case of legal interests
in land where the uncertainty caused by the doctrine will itself
render the land virtually inalienable throughout the permissible
waiting period. 147
To a limited extent, these arguments are well founded. "Wait
and see" does involve the potential "costs" of increased uncer-
tainty and restrained alienability. However in some jurisdictions,
including Massachusetts 1"8 and to a less certain extent Florida, "
145. This possibility may be illustrated in the context of the limitation described in
CASE-2. If at S's death his eldest surviving child is C-2, a child born to him after T's death,
and if C-2 in turn dies within 21 years of S's death, the remainder in S's then-living lineal
descendants vests in time. Nevertheless, the remainder is void under chapter 77-23. As of
S's death, when the subsection (2)(a) waiting period expired, the required certainty of
timely vesting was not present. C-2 might have lived more than 21 years beyond S in which
case the remainder interest would have vested remotely.
146. Simes, supra note 142, at 188-90.
147. See, e.g., Phipps, The Pennsylvania Experiment In Perpetuities, 143 TEMP L.Q.
20, 22-23 (1949); Simes, supra note 142, at 188; Schuyler, supra note 22, at 715. But see,
e.g., Br6gy, A Defense of Pennsylvania's Statute on Perpetuities, 23 TEMP. L.Q. 313, 315-20
(1950).
148. See, e.g., B. M. C. Durfee Trust Co. v. Taylor, 89 N.E.2d 777 (Mass. 1950); 6 A.L.P.,
supra note 23, at § 24.21.
149. See Story v. First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 156 So. 101 (Fla. 1934) (discussed supra
note 132). But see Van Roy v. Hoover, 117 So. 887 (Fla. 1928).
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courts traditionally decline to pass on the validity of remainder in-
terests until antecedent life estates have ended.150 Not only has
there been no inconvenience caused by this practice,10' but the en-
actment of "wait and see" in such jurisdictions would not involve
any additional restraint on alienation provided the waiting period
under the doctrine is restricted to the duration of preceding valid
estates.' Courts would wait that long in any event.
Therein lies the purpose of the truncated waiting period in sub-
150. This rule of judicial restraint was approved by Professor Leach and criticized by
Professor Simes. Cf. Leach, supra note 60, at 729; Simes, supra note 142, at 185.
151. Although these problems have yet to arise, the rule of judicial restraint and corre-
spondingly the "wait and see" doctrine do create a certain potential for inconvenience that
would not be present were courts to apply the common-law "might have been" test as of the
creation of an interest. One such possibility might arise if a trustee made a discretionary
distribution to a beneficiary whose interest was subsequently determined to be invalid.
Could the beneficiary be forced to rebate the distribution? Could the trustee be surcharged
for making it?
At least insofar as the "wait and see" doctrine is concerned, the answer to both questions
should be no. During the waiting period, all interests that continue to have a possibility of
timely vesting should be treated as presumptively valid and actions taken in reliance
thereon should be regarded as proper. This result should be reached even in the absence of
the specific statutory provision to that effect that exists in some jurisdictions. See, e.g., Per-
petuities and Accumulations Act, 1964, c. 55, § 3(1) (England).
The doctrine of infectious invalidity provides a second possibility for inconvenience.
Simes, supra note 142, at 189. Normally, when an interest violates the Rule Against Perpe-
tuities, that interest and only that interest is void. The doctrine of infectious invalidity is
the exception. This doctrine gives courts the authority to strike otherwise valid interests if
doing so produces a result that more nearly approximates the testator's presumed intent.
Porter v. Baynard, 28 So. 2d 890 (Fla. 1946), cert. denied, 330 U.S. 844 (1946); 6 A.L.P.,
supra note 23, at §§ 24.48-.52; RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 402 (1944); L. SIMES & A.
SMITH, supra note 21, at § 1262.
The application of the infectious invalidity doctrine in tandem with either a rule of judi-
cial restraint or the "wait and see" doctrine presents unique considerations. In either case,
the interests that would fall prey to infectious invalidity would have been in existence
throughout the judicial restraint or "wait and see" period. However, as Professor Leach
noted, the absence of even a single case where the problem has arisen indicates that it is
more pedagogical than real and, in any case, the "wait and see" doctrine is to be preferred
over the infectious invalidity doctrine. "Wait and see" has a greater remedial impact for a
larger number of cases. See Leach, supra note 143, at 1147-49.
152. This is true, of course, only if the "wait and see" doctrine is applicable exclusively
to interests limited to take after one or more valid anterior interests. While the Massachu-
setts statute, supra note 144, is restricted in this manner, subsection (2)(a) is not. It pro-
vides an alternate 21-year in gross waiting period for certain executory interests to which
the Massachusetts provision would not apply at all. In practice, however, the alternate sub-
section (2)(a) waiting period will seldom apply. Most limitations which do not involve mea-
suring lives are either gifts over from one charity to another, purchase options, or gifts made
contingent on some aspect of the estate administration process. The former two are exempt
from the statutory Rule Against Perpetuities under subsections (3)(a)1 and 7, respectively.
For the latter, it is not necessary to "wait and see" at all. See subsection (5)(c) (discussed
infra pp. 826-28).
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section (2)(a). It is designed to mitigate to the greatest extent pos-
sible the "costs" of "wait and see" by circumscribing the waiting
period to the duration of preceding valid estates."'3 Significantly,
this can only be accomplished if the class of eligible measuring
lives is restricted to the beneficiaries of the transfer. Indeed, this
objective suggests the need for a further refinement of the measur-
ing lives criteria. As used in subsection (2)(a), the phrase "used to
measure the permissible period" should be construed to exclude as
a measuring life any person (beneficiary or not) whose life, if used
for that purpose, could extend the waiting period beyond the expi-
ration of anterior valid interests.15 4
Within this stricture and provided further that only persons
alive or in gestation at the creation of an interest are "lives in be-
ing," all beneficiaries are permissible measuring lives. Where there
is more than one such person, the waiting period extends until the
death of the last. Moreover, in identifying the measuring lives, the
type of future interest involved should not be relevant. Subsection
(2)(a) makes no distinction between remainders and executory in-
terests except, of course, that the latter may involve no permissible
measuring lives, in which case the subsection (2)(a) period is
twenty-one years. Likewise it should not be relevant whether the
153. In a recent article, Professor Waggoner of the University of Michigan suggests that
one of the criteria against which "wait and see" statutes should be measured is whether they
produce a result that closely approximates that which could be obtained by a "Rule-wise"
lawyer. Waggoner, supra note 130, at 1773-74. On this criterion, "wait and see" statutes
such as those of Massachusetts and Florida, which restrict the class of eligible measuring
lives to the beneficiaries of the transfer and which truncate the "wait and see" period short
of the full period of the Rule, fall "markedly short of the goal." Id. at 1773 n.149. Of the
various "wait and see" approaches, Professor Waggoner prefers that of the RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF PROPERTY (discussed supra note 144). Id. at 1776-85. As for the so-called
"costs" of the "wait and see" doctrine, Professor Waggoner suggests that these can be kept
within acceptable limits if: (1) courts "wait to see" only where it is necessary to do so; (2) a
workable criterion for the identification of the measuring lives is included in the statute;
and (3) when faced with an interest that might or might not vest in time, courts compe-
tently identify the possible chains of future events that can affect vesting and state clearly
which will result in validity and which will not. Id. at 1769-73.
154. There is one exception. As previously indicated, subsection (1) of chapter 77-23
continues that aspect of the common-law Rule which permits a testator to specify an ascer-
tainable group of persons to be used as measuring lives in determining the period of the
Rule Against Perpetuities. Where this has been done, logic and the language of subsection
(2)(a) indicate that the designated lives are also measuring lives for purposes of the "wait
and see" rule. In this one instance, the subsection (2)(a) measuring lives need not be benefi-
ciaries. While this result may appear to be inconsistent with the objective of restricting the
waiting period to the duration of preceding valid estates, in practice the inconsistency will
seldom be present. Usually, with the type of provision under discussion here, there will be
no need to "wait and see" at all.
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interests of the measuring lives are present or future; whether they
are vested, contingent or subject to divestment; or whether the
takers are identified by class description or by name. Additionally,
in the case of class gifts, it should not be relevant that the class is
open as of the date of a transfer or that additional members actu-
ally enter the class after that date.' 55 None of these various factors
has any bearing on the policy or practical concerns that influenced
the language used in subsection (2)(a).
CASE-3: T bequeaths $250,000 in trust to pay the income to his
brother B for life, then to distribute the trust principal to the first
grandchild of B to marry. T is survived by his brother B, by B's
two children, C-1 and C-2, and by C-l's infant child, GC.
In CASE-3, the only subsection (2)(a) measuring life is B. C-1
and C-2 do not qualify; they are not beneficiaries of the transfer.
To use them as measuring lives would necessarily mean that the
subsection (2)(a) waiting period could extend beyond the expira-
tion of B's life interest. GC, although a potential beneficiary,
should be disqualified for the same reason.
CASE-4: T bequeaths $250,000 to the grandchildren of his
brother B. At T's death, B is alive. He has two children but no
grandchildren.
Under principles similar to those discussed in conjunction with
CASE-3, there are no measuring lives for CASE-4. Therefore the
subsection (2)(a) waiting period is twenty-one years.
CASE-5: T devised Blackacre to his son S for so long as it is used
as a parking lot for the family lumber business and if it shall ever
cease to be so used, then, and in that event, to his daughter M.
In CASE-5, S is clearly a permissible measuring life. But what
about M? It may be difficult to say that T has used M to measure
the perpetuities period. M's life is in no way relevant to the vesting
155. But see In re Estate of Pearson, 275 A.2d 336 (Pa. 1971), where the court in apply-
ing the Pennsylvania "wait and see" statute, supra note 141, held that members of a class
alive at the commencement of the perpetuities period could not be used as measuring lives
if additional members to the class were born during the "wait and see" period. This result
has been appropriately criticized as an unwarranted extension of the common-law require-
ment that class gifts must either be good as to all members or they are bad as to all mem-
bers. J. DUKEMINIER & S. JOHANSON, FAMILY WEALTH TRANSACTIONS: WILLS, TRUSTS, AND
ESTATES 1058 n.81 (2d ed. 1978).
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or failure of her own interest. Nevertheless, M is easily identifiable;
she is a beneficiary of the transfer; and using her as a measuring
life could not extend the waiting period beyond the termination of
S's determinable fee. On balance, therefore, there would appear to
be no sound reason for excluding her. 56 By naming her as a benefi-
ciary of his limitation, T could be said to have used her to measure
the perpetuities period.
CASE-6: T leaves the residue of his estate in trust to pay the
income to his son S for life, then to pay the income in equal
shares to such of S's children as are from time to time living and,
at the death of the last, to distribute the trust principal to S's
then-living grandchildren.
The subsection (2)(a) measuring lives for CASE-6 consist of S,
and all of his children and grandchildren who were alive at T's
death.
CASE-7: T leaves the residue of his estate in trust to pay the
income to his son S for life, then to pay the income to S's surviv-
ing spouse, if any, for life, then to divide the income among such
of S's children as are from time to time living and, at the death of
the last child of S, to distribute the trust principal per stirpes to
S's then-living lineal descendants. T is survived by S, by S's wife,
W, and by their only child, GC. Subsequently, S and W divorce
and still later S marries M. M has a child, A-i, whom S adopts.
A-1 was born before T's death.
In CASE-7, S and GC are permissible measuring lives. W does
not qualify because she is no longer a beneficiary of T's trust. Be-
yond that, things are less certain. As S's surviving spouse and
adopted child, respectively, M and A-1 are beneficiaries of T's
transfer. But are they eligible measuring lives under subsection
(2)(a)?
Whether M and A-1 qualify depends on whether the subsection
(2)(a) measuring lives must be ascertainable as such when the pe-
riod of the Rule commences. 157 The statutes of some jurisdictions
156. Accord Act of Apr. 22, 1983, S.F. 433, 1983 Iowa Legis. Serv. 90 (West) (to be codi-
fied as IOWA CODE § 558.68(2)(b)(2)); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY § 1.3 comment e
(1983) (Donative Transfers). See also ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 30, § 195(a) (Smith-Hurd Supp.
1983-1984) (waiting period measured by lives of all trust beneficiaries, not just those whose
lives are relevant to vesting).
157. A similar problem would exist if S and W had remained married until S's death. W
would be a life in being but she would not be an ascertainable beneficiary of T's trust until
RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES
expressly include such a requirement. 158 Although chapter 77-23
does not, arguably the requirement is implicit in the requirement
of subsection (1) that the lives used to measure the perpetuities
period not be "so numerous or designated in such a manner as to
make proof of their end unreasonably difficult." Alternatively, this
language could be interpreted to require only that the measuring
lives be ascertainable by the time it is necessary to resort to their
use to measure the waiting period.
Whether a requirement that the measuring lives be ascertainable
as of the testator's death would serve any viable objective is doubt-
ful. Perhaps where the statute allows courts to consider measuring
lives other than beneficiaries of the transfer, the requirement could
be justified on the basis of administrative convenience. However,
where only beneficiaries qualify as measuring lives, there would be
little inconvenience in waiting to see who the permissible measur-
ing lives are. 59 Accordingly, the better interpretation of chapter
77-23 would be one which required only that the measuring lives
be ascertainable as of the time that reference to them becomes
necessary to keep the subsection (2)(a) waiting period from end-
ing.' 60 This would ensure that M and A-1 in CASE-7 qualify. Their
identity and status as beneficiaries will be known at or before S's
death.
B. Statutory Rules of Construction
As an adjunct to the "might have been" test, courts have con-
sistently held that the common-law Rule is satisfied only if an in-
terest is absolutely certain to vest, if at all, within the permissible
perpetuities period. A probability of timely vesting, regardless of
how high, is not sufficient. 6' As a consequence, interests have been
stricken (and otherwise reasonable testamentary objectives have
been frustrated) solely on the basis of preposterous factual pre-
sumptions. The classic "unborn widow," "administrative contin-
S's death.
158. See Perpetuities and Accumulations Act, 1964, c. 55, § 3(4)(a) (England); Perpetu-
ities and Accumulations Ordinance, 1970, No. 26, § 8(4)(a) (Hong Kong); Perpetuities Act,
1964, No. 47, § 8(4)(a) (New Zealand). Cf. Perpetuities Act, 1966, c. 2, § 3(4)(a) (Northern
Ireland) (creating an exception for spouses of eligible measuring lives).
159. But see Maudsley, Perpetuities: Reforming The Common-Law Rule - How to
Wait And See, 60 CORNELL L. REv. 355, 369-70 (1975).
160. Accord RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY § 1.3 comment e (1983) (Donative
Transfers).
161. 6 A.L.P., supra note 23, at § 24.21; J. GRAY, supra note 22, at § 214; J. MORRIS & W.
LEACH, supra note 23, at 70-72; L. SiMEs & A. SMITH, supra note 21, at § 1228.
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gency" and "fertile octogenarian"-type violations are notorious in
this regard.""2 Respectively, these violations are founded on the
possibility that a life beneficiary might marry someone who, by le-
gal presumption, was not born at the commencement of the perpe-
tuities period; the possibility that the administration of even the
simplest of estates could take longer than twenty-one years; and
the possibility that a woman might give birth to a child even
though she is physiologically or medically incapable of doing so.
Subsection (5) of chapter 77-23 injects a healthy dose of common
sense into Florida's perpetuities law through a series of four pre-
sumptive rules of construction to be used by courts in applying the
statutory Rule. These rules of construction reflect the unanimous
view of perpetuities authorities that interests should not be invalid
solely because some unrealistic factual presumption can be used to
establish the existence of a remote possibility of untimely vesting.
In the overall context of chapter 77-23, the subsection (5) rules
of construction serve two important functions. First, as previously
discussed, an interest is invalid under subsection (2)(a) if at the
expiration of the truncated waiting period there exists a continuing
possibility of remote vesting. Subsection (5) ensures that any such
possibility must be based on realistic rather than fanciful factual
presumptions. Second, to the extent that the critics of "wait and
see" are correct in their concerns about the added "costs" involved
in waiting to see, the priority use of subsection (5) will have the
salutory effect of mitigating those "costs.'1 6 3
1. A General Presumption of Validity
(5) RULES OF CONSTRUCTION.-
Unless a contrary intent appears...
(a) It shall be presumed that the creator of an interest in-
tended that the interest be valid.
According to Gray, the Rule Against Perpetuities is a rule of law,
not of construction. It accomplishes its objectives by defeating
rather than by furthering the transferor's intent. Thus, Gray ad-
monished that limitations were to be construed as if there were no
162. See generally 6 A.L.P., supra note 23, at §§ 24.21-.24; J. GRAY, supra note 22, at §§
214-215; J. MORRIS & W. LEACH, supra note 23, at 72-86; L. SIMES & A. SMrrH, supra note
22, at §§ 1228-1229.
163. Accord LAW REFORM COMM. REP., supra note 38, 1 18, at p. 11.
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Rule; then the Rule was to be remorselessly applied."'
There is ample evidence of courts, particularly those of England,
taking Gray's admonition literally. 165 However, in appropriate
cases, most American courts attempt to minimize the harshness of
the Rule by employing a constructional preference for validity."
The Florida Supreme Court, for example, has held that in ruling
on the validity of an interest that is "fairly susceptible of two con-
structions, one of which would turn it into an illegal perpetuity
and the other make it valid and operative, the latter should be
adopted, as the law presumes that the testator intended to make a
binding will.' 67
Subsection (5)(a) makes this heretofore judicially sanctioned
rule of construction a part of the codified Rule Against Perpetu-
ities.1" Although it may be viewed as declaratory of existing law,
the extent of the constructional preference for validity under prior
law is unclear. The Restatement of Property, for example, adopts
the position that a limitation must normally be ambiguous without
regard for the Rule before a validating construction may be
adopted. That is, the possibility that one construction might vio-
late the Rule, while another would not, is not sufficient justifica-
tion, in and of itself, for a court to adopt the former.'69
It may be, as some have suggested, that the line drawn by the
Restatement is not the same line drawn by courts in this coun-
try-that in many instances courts have used the possibility of a
perpetuities violation as the sole justification for adopting some
other validating construction. 70 In any case, it is clear that such an
approach would be permissible under subsection (5). Note, how-
164. J. GRAY, supra note 22, at § 629.
165. See, e.g., Ward v. Van der Loeff, [19241 A.C. 653. The proclivity of English courts to
apply the Rule remorselessly is discussed and criticized in J. MoRnis & W. LEACH, supra
note 23, at 247-55.
166. 6 A.L.P., supra note 23, at § 24.45; L. SIMmS & A. SMrrH, supra note 21, at § 1288.
Even Gray conceded that where a true ambiguity exists and a limitation is reasonably sus-
ceptible of two constructions, the one which results in validity should be preferred. J. GRAY,
supra note 22, at § 633. But Gray argued that this constructional technique should be nar-
rowly confined. He did not approve of a broad license in courts to avoid the consequences of
the Rule Against Perpetuities through the construction process. See id. at §§ 634-642.
167. Story v. First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 156 So. 101, 107 (Fla. 1934). Accord Cartin-
hour v. Houser, 66 So. 2d 686, 688 (Fla. 1953).
168. Accord ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 30, § 194(c)(1) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1983-1984); N.Y. EST.
POWERS & TRUST LAW § 9-1.3(b) (McKinney 1967); Perpetuities Act, 1964, No. 47, § 15
(New Zealand).
169. RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 375 & comment b (1944). But see id. at § 377 com-
ment c.
170. L. SIMES & A. SMrrH, supra note 21, at § 1289.
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ever, that the subsection (5)(a) presumption is not conclusive. If
the terms of the limitation or other facts show the transferor's in-
tent to be inconsistent with the facts a court would have to pre-
sume in order to avoid a violation of the Rule, subsection (5)(a)
should not be used to avoid the violation. Moreover, under prevail-
ing dogma, the transferor's intent must be determined at the time
the instrument of transfer is executed. For testamentary transfers,
this would be at the execution of the will rather than at the testa-
tor's death.1 71
CASE-8: Mrs. T executes a will in which she leaves the residue of
her estate in trust to pay the income to her daughter A for life,
then to distribute the trust principal to such of A's children as
live to attain the age of twenty-five. At the time Mrs. T executes
her will, A is forty-five years old and is married to H, age fifty. A
and H have two daughters the youngest of whom is sixteen. Mrs.
T dies within a few months of executing her will, survived by A,
H and their two daughters.
Normally, a class gift to children is construed to include all chil-
dren, whenever born, not just those alive at the execution of the
instrument. 72 Were this construction applied to CASE-8, the gift
to A's children would violate the common-law Rule.
Under chapter 77-23, it would be possible to "wait and see" if A
gives birth to another child after Mrs. T's death. But it is not nec-
essary to do so. Under the facts of CASE-8, it is reasonable to as-
sume that Mrs. T did not contemplate the birth of additional chil-
dren by A and H. Accordingly, the remainder interest could be
upheld pursuant to subsection (5)(a) without waiting to see. This
could be done by adopting a construction of Mrs. T's instrument
which precluded afterborn children of A from sharing.17 3
171. "[T]he intent of the testator shall be determined as of the time of the execution of
his will, and such intention cannot be altered by the occurrence of subsequent events...
which the testator did not anticipate and over which he had no control." In re Parker's
Estate, 110 So. 2d 498, 502 (Fla. 1st DCA 1959), cited with approval in Jenkins v. Donahoo,
231 So. 2d 809, 811 (Fla. 1970). Accord 2A R. POWELL, supra note 21, at V 319; RESTATEMENT
oF PROPERTY §§ 242, 244 (1940).
172. 5 A.L.P., supra note 23, at §§ 22.44, .45; RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 295(a) com-
ment a (1940); L. SIMES & A. SMITH, supra note 21, at § 640.
173. 6 A.L.P., supra note 23, at § 24.22; RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 243(c) comment n,
illustration 4 (1940); L. SIMEs & A. SMITH, supra note 21, at § 1229. For other situations
where subsection (5)(a) might appropriately be used to save a gift, see generally 5A R. Pow-
ELL, supra note 21, at 777.
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CASE-9: Same as CASE-8 except Mrs. T had executed her will
several years before her death. At that time, A and H were
twenty-four and twenty-nine, respectively. A had just given birth
to her second daughter. Sixteen years later, Mrs. T dies survived
by A, H and their two daughters.
Here, the ages of A and H when Mrs. T executed her will, as well
as the recent birth of one of their daughters, indicates that Mrs. T
probably contemplated the possibility that A and H might have
additional children. There is no evidence to suggest that Mrs. T
would not have wanted to treat afterborn children equally with the
two existing daughters. In fact, the use of "children" rather than
"daughters" in Mrs. T's will indicates the contrary. Accordingly,
under these facts, it would be inappropriate for a court to save the
gift to A's children by presuming pursuant to subsection (5)(a)
that Mrs. T intended only the existing children of A to share under
her will. 7 4 In CASE-9, it is necessary to "wait and see."
2. Unborn Widows
(5) RULES OF CONSTRUCTION.-
Unless a contrary intent appears...
(b) If, except for this paragraph, an interest would be invalid
because of the possibility that the person to whom it is given or
limited may be a person not in being at the time of the creation
of the estate, and such person is referred to in the instrument
creating the interest as the spouse of another without further
identification, it is presumed that such reference is to a person in
being on the effective date of the instrument.
We have seen that in order for an interest to be valid under the
common-law Rule it must be absolutely certain to vest, if at all,
within lives in being at its creation plus twenty-one years. More-
over, under the "might have been" test the required certainty of
vesting must exist as of the date the interest is created. Carried to
their logical extremes, these elements of the common-law Rule
have resulted in the "unborn widow" genre of perpetuities
violations.
CASE-10: T's will leaves $250,000 in trust to pay the income to
his son S for life, then to pay the income to S's widow for life,
174. 6 A.L.P., supra note 23, at § 24.22; RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 377 comment c &
illustration 1 (1944).
19841
822 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 11:767
and at the death of the widow, or at S's death if he is not sur-
vived by a widow, to distribute the principal in fee to S's then-
living children. The residue of T's estate is left to T's daughter.
When T executes his will, S is twenty years old and unmarried. T
dies two years later.
At common law the remainder in S's children is void in its in-
ception. 175 It is not certain to vest until the termination of the in-
termediate life interest in S's surviving spouse. This might occur
beyond the permissible period of the Rule.
The primary objection to the orthodox result in CASE-10 is that
in many instances an otherwise reasonable testamentary plan is
frustrated even though there is little likelihood that the children's
remainder will in fact vest remotely. For that to happen, S must
not only father a child after the transfer, but he must also be sur-
vived by a wife who was not alive at T's death. This unique se-
quence of events is only remotely possible if S is of advanced age
when T executes his will. If, as in CASE-10, S is in his twenties
and unmarried at that time, remote vesting is more likely although
even here it is not probable.
Many "unborn widow"-type violations will be eliminated by the
"wait and see" rule of subsection (2)(a). In CASE-10, for example,
at S's death it might be known that S was not survived by an
afterborn spouse, or even if he was, that he was not survived by an
afterborn child. In either situation, the remainder in S's children
would be valid. 176
175. 6 A.L.P., supra note 23, at § 24.21; J. GRAY, supra note 22, at § 214; J. MORRIS & W.
LEACH, supra note 23, at 72-73; L. SIMES & A. SMITH, supra note 21, at § 1228.
The circumstances existing when T executes his will may make it possible to avoid a
violation of the Rule by applying the subsection (5)(a) presumption of validity. If S was
married at that time, a violation could be avoided by adopting a construction of T's limita-
tion which restricted his reference to S's widow to the spouse S had at the will's execution.
Alternatively, if S had children when T executed his will and was old enough that he was
not likely to have more, the limitation could be upheld by construing T's reference to S's
children to include only those children S had when T executed his instrument. See gener-
ally 6 A.L.P., supra note 23, at § 24.21; 5A R. POWELL, supra note 21, at 765[4]; L. SIMES
& A. SMITH, supra note 21, at § 1228 and the authorities cited therein.
176. If S either has no surviving spouse or his surviving spouse was alive at T's death,
the remainder in S's children is valid pursuant to subsection (2)(a). In the first event, it will
vest at S's death. In the second, it will vest at the death of S's surviving spouse whom the
court will know to be a life in being. Similarly, even if S is survived by an afterborn spouse,
the remainder is valid under subsection (2)(a) provided he is not also survived by an
afterborn child. In this case, the remainder interest would vest or fail within the lifetimes of
a class comprised exclusively of lives in being.
In appropriate situations, it may also be possible to use the general presumption of valid-
ity in subsection (5)(a) to uphold the gift to S's children without waiting to see. See supra
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Suppose, however, that the facts at S's death show that the un-
likely has happened. S's wife died shortly after T and eighteen
years later S married someone who was not alive at T's death.
Then S and his child-bride (call her Lolita) had a child S Jr. Sev-
eral years later, S died, survived by Lolita and S Jr. Under these
postulated facts, it would not be possible to save the remainder
interest in S's children simply by applying the "wait and see" rule.
There is no certainty of timely vesting at S's death when the sub-
section (2)(a) waiting period expires. Nevertheless, the remainder
may yet be saved by the constructional presumption of subsection
(5)(b).
Subsection (5)(b) creates a rebuttable presumption that refer-
ences to a person's spouse in an instrument are intended by the
maker of the instrument to refer exclusively to persons who are
alive at the "effective date of the instrument." The initial phrase
of the subsection makes it clear that it is to apply only where re-
mote vesting remains a possibility after the expiration of the sub-
section (2)(a) "wait and see" period. Where this possibility exists, a
court may save the children's remainder by construing T's gift to
S's widow as if it were qualified by the language: "provided, how-
ever, that no spouse of S shall take unless she was alive at the
effective date of this instrument." Construed in this manner, Lolita
does not succeed to the intermediate life interest. 1  As a conse-
quence, however, the remainder interest in S's children is valid. It
will vest in S's children, including any he had by Lolita, immedi-
ately at S's death.
Although the purpose of subsection (5)(b) is apparent, the word-
ing of the subsection leaves something to be desired. There are two
areas of concern. First, is the subsection restricted, as its wording
might suggest, to limitations which refer to the word "spouse?"
Quite obviously, if it is, the subsection has no application to
CASE-10 where T's reference was to S's "widow." Equally obvious,
if the subsection is to serve its purpose, "spouse" must be inter-
note 175. Alternatively, since a violation presupposes the birth of an afterborn child, if S
becomes medically incapable of procreating before he in fact has an afterborn child, the
remainder could be upheld without waiting the full subsection (2)(a) period. See subsection
(5)(d) (discussed infra pp. 828-36).
177. Cf. Perpetuities and Accumulations Act, 1964, c. 55, § 5 (England) (under which the
afterborn spouse is entitled to take the intermediate income interest but the remainder is
saved by accelerating its vesting to the end of a "wait and see" period that does not include
the life of the afterborn spouse). Accord Perpetuities and Accumulations Ordinance, 1970,
No. 26, § 10 (Hong Kong); Perpetuities Act, 1966, c. 2, § 5 (Northern Ireland). See also infra
note 179.
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preted to include such generic substitutes as wife, husband, widow
and widower. Presumably this will present little difficulty for our
courts.
More critically, if subsection (5)(b) is to accomplish its full re-
medial objective, courts will have to take poetic license with its
wording. Read literally, the subsection applies only to transfers
where the interest offending the Rule is limited in favor of the un-
named spouse."7 8 However, as CASE-10 illustrates, the interest
that violates the Rule in the "unborn widow"-type situation is fre-
quently not that of the spouse, but is instead that which is limited
to take following the spouse's interest. Most likely Florida courts
will eschew a literal interpretation of the subsection in favor of one
which more logically comports with its obvious objective. Better
yet, the subsection might be amended. 179
178. N.Y. EsT. Powaas & TRUSTS LAW § 9-1.3(c) (McKinney 1967), upon which subsec-
tion (5)(b) was based, suffers from the same defect. Cf. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 30, § 194
(c)(1)(C) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1983-1984):
(c) In determining whether an interest violates the rule against perpetuities:
(1) it shall be presumed . . . (C) where the instrument creates an interest in
the "widow", "widower", or "spouse" of another person, that the maker of the
instrument intended to refer to a person who was living at the date that the pe-
riod of the rule against perpetuities commences to run.
179. If subsection (5)(b) is to be amended, consideration should be given to the approach
taken in California. CAL. Civ. CODE § 715.7 (West 1982) provides:
In determining the validity of a future interest in real or personal property ... an
individual described as the spouse of a person in being at the commencement of a
perpetuities period shall be deemed a "life in being" at such time whether or not
the individual so described was then in being. (emphasis added)
Similar legislation has been enacted in several Commonwealth jurisdictions. See Perpetu-
ities Act, 1964, No. 47, § 13 (New Zealand); Perpetuities Ordinance, 1968 (second session), c.
15, § 10 (Northwest Territories, Canada); The Perpetuities Act, 1966, c. 94, § 9 (Ontario,
Canada); Perpetuities and Accumulations Act, 1972, 21 Eliz. 2, No. 9, § 10 (Queensland,
Australia); Perpetuities and Accumulations Act, 1968, 17 Eliz. 2, No. 7750, § 10 (Victoria,
Canada); Law Reform (Property, Perpetuities, and Succession) Act, 1962, 11 Eliz. 2, No. 83,
§ 12 (Western Australia); Perpetuities Ordinance, 1968 (second session), c. 2, § 10 (Yukon
Territory, Canada).
The California approach is open to the criticism that it lengthens the perpetuities period
in situations like CASE-10, where S is in fact survived by an afterborn spouse and child.
Under the precise facts of CASE-10, this may not appear too likely. But if S were younger,
the likelihood increases and, in these cases, the period of the Rule could be lengthened by
the interval of time between the testator's death and the birth of his afterborn spouse. This
could be 20 or more years. However, there is little room for abuse in this area. Moreover,
there are other instances where chapter 77-23 has the potential of lengthening the period of
the Rule. See subsection (5)(d)1, discussed infra pp. 833-36, as it relates to the possibility
that a person might have a child by adoption. And most importantly, the California ap-
proach has significant offsetting advantages. First, it eliminates the probable distortion of
the testator's plan that exists under subsection (5)(b) when the afterborn spouse is pre-
cluded from taking the intermediate income interest. Second, the approach is self-operating
and irrebutable. It therefore eliminates a potential source of litigation that exists under
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In determining whether the subsection (5)(b) presumption has
been rebutted, the words used by the testator and the facts known
to him at the time he executes his will are usually important fac-
tors. In a limitation like CASE-10, for example, if S is very young
when T executes his will, it is more than remotely possible that he
might be survived by an afterborn spouse and child. If these facts
ultimately develop, so the remainder is not valid under "wait and
see," a court should normally decline a proffered construction
based on subsection (5)(b). It could not reasonably be said that T
had only lives in being in mind when he referred to S's widow.
The consequences of a violation of the statutory Rule Against
Perpetuities may also have some bearing on whether the subsec-
tion (5)(b) presumption has been rebutted. It is generally assumed
that the intent of the testator is frustrated when the Rule Against
Perpetuities is violated. But subsection (5)(b) has the same poten-
tial. When it is applied, the afterborn spouse is precluded from
sharing in the property. While this result may be better than inva-
lidity, this is not necessarily the case.
CASE-11: T's will leaves the residue of his estate in trust to pay
the income to his only child S for life, then to pay the income to
S's widow for life, and at the death of the widow, or at S's death
if he is not survived by a widow, to distribute the principal in fee
to S's then-living children. When T executes his will, S is twenty
years old and unmarried. T dies a widower shortly thereafter.
Eighteen years later, S marries afterborn Lolita. Still later, Lolita
bears S a child. Then S dies survived by Lolita and their infant
child, S Jr. After making adequate provision for Lolita, S's will
leaves the residue of his estate to S Jr.
On the surface, the facts of CASE-11 are similar to those of
CASE-10. The remainder interest in S's children is void as of S's
death unless the subsection (5)(b) presumption is applied to save
it. But should a court do this when the effect is to preclude Lolita
from succeeding to the intermediate income interest at S's death?
Consider the alternative. If subsection (5)(b) is not applied, T's
will is read as if the limitation in favor of S's children had never
been included. Consequently, a resulting trust arises in favor of T's
sole heir S.180 At S's death, this interest passes to S Jr. pursuant to
subsection (5)(b). Finally, in transfers like CASE-10, it would be possible to uphold the
remainder interest in S's children without the necessity of waiting to see. This would further
mitigate the inconvenience and other "costs" attendant to the "wait and see" doctrine.
180. 6 A.L.P., supra note 23, at § 24.47.
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S's will and at Lolita's death, when her intermediate income inter-
est ends, the trust property will be distributed to S Jr. Arguably,
this is a situation where the subsection (5)(b) presumption should
not be applied.
3. Administrative Contingencies
(5) RULES OF CONSTRUCTION.-
Unless a contrary intent appears...
(c) If the duration or vesting of an interest is contingent upon
the probate of a will, the appointment of a fiduciary, the location
of a distributee, the payment of debts, the sale of assets, the set-
tlement of an estate, the determination of questions relating to an
estate or transfer tax, or the occurrence of any specified contin-
gency, it is presumed that the creator of such interest intended
that the contingency occur, if at all, within 21 years from the ef-
fective date of the interest.
Where the vesting of a future interest is dependent on the hap-
pening of an event which is unrelated to any person's life, the pe-
riod of the Rule Against Perpetuities is twenty-one years. With the
exclusion of gifts from one charity to another and specifically en-
forceable options, both of which are exempt from Florida's statu-
tory Rule, the "administrative contingency"-type case is the most
frequently recurring transfer of this type.
CASE-12: T's will leaves the residue of his estate, per stirpes, to
such of his lineal descendants as are living when administration
of his estate is completed and distribution is made.
At common law, the executory interest created in CASE-12 is
void from its inception.181 Although administration and distribu-
tion of virtually all estates would be completed within a few years
of the testator's death, the requisite absolute certainty of timely
vesting is not present. Under subsection (5)(c), however, a court
will presume that T intended administration and distribution to
occur within twenty-one years of his death. Absent evidence of a
contrary intent, this presumption will operate to save interests of
the type illustrated in CASE-12.
An interesting question arises when subsection (5)(c) is applied
to save an interest and subsequent facts show that the interest
181. Id. at § 24.23; J. MoRms & W. LEACH, supra note 23, at 73-76; L. SimEs & A. Smrrm,
supra note 21, at § 1228.
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does not in fact vest within the twenty-one years permitted by the
Rule. Estate administrations lasting more than twenty-one years
are rare, but they are not impossible. Where they in fact occur,
there would appear to be two possible consequences. The execu-
tory interest might be ruled void as of that time; alternatively, the
interest might be saved by relieving it of its contingency.182
The second alternative is preferable. Not only is it more consis-
tent with the underlying presumption of subsection (5)(c), but it
also creates a meaningful role for the subsection to play in the
overall scheme of chapter 77-23. The first construction would make
subsection (5)(c) duplicative of the "wait and see" rule of subsec-
tion (2)(a); the second would not. It would mean that subsection
(5)(c) would insure the ultimate validity of all interests to which it
applies. In turn, the subsection would offer yet another means of
reducing the potential for inconvenience that some see in the "wait
and see" doctrine.
Subsection (5)(c) is drafted broadly enough to evince a legisla-
tive intent to reach all contingencies reasonably related to estate
administration. Indeed, most such contingencies are referred to in
the subsection. Also included is an interest in property the vesting
of which is made contingent on the occurrence of "any specified
contingency." This term can be traced to an identical New York
provision,88 the legislative history of which reveals that it was
meant to ensure that the New York statutory rule was applicable
to contingencies other than those directly related to the estate ad-
ministration process. Specifically, the intent was to include inter-
ests contingent on the payment of mortgages or on the liquidation
of a decedent's business.' " A similar construction would be appro-
182. Under the second construction, the executory interest would vest indefeasibly in
the lineal descendants alive at the end of the 21-year waiting period. There would be no
further requirement of survival and no lineal descendant born thereafter would share.
183. N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 9-1.3(d) (McKinney 1967). Cf. ILL. ANN. STAT.
ch. 30, § 194(c) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1983-1984).
184. FIFTH REPORT OF THE NEW YORK TEMPORARY STATE COMMISSION ON MODERNIZATION,
REvISION AND SIMPLIFICATION OF THE LAW OF ESTATES 224 (1966).
Concerns about the difficulties involved in phrasing a satisfactorily exhaustive administra-
tive contingency statute led the English Law Reform Committee to recommend that no
special statute addressed to this type of violation be enacted. Instead, they recommended
that this type of violation be dealt with through the general curative impact of the "walt
and see" doctrine. LAW REFORM COMM. REP., supra note 38, at 10.
The experience in New York has shown that the concerns of the Law Reform Committee
may have been overstated. Perhaps out of necessity (New York does not have the "wait and
see" doctrine), New York courts have proven adept at broadly interpreting their administra-
tive contingency statute. Thus, in Buffalo Seminary v. McCarthy, 435 N.Y.S.2d 228 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 1980), the New York provision was applied to an option to purchase land. In doing
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priate for subsection (5)(c).
4. Fertile Octogenarians
(5) RULES OF CONSTRUCTION.-
Unless a contrary intent appears...
(d) 1. If the validity of a disposition depends upon the abil-
ity of a person to have a child at some future time, it is presumed,
subject to paragraph 2., that a male can have a child at 14 years
of age or older, but no younger than age 14, and that a female can
have a child at 12 years of age or older, but not older than 55 or
younger than 12. However, in the case of a living person, evidence
may be given to establish whether such person can have a child at
the time in question. The possibility that a person may have a
child by adoption is disregarded.
a. A determination of validity of a disposition under the
rule against perpetuities by the application of this para-
graph is not affected by the later occurrence of facts in con-
tradiction to the facts presumed or determined or the possi-
bility of adoption disregarded under this paragraph.
b. Any invalidity because of the ability of a person to
have a child at some future time shall be determined in ac-
cordance with paragraph (2)(a).
2. This paragraph does not apply for any purpose other than
that of determining the validity of a disposition under the rule
against perpetuities when such validity depends on the ability of
a person to have a child at some future time.
Subsection (5)(d) is concerned with a particularly troublesome
aspect of the common-law requirement of absolute certainty of
vesting. In the infamous case of Jee v. Audley, s5 an executory in-
terest was invalidated because of the possibility that a married
couple in their seventies might give birth to afterborn children.
The interest would have been good had the court been willing to
recognize what every reasonable person knows-it is physiologi-
cally impossible for seventy-year-old women to bear children. Nev-
ertheless, arguments that the court should take into account the
impossibility of birth under the facts in Jee fell on unreceptive
so, the court rejected the implications of a previous decision that the New York statute,
"under the principle of ejusdem generis, is limited to administrative contingencies inherent
in the orderly liquidation and settlement of estates and related reasonably expectable short-
term events." In re Shaul, 297 N.Y.S.2d 209, 212 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1969).
185. 1 Cox. 324, 29 Eng. Rep. 1186 (Ch. 1787).
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ears. Sir Lloyd Kenyon ruled instead that for purposes of the Rule,
a woman is conclusively presumed capable of conception through-
out her life. Thus the common-law conclusive presumption of life-
long fertility became an established part of perpetuities law,8'5 and
with it came an indefensible species of perpetuities violation eu-
phemistically referred to as the "fertile octogenarian." The follow-
ing is but one of many possible examples.
CASE-13: T's will leaves the residue of his estate in trust to pay
the income to his sixty-year-old sister for life, then to distribute
the trust principal in fee to such of the sister's grandchildren as
survive her. T's sister is alive at his death but she has no
grandchildren.
At common law, the interest in the grandchildren is void in its
inception. Because T's sister is conclusively presumed capable of
having children, it is possible that her sole surviving lineal descen-
dant would be a child born to her after T's death. If that child
then lived more than twenty-one years and died survived by a
child, the remainder interest would vest remotely. 187
In the unanimous opinion of perpetuities reform enthusiasts, the
application of the Rule Against Perpetuities to situations like that
in CASE-13 has brought the common-law Rule into deserving dis-
repute. This type of case, even more than the "administrative con-
tingency" and "unborn widow" fact situations, is deserving of re-
form. There is not even a remote possibility that the contingent
interest would, in fact, vest beyond the permissible perpetuities
period.
The rules of construction provided by subsection (5)(d) will go a
long way toward eliminating this type of perpetuities violation.
This subsection, which is virtually identical to a New York stat-
ute,lss replaces the common-law conclusive presumption of lifelong
186. But see In re Lattoufs Will, 208 A.2d 411 (N.J. 1965) (holding that the common-
law presumption of fertility is rebuttable).
The Florida Supreme Court has recognized the common-law presumption of lifelong fer-
tility in a trust termination case. Byers v. Beddow, 142 So. 894 (Fla. 1932).
187. For a gift to a class to vest for purposes of the Rule, the class must close and all
conditions precedent for all members of the class must be satisfied. RESTATEMENT OF PROP-
ERY § 371 (1944). Accord 6 A.L.P., supra note 23, at § 24.19; J. MoRRIs & W. LEACH, supra
note 23, at 38-40; L. SImEs & A. SMITH, supra note 21, at § 1265. Thus, under the facts
posited in CASE-13, the grandchildren's interest transgresses the common-law rule even in
the absence of the requirement that they survive T's sister. Id. at § 1270.
188. N.Y. EsT. Powans & TRUSTS LAW § 9-1.3(e) (McKinney Supp. 1982-1983). For simi-
lar legislation, see ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 30, § 194(c)(3) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1983-1984); Perpe-
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fertility with a series of statutory presumptions and related rules
founded on common sense and medical knowledge.
In a direct reversal of common law, the last sentence of subsec-
tion (5)(d)1 permits the introduction of medical evidence to rebut
the presumption that a person is capable of procreating. 189 More
important to the facts of CASE-13, subsection (5)(d)1 creates a
presumption that females under the age of twelve or over the age
of fifty-five are incapable of bearing children. This presumption
saves the contingent remainder in CASE-13. With the elimination
of possibilities based on T's sixty-year-old sister giving birth to
afterborn children, the interest in her grandchildren becomes cer-
tain to vest, if at all, no later than the last to die of T's sister and
the children she had at T's death.
Assume the same transfer as in CASE-13 except that T's sister is
thirty-five rather than sixty years old at his death. Here, absent
evidence showing that T's sister is incapable of procreating, the
subsection (5)(d) rules of construction will not save the grandchil-
dren's interest. In this case, subsection (5)(d)l.b tells us that valid-
ity of the interest is to be determined by applying the "wait and
see" rule of subsection (2)(a).
T's sister is the only permissible measuring life for CASE-13; the
subsection (2)(a) waiting period ends with her death. Once this oc-
curs, the condition precedent attached to the grandchildren's in-
terest becomes meaningless; the interest will vest as soon as the
class of takers closes. 190 Hence, the relevant inquiry is whether, as
of the sister's death, it remains possible for the class of her
grandchildren to stay open beyond the period permitted by the
statutory Rule Against Perpetuities. This possibility would exist if
but only if: 1) T's sister is survived by one or more afterborn chil-
tuities and Accumulations Act, 1964, c. 55, § 2(a) (England); Perpetuities and Accumula-
tions Ordinance, 1970, No. 25, § 7(1) (Hong Kong); Perpetutites Act, 1964, No. 47, § 7(1)
(New Zealand); Perpetuites Act, 1966, c. 2, § 2(1) (Northern Ireland); Perpetuities Ordi-
nance, 1968 (second session), c. 15, § 8(1) (Northwest Territories, Canada); Perpetuities and
Accumulations Act, 1972, 21 Eliz. 2, No. 9, § 8(1) (Queensland, Australia); Perpetuities and
Accumulations Act, 1968, 17 Eliz. 2, No. 7750, § 8(a) (Victoria, Canada); Law Reform (Prop-
erty, Perpetuities, and Succession) Act, 1962, 11 Eliz. 2, No. 83, § 6 (Western Australia);
Perpetuities Ordinance, 1968 (second session), c. 2, § 8(1) (Yukon Territory, Canada).
189. Subsection (5)(d) would appear to place the burden of proving a medical inability
to procreate on the proponents of the interest. Accord TENN. CODE ANN. § 24-5-112 (1980).
Cf. IDAHO CODE § 55-111 (1979) ("there shall be no presumption that a person is capable of
having children at any stage of adult life").
190. For the rules determining when a class closes, see 5 A.L.P., supra note 23, at §§
22.39-.46; RESTATEmENT OF PROPERTY §§ 294-295 (1940); L. Siuas & A. SMrrH, supra note
21, at §§ 634-651.
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dren at least one of whom is still capable of procreating under the
provisions of subsection (5)(d), and 2) T's sister is not survived by
a grandchild. If this combination of facts exists, the remainder is
invalid. Chapter 77-23 does not guarantee the validity of every in-
terest. If either of these facts is absent, the remainder is good. It
will be certain to vest, if it ever vests, no later than the death of
the last child of T's sister who was alive at T's death.' 1
The foregoing assumes that it would be necessary to wait in
CASE-13 until the full subsection (2)(a) waiting period expires.
This may not be the case. If T's sister loses the-ability to procre-
ate, the required certainty of timely vesting may be present before
her death. This would be true if at any time after T's sister's loss
of fertility: 1) there is no afterborn child of hers living or 2) all
such afterborn children have themselves become incapable of
procreating under the provisions of subsection (5)(d). In either
case, it could be said as a matter of certainty that the interest in
the grandchildren will vest, if at all, no later than the death of T's
sister and the children she had at T's death.
Subsection (5)(d)1 applies somewhat differently to males. It does
not include a maximum age limit on the ability of males to father
children. 1'2 Hence, if the transfer in CASE-13 had been to T's
brother and the brother's grandchildren, respectively, absent evi-
dence establishing the brother's medical lack of fertility, subsec-
tion (5)(d)1 would not be applicable to save the gift. That is not to
say, however, that the remainder interest would necessarily be bad.
Where the brother was of advanced age when T executed his will,
particularly if T believed him to be happily married to a woman
who was herself incapable of procreating under the provisions of
subsection (5)(d), a court should normally presume, pursuant to
the general subsection (5)(a) presumption of validity, that T in-
tended to limit the remainder in CASE-13 to the children of his
brother's existing children.19 8 Moreover, even in cases where such a
191. If T's sister is survived by one or more grandchildren, the class closes (and vests)
immediately at her death. If no grandchildren survive her, the class will remain open until it
is no longer possible for additional grandchildren to be born. 5 A.L.P., supra note 23, at §
22.43; RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 295 (1940); L. SIMEs & A. SMrrH, supra note 21, at §
640. In this latter case, if T's sister is survived by children but only those who were alive at
T's death have procreative capability, there is a certainty that the class of grandchildren will
close physiologically (and thereby vest) no later than the death of the last to die of a group
consisting exclusively of lives in being.
192. Cf. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 30, § 194(c)(3) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1983-1984) (any person
over the age of 65 presumed incapable of procreating).
193. See 6 A.L.P., supra note 23, at § 24.22 (particularly p. 69); RESTATEMENT OF PRoP-
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construction would be inappropriate, the grandchildren's interest
might be upheld at the brother's death (or possibly earlier if he
became medically incapable of procreating) under the "wait and
see" authority of subsection (2)(a).
What is the significance of the subsection (5)(d)l presumptions
that females under the age of twelve and males under the age of
fourteen are incapable of procreating? Clearly these minimum age
presumptions can have no curative impact for the typical limita-
tion. To presume that a female under the age of twelve cannot
have a child would do nothing to eliminate possibilities for remote
vesting based on the assumption that she might live beyond that
age and then have a child. Rather, these presumptions will apply
to save a gift only in the rare situation where the facts which must
occur to show a remote vesting require a person to have a child
while the person remains under the minimum presumptive age.
There has only been one litigated case involving this situation.
In that case,"" which Professor Leach called the "precocious tod-
dler," a testatrix bequeathed property in trust to pay the income
to a designated individual for life, remainder to such of that per-
son's grandchildren living at the death of the testatrix or born
within five years therefrom who shall attain the age of twenty-one.
Assuming that a person is capable of having children from the mo-
ment of his birth, as the conclusive presumption of lifelong fertility
appears to require, the interest in the grandchildren could vest re-
motely. Within five years of the death of the testatrix, the life ten-
ant might have an afterborn child, all lives in being might die, and
the afterborn child might in turn have a child. " '
Obviously, to invalidate any interest on the basis that an
afterborn child could procreate within five years of his or her birth
would be absurd. Fortunately, the minimum age presumptions of
subsection (5)(d)1 now ensure that no toddler can be that
precocious.
In addition to the realistic fertility presumptions and the provi-
sion permitting the introduction of medical evidence to establish a
person's inability to procreate, subsection (5)(d) borrows a number
of subsidiary rules from the New York perpetuities statute. One of
ERTY § 377 comment c (1944).
194. In re Gaite's Will Trusts, [1949] 1 All E.R. 459.
195. In the actual case, the court avoided a violation by reasoning that any child of a
person under the age of five would not be entitled to take under the testatrix's instrument.
Such a child would be illegitimate under English law. This reasoning was later criticized in
Leach, supra note 60, at 733-34.
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these covers the way the possibility of having a child by adoption
is to be treated.
The modern trend in probate law is to treat adopted children
identically to natural children for purposes of taking under instru-
ments containing class gifts to "children," "lineal descendants" or
"issue. ' Without some specific rule dealing with adoption, even a
person who would be presumptively incapable of having children
due to age or medical condition would be considered capable of
having them by adoption. The last sentence of subsection (5)(d)1
eliminates this concern. It provides that where the validity of a
disposition depends on the ability of a person to have a child at
some future time, the possibility that a person may have a child by
adoption is to be disregarded.1 9
It is possible that once a court has applied subsection (5)(d) to
validate an interest, later events may occur in contradiction to the
lack of fertility presumed or established pursuant to the subsec-
tion. Consider the following:
CASE-14: T leaves the residue of his estate in trust to pay the
income to his daughter W for life, then to divide the income
equally among such of W's children as are from time to time liv-
ing and at the death of the last of W's children to distribute the
trust principal in fee to W's then-living grandchildren. At T's
death, W is thirty-five years old. She is married to H; they have
196. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. §§ 732.108, .608 (1981).
197. Accord ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 30, § 194(c)(3) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1983-1984); Perpetu-
ities Ordinance, 1968 (second session), c. 15, § 8(4) (Northwest Territories, Canada); The
Perpetuities Act, 1966, c. 113, as amended by The Perpetuities Amendment Act, 1968, c. 94,
§ 7(4) (Ontario, Canada); Perpetuities Ordinance, 1968 (second session), c. 2, § 8(4) (Yukon
Territory, Canada). Cf. Perpetuities and Accumulations Act, 1964, c. 55, § 2 (4) (England)
(possibility of having a child by adoption disregarded only when a person would otherwise
be presumed incapable of procreating due to age or medical condition). Accord Perpetuities
and Accumulations Ordinance, 1970, No. 26, § 7(4) (Hong Kong); Perpetuities Act, 1964,
No. 47, § 7(5) (New Zealand); Perpetuities Act, 1966, c. 2, § 2(4) (Northern Ireland); Perpe-
tuities and Accumulations Act, 1972, 21 Eliz. 2, No. 9, § 8(4) (Queensland, Australia); Perpe-
tuities and Accumulations Act, 1968, 17 Eliz. 2, No. 7750, § 8(4) (Victoria, Canada).
Since 1961, it has been possible for men to deposit their sperm in a sperm bank and,
theoretically at least, have children more than 21 years after their deaths. Should courts
take cognizance of this possibility, a bequest to "A for life, remainder to such of his children
as attain the age of 21" would violate the Rule. See Leach, Perpetuities in the Atomic Age:
the Sperm Bank and the Fertile Decedent, 48 A.B.A.J. 942 (1962). To date, no jurisdiction
has enacted legislation dealing with this possibility, no doubt because no court has invali-
dated an interest based on it. The "wait and see" rule of subsection (2)(a) will eliminate
some of the problems presented by this new biology. The transfer above would be valid if at
A's death he had not in fact deposited sperm in a sperm bank. For possible solutions if he
had, see id. at 943-44. See also Schuyler, The New Biology and the Rule Against Perpetu-
ities, 15 U.C.L.A. L. Rv. 420, 425 (1968).
1984]
834 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 11:767
one child, but no grandchildren. In the course of the administra-
tion of T's estate, T's trustee/executor petitions the court for a
determination of the validity of Ts trust as it relates to the inter-
est in W's grandchildren. T's trustee introduces evidence to show
that W is medically incapable of bearing additional children and
on this basis the court upholds the grandchildren's remainder in-
terest. Subsequently, W and H adopt an infant child. The child
was born after T's death.
Two questions are raised by the facts of CASE-14. First, what
effect does the adoption have on the initial validity of the contin-
gent remainder in W's grandchildren? Second, would the adopted
child and that child's children be entitled to share T's trust?
In the context of the actual facts of CASE-14, the first question
is definitively settled by subsection (5)(d)l.a which states: "A de-
termination of validity is not affected by the later occurrence of
facts in contradiction to the facts presumed or determined or the
possibility of adoption disregarded." The grandchildren's interest
remains valid.1 5
Suppose, though, that the validity of the grandchildren's interest
is not presented to a court until the subsection (2)(a) "wait and
see" period expires at the death of the last to die of W and her
first child. At that time, the court would know that W had in fact
adopted a child and that that child had in fact survived the expira-
tion of the waiting period. Would subsection (5)(d)L.a apply to
these facts?
The better answer is no. The purpose of subsection (5)(d)L.a is
to give finality to court determinations so that interested persons
may safely rely on them. The facts under discussion here do not
raise this concern. This is not a situation where a prior determina-
tion would be affected by the later occurrence of contradictory
facts as the wording and purpose of subsection (5)(d)l.a require.
Thus, in some instances, the same interest that would be valid if
198. The position taken in subsection (5)(d)l.a comports with the recommendations of
the English Law Reform Committee, supra note 38, at T 12, and is reflected in the perpetu-
ities legislation of virtually every jurisdiction that has modified the common-law fertility
presumption. See, e.g., N.Y. EST. PowERs & TSusTs LAW § 9-1.3(e)(4) (McKinney Supp.
1978-1979), Perpetuities and Accumulations Act, 1964, c. 55, § 2(3) (England); The Perpetu-
ities Act, 1966, c. 113, as amended by The Perpetuities Amendment Act, 1968, c. 94, § 7(2)
(Ontario, Canada); Law Reform (Property, Perpetuities, and Succession) Act, 1962, 11 Eliz.
2, No. 83, § 6(4) (Western Australia). Although ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 30, § 194(c)(3) (Smith-
Hurd Supp. 1983-1984) is silent on this point, Professor Schuyler, who helped draft it, has
indicated that the result in Illinois would be the same. See Schuyler, supra note 36, at 45-
46.
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litigated before the contrary facts occur would be invalid if first
litigated after that time.
Returning to the original facts of CASE-14, would W's adopted
child and that child's children be entitled to take as beneficiaries
of T's trust? For the adopted child, at least, the statute provides
the answer. Subsection (5)(d)2 states that the subsection (5)(d)1
presumptions are limited to questions involving "the validity of a
disposition under the rule against perpetuities when such validity
depends on the ability of a person to have a child at some future
time."199 Although its purpose could have been stated more
clearly,200 subsection (5)(d)2 was intended to ensure that the sub-
section (5)(d)1 rules of construction are not applied to prevent per-
sons such as W's adopted child in CASE-14 from taking interests
that they would otherwise take but for the subsection. Any doubt
about this is eliminated by the legislative history of the virtually
identical New York provision on which subsection (5)(d)2 was
based. 10 1 As for the question of whether the children of W's
adopted child may share in the ultimate remainder, the answer is
less certain. Theirs is not an interest that would be valid but for
the presumptions of subsection (5)(d). Nevertheless, the better
view is that they too should be permitted to take as beneficiaries of
199. As a result, subsection (5)(d) does not overrule Byers v. Beddow, 142 So. 894 (Fla.
1932), in which the common-law conclusive presumption of fertility was applied to an issue
involving the right of trust beneficiaries to compel termination of their trust. See supra note
186. Cf. Perpetuities Act, 1964, No. 47, § 7(1) (New Zealand) (realistic fertility presumptions
extended to a variety of issues other than validity under the Rule Against Perpetuities,
including issues relating to trust termination). See also TENN. CODE AN. § 24-5-112 (1980).
200. See, e.g., Law Reform (Property, Perpetuties, and Succession) Act, 1962, 11 Eliz. 2,
No. 83, § 6(4) (Western Australia). Cf. Perpetuities and Accumulations Act, 1964, c. 55, §
2(2) (England); The Perpetuities Act, 1966, c. 113, as amended by The Perpetuities Amend-
ment Act, 1968, c. 94, § 7(3) (Ontario, Canada).
201. See N.Y. EST. PowERs & TRusTS LAW § 9-1.3(e)(4) (McKinney Supp. 1978-1979). In
recommending that this section be enacted, the 1972 Report of the New York Law Revision
Commission, 1972 Leg. Doc. 65(J) states:
The second question concerns the rights of a natural child or adopted child who is
born or adopted after a disposition has been held valid by presuming that the
natural child would not be born or by disregarding the possibility of adoption. On
this question the Commission believes that if the natural or adopted child had a
valid interest under the instrument to begin with, there is no sound reason for
invalidating that interest on the basis of subsequent events. In other words, the
fact that another interest, which was questionable under the rule against perpetu-
ities, has been "mistakenly" determined to be valid, is no reason to invalidate an
interest whose validity was not in question from the outset. This approach again is
reflected in the English Act as well as in the recent Ontario statute. (citations
omitted)
But see Schuyler, supra note 36, at 46 (indicating that a different result would be reached
under ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 30, § 194(c)(3) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1983-1984)).
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T's trust. If W's adopted child is permitted to take as a benefi-
ciary, there is no sound reason for excluding that child's
children. °2
C. Reduction of Excess Age Contingencies
(4) REDUCTION OF AGE CONTINGENCY.-
If, except for this subsection, an interest in property would be
invalid because it depends for its vesting upon any person attain-
ing or failing to attain an age in excess of 21 years, the age contin-
gency is reduced to 21 with respect to each person subject to the
contingency.
Subsection (4) addresses one of the most frequently recurring
types of perpetuities violations. Under the subsection, where an in-
terest would violate the statutory Rule because its vesting is de-
pendent on some person attaining or failing to attain an age in
excess of twenty-one, the excessive age contingency is automati-
cally reduced to twenty-one. 0 3 The underlying premise of the sub-
202. Accord Waggoner, supra note 130, at 1737 n.50.
203. Subsection (4) applies only where the vesting of an interest is contingent on some
person attaining or failing to attain a specified age in excess of 21. It does not apply to other
contingencies, even those that are age related. Thus, for example, it would not apply to an
interest that is contingent on its taker marrying before the age of 30. For similar legislation
in other jurisdictions, see infra note 205.
Excess age contingencies may also be reduced under the statutory cy pres authority
courts of some jurisdictions have to reform invalid limitations. These statutes are of two
types: those that couple cy pres with "wait and see" and those that do not. Jurisdictions
with the former type of statute include: 1983 Alaska Sess. Laws ch. 51 (to be codified at
ALASKA STAT. § 34.27.010); Act of Apr. 22, 1983, S.F. 433, 1983 Iowa Legis. Serv. 90 (West)
(to be codified at IOWA CODE § 558.68); Ky. REV. STAT. § 381.216 (1972); Act of May 19,
1983, ch. 380, § 4, 1983 Nev. Stat. 927, 928 (to be codified at NEV. REV. STAT. ch. 111); 1983
N.M. Laws 246; OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2131.08(C) (Page 1976); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 27, §
501 (1975); VA. CODE § 55-13.3 (Supp. 1983); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 11.98.010, .030
(1967); Perpetuities Act, 1964, No. 47, §§ 8-10 (New Zealand). In all of these statutes, the
"wait and see" doctrine is given priority over cy pres.
Jurisdictions that have enacted the cy pres doctrine without coupling it with "wait and
see" include: CAL. Civ. CODE § 715.5 (West 1982); IDAHO CODE § 55-111 (1979); Mo. ANN.
STAT. § 442.555 (Vernon Supp. 1983); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 60, § 75 (West Supp. 1982-1983);
TEx. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art 1291b (Vernon 1980).
The cy pres doctrine also finds acceptance in RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY § 1.5
(1983) (Donative Transfers). In addition, Hawaii, Kansas, Mississippi, New Hampshire and
West Virginia have to some extent adopted the doctrine by judicial decision. In re Estate of
Chun Quan Yee Hop, 469 P.2d 183 (Hawaii 1970) (bequest reformed to take effect 21 rather
than 30 years after testator's death); In re Foster's Estate, 376 P.2d 784 (Kan. 1963) (will
provision postponing distribution until testator's youngest grandchild attained age 23 ex-
cised from instrument); Carter v. Berry, 140 So. 2d 843 (Miss. 1962) (age contingency re-
duced and class split to avoid violation); Edgerly v. Barker, 31 A. 900 (N.H. 1891) (age
RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES
section is that most testators would prefer that their beneficiaries
take at an earlier age than not at all. However, because this reduc-
tion distorts to some extent the testator's initial intent, subsection
(4) applies only to interests that would be invalid but for its appli-
cation. That is, the subsection (5) rules of construction and the
"wait and see" rule of subsection (2)(a) take priority.'"
CASE-15: T bequeaths $250,000 in trust to pay the income to his
daughter A for life, then to distribute the trust principal to such
of A's children as live to attain the age of twenty-five. At T's
death, A is thirty-two years old. She and her husband have a
four-year-old son, C-1. Subsequently, A has another son, C-2 and
then dies. When A dies, C-1 and C-2 are ages eight and three,
respectively.
In CASE-15, the remainder in A's children can not be upheld
under the "wait and see" rule of subsection (2)(a). The required
certainty of timely vesting is not present when the subsection
(2)(a) waiting period ends. Accordingly, at A's death, the age con-
tingency is reduced to twenty-one. No court intervention should be
necessary. Subsection (4) is self-operating. The age contingency is
automatically reduced; it is reduced to twenty-one even though a
reduction to twenty-two would suffice00 and it is reduced with re-
contingency reduced to 21 to save gift to testator's grandchildren when the youngest at-
tained 40); Berry v. Union Nat'l Bank, 262 S.E.2d 766 (W. Va. 1980) (trust saved by reduc-
ing termination date from 25 to 21 years). Mississippi, New Hampshire and the RESTATE-
MENT (SEcOND) OF PROPERTY also apply the "wait and see" doctrine. See supra note 130.
204. Cf. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 30, § 194(c)(3) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1983-1984) (giving the
age contingency section priority of application over the provision relating to procreative ca-
pacity). But see Waggoner, supra note 130, at 1749 (criticizing the Illinois approach). The
English Law Reform Committee, supra note 38, at 11 26-27, recommended that age reduc-
tion provisions be given priority over "wait and see." This recommendation has been univer-
sally rejected. See statutes cited infra note 205. See also RSTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF PROP-
ERTY §§ 1.4, 1.5 (1983) (Donative Transfers).
205. Accord CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 45-96 (West 1981); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 30, §
194(c)(2) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1983-1984); Mz. Rzv. STAT. ANN. tit. 33, § 102 (1964); MD.
EST. & TRUSTS CODE ANN. § 11-103(b) (1974); MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 184A, § 2 (West
1977); N.Y. EST. PowEss & TRusTs LAW § 9-1.2 (McKinney 1967); Law Reform (Property,
Perpetuities, and Succession) Act, 1962, 11 Eliz. 2, No. 83, § 7 (Western Australia). Cf. Per-
petuities and Accumulations Act, 1964, c. 55, § 4(1), (2) (England) (providing that, in Eng-
land, the reduction is to be made to the age nearest that specified in the limitation that will
result in validity under the Rule). Accord Perpetuities and Accumulations Ordinance, 1970,
No. 26, §§ 9(1), (2) (Hong Kong); Perpetuities Act, 1964, No. 47, §§ 9(1), (2) (New Zealand);
Perpetuities Act, 1966, c. 2, §§ 4(1), (2) (Northern Ireland); Perpetuities Ordinance, 1968
(second session), c. 15, § 9(1) (Northwest Territories, Canada); Perpetuities Act, 1966, c.
113, as amended by The Perpetuities Amendment Act, 1968, c. 94, §§ 8(1), (2) (Ontario,
Canada); Perpetuities and Accumulations Act, 1972, 21 Eliz. 2, No. 9, §§ 9(1), (2) (Queen-
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spect to each person subject to it. Thus, the contingency is reduced
with respect to C-i's interest as well.2°0
CASE-16: T bequeaths $250,000 in trust to pay the income to his
son A for life, then to pay the income to A's widow, if any, for
life, and at the death of the widow (or at A's death if there is no
widow) to such of A's children as live to attain the age of twenty-
five. The residue of T's estate is left to T's daughter, D. At T's
death, A is young and unmarried. Subsequently A dies, survived
by a wife, W, and a three-year-old child, C-1. Both W and C-1
were born after T's death.
The limitation in CASE-16 is a combination of the "unborn
widow" and excess age contingency violations. The interest in A's
children cannot be saved by applying either the "unborn widow"
provision of subsection (5)(b) or the age reduction provision of
subsection (4) alone. It can, and normally should, however, be
saved by applying the two subsections in tandem. 07 W would not
be entitled to the intermediate income interest and the age contin-
gency attached to C-l's interest would be reduced to twenty-one.
CASE-17: T leaves the residue of his estate in trust to pay the
income to his son A for life, then to divide the trust income in
equal shares among such of A's children as are from time to time
living and at the death of the last, to distribute the trust principal
to such of A's grandchildren as live to attain the age of twenty-
five. At T's death, A is thirty years old. He has one child, C-1 and
sland, Australia); The Perpetuities and Accumulations Act, 1968, 17 Eliz. 2, No. 7750, §§
9(1), (2) (Victoria, Canada); Perpetuities Ordinance, 1968 (second session), c. 2, § 9(1)
(Yukon Territory, Canada).
206. Cf. N.Y. EsT. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 9-1.2 (McKinney 1967) (age contingency is
to be reduced "as to any or all persons subject to such contingency" (emphasis added)).
Per capita class gifts and gifts to sub-classes are afforded special treatment under the
common-law Rule. As to these gifts, the "bad as to one, bad as to all" rule of Leake v.
Robinson, 2 Mer. 363, 35 Eng. Rep. 979 (Ch. 1817) does not apply; valid portions of the class
may be severed from the invalid portions. See 6 A.L.P., supra note 23, at §§ 24.28-.29; J.
GRAY, supra note 22, at §§ 389-391; J. MoRIs & W. LEACH, supra note 23, at 106-09; L.
SIMEs & A. SMrTH, supra note 21, at §§ 1266-1267. In applying subsection (4) to these types
of gifts, the age contingency for any portion of the class that satisfies the common-law Rule
should not be reduced. The subsection (3)(a)1 exemption applies to these interests. Accord
In re Pendleton's Estate, 246 N.Y.S.2d 351 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1964). See also Leach, supra note
140, at 1361-62.
For an example of a limitation to which the rule under discussion here would apply, see
RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 389 illustration 2 (1944).
207. See Morris & Wade, supra note 143, at 514-15 (suggesting that a similar result
would be reached under sections 4 and 5 of the English Perpetuities and Accumulations
Act).
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no grandchildren. Subsequently, A has an afterborn child, C-2.
Still later, C-1 gives birth to a child, GC. Then, when GC is three
years old, A and C-1 die survived by C-2 and by C-l's child, GC.
CASE-17 illustrates that subsection (4) does not ensure the va-
lidity of every excess age contingency-type limitation. The subsec-
tion (2)(a) measuring lives for CASE-17 are A and C-1. At the
death of the survivor, a reduction of the age condition would en-
sure that GC's individual interest would vest, if at all, in time.
However, it would do nothing to ensure that any afterborn chil-
dren of C-2 would attain age twenty-one or indeed even be born
within twenty-one years of the death of A and C-1. Accordingly, if
C-2 still has procreative capability when the subsection (2)(a) wait-
ing period ends, the interest in A's grandchildren, including that of
GC, is void as of that time.20
III. PROVISIONS RELATED TO APPLYING THE RULE-REVOCABLE
TRUSTS AND POWERS OF APPOINTMENT
We have considered how the statutory Rule applies in general.
We now consider how these general rules are affected by the exis-
tence of a power in some person to alter the beneficial enjoyment
of the transferred property. One such power-a trustee's power to
allocate trust income and principal-has been covered previ-
ously.2 09 Our concern here focuses on two other kinds of powers:
the power to revoke a trust and the power a settlor or beneficiary
might have to appoint trust property.
A. Revocable Inter Vivos Trusts
(3) APPLICATION OF RULE.-
(b) The period of perpetuities does not commence to run in
connection with a disposition of property or interest therein, no
instrument is considered to be effective for purposes of the rule
against perpetuities, and no interest or power is considered to be
created for purposes of the rule against perpetuities as long as,
under the instrument, the maker of the instrument has the power
to revoke the instrument or to transfer or direct transfer to him-
208. In jurisdictions with statutes that require class gifts to be construed to exclude
members whose individual interests do not vest in time, see supra note 135, the gift to GC
would be saved by reducing the age contingency attached to it and by closing the class at
A's death. A similar result could be reached in jurisdictions in which the cy pres doctrine is
in force. See supra note 203.
209. See subsection (3)(a)4 (discussed supro notes 108-113 and accompanying text).
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self of the entire legal and equitable ownership of the property or
interest therein.
Although there is no Florida authority on point, it is a univer-
sally accepted principle of the common-law Rule that the perpetu-
ities period does not begin to run for a transfer as long as one per-
son, acting alone, has an unqualified power to secure for himself
the full ownership of the property. 10 The justification for this is
that the policies of the Rule are no more offended by such a trans-
fer than they would be were the power holder to have absolute
ownership. Indeed, the only thing standing between the power
holder and absolute ownership is the formality of exercising the
power.
Subsection (3)(b) of chapter 77-23 codifies this common-law
principle as it applies to powers retained by a transferor. Since
most contingent future interests are equitable, the subsection's
most frequent application will be to transfers in trust where the
settlor retains a power to revoke the transfer. Less common, but
equally within the terms of subsection (3)(b), is an irrevocable
trust in which the settlor retains a power to withdraw all of the
trust principal. In either situation, subsection (3)(b) provides that
the period of the statutory Rule begins when the settlor's power to
revoke or withdraw terminates. In the typical case, this will be at
the settlor's death. Additionally, subsection (3)(b) provides that no
interest or other power in such a trust is considered to be created
for purposes of Florida's statutory Rule as long as the settlor's
power continues. This extends the remedial impact of chapter 77-
23 to trusts created before January 1, 1979, where the settlor's
power to revoke or withdraw terminates after that date.
The source of subsection (3)(b) is relevant to its proper con-
struction. Subsection (3)(b) can be traced to a virtually identical
Illinois statute.21" ' The Illinois provision was intended by its formu-
lators to restate common law,212 not to modify or enlarge it. A simi-
lar purpose may therefore be ascribed to subsection (3)(b). As a
consequence, the subsection does not tell the whole story. Com-
210. 6 A.L.P., supra note 23, at § 24.59; J. GAv, supra note 22, at § 524.1; J. Momus &
W. LEACH, supra note 23, at 56, 160-61; L. SiMEs & A. SMFFH, supra note 21, at § 1250.
211. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 30, § 194(b) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1983-1984). For similar legisla-
tion in other states, see CAL. CIv. CODE § 716 (West 1982); MONT. CODE ANN. § 67-407
(1970); N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 10-8.1(b) (McKinney 1967); OHIo REV. CODE
ANN. § 2131.08(B) (Page Supp. 1982); 20 PA. CoNs. STAT. ANN. § 6104(c) (Purdon 1975); VA.
CODE § 55-13.2 (1981); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 11.98.040 (1967).
212. Schuyler, supra note 36, at 38-39.
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mon-law requirements that the settlor's revocation or withdrawal
power be solely and unconditionally exercisable by him"'3 are im-
plicit requirements of subsection (3)(b) as well. Note, however,
that the subsection requires only that the settlor have the requisite
power "under the instrument." This phrase is intended to ensure
that qualification under subsection (3)(b) is not adversely affected
by the fact that the settlor may lack the legal capacity to exercise
his power or that an exercise on his behalf by a guardian would
require court approval.21
B. Powers of Appointment
1. Definitions and Classification
Because they are so useful in adding flexibility to trust disposi-
tions, it is a rare trust that does not include one or more powers of
appointment. In its broadest sense, a power of appointment is an
authority, other than one that is incidental to beneficial ownership,
to designate the beneficial interests in property.2 5 For chapter 77-
23, however, the concept must be narrowed to exclude the discre-
tionary allocation powers of trustees and powers associated with
the revocable inter vivos trust.2 16 These powers are treated
separately.
For purposes of the common-law Rule and to a lesser extent
chapter 77-23, powers of appointment must be divided into catego-
ries on the basis of the breadth of their objects and the time that
they may be exercised.2 17 As to the breadth of objects, powers are
either general or special. A power is general if it may be exercised
in favor of the donee or his estate. A power is special if it is exer-
cisable only in favor of a reasonably restricted class of objects that
does not include the donee or his estate.
With regard to time of exercise, powers are either testamentary
213. See supra note 210.
214. The Illinois counterpart to subsection (3)(b) has been similarly construed. See
Schuyler, supra note 36, at 40. Accord RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY § 1.2 comment
b & illustration 3 (1983) (Donative Transfers).
215. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY § 11.1 (Tent. Draft No. 5, 1982) (Donative
Transfers).
216. This is in accord with orthodox classification terminology. See RESTATEMENT OF
PROPERTY § 318(2) (1940). But see Phipps v. Palm Beach Trust Co., 196 So. 299 (Fla. 1940)
(trustee's power to allocate referred to as a power of appointment).
217. On the classification of powers, see generally 5 A.L.P., supra note 23, at § 23.12;
RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY §§ 320, 321 (1940); L. SIMES & A. SmrrH, supra note 21, at §§
874-879.
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or inter vivos. A testamentary power is one which may be exercised
only in the donee's will. In effect, the exercise of a testamentary
power is conditioned on the death of the donee. An inter vivos
power is one which is or may become exercisable during the do-
nee's life. An inter vivos power that is not subject to any condi-
tions other than those relating to the formalities of exercise is said
to be presently exercisable.
2. The Validity of Powers Themselves
There is no specific provision in chapter 77-23 dealing with the
validity of the powers themselves. Rather, this matter is controlled
by common-law principles as they are modified by the "wait and
see" and other remedial provisions of Florida's statutory Rule. The
appropriate analysis depends on the type of power involved.
a. General Powers Which Are or May Become Presently
Exercisable
Because he has the ability to become an absolute owner simply
by exercising his power in his own favor, the donee of a presently
exercisable general power is regarded as the equivalent of an abso-
lute owner for purposes of the Rule Against Perpetuities. It follows
from this that the Rule is not violated merely because such a
power can be exercised beyond the perpetuities period. The Rule is
no more concerned with the duration of presently exercisable gen-
eral powers than it is with the duration of absolute ownership. The
Rule is concerned, however, with when general inter vivos powers
become presently exercisable. Until they do, ownership
equivalency is lacking. Thus, at common law, if the exercise of a
general inter vivos power is conditioned on the happening of some
event which might occur beyond the perpetuities period, the power
is void in its inception.2 18 Under chapter 77-23, however, such a
power would not be void in its inception. Under chapter 77-23, a
general inter vivos power is invalid only if, at the expiration of the
subsection (2)(a) waiting period, it remains possible that the power
would not become exercisable within the permissible perpetuities
period.
CASE-18: T leaves the residue of his estate in trust to pay the
218. 6 A.L.P., supra note 23, at § 24.31 (by implication); J. GRAY, supra note 22, at §
477; J. MORRIS & W. LEACH, supra note 23, at 140-41; RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 390(1)
(1944); L. SIMEs & A. SMITH, supra note 21, at § 1272.
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income to his son A for life, then to pay the income to A's widow
for life, and at the death of A's widow, or at A's death if he is not
survived by a widow, to such persons as A's eldest surviving child
shall appoint by deed or will.
CASE-18 is an "unborn widow"-type of limitation with the ulti-
mate interest taking the form of a general inter vivos power of ap-
pointment. Under principles discussed previously, the power is
void in its inception at common law. Both A's eldest surviving
child and his widow might be born after T's death. Under chapter
77-23, the power is not necessarily bad. It is invalid only if those
facts actually occur and the situation at T's death makes it inap-
propriate for a court to save the power by applying the subsection
(5)(b) rule of construction."'
b. General Testamentary and All Special Powers
The Rule Against Perpetuities applies differently to general tes-
tamentary and all special powers of appointment. These powers
lack the ownership equivalency that characterizes presently exer-
cisable general powers. In the case of special powers, by definition,
these powers may not be exercised in a manner benefiting the do-
nee or his estate. Hence, special powers are more akin to an agency
through which donors attempt to exert the very dead-hand control
which it is the Rule's primary purpose to restrict. In the case of
general testamentary powers, ownership equivalency is lacking be-
cause the donee cannot exercise his power during life. Accordingly,
it is not enough that general testamentary and special powers be-
come exercisable within lives in being plus twenty-one years. The
Rule requires that they not be exercisable beyond that period.2 0
CASE-19: T leaves the residue of his estate in trust to pay the
income to his daughter A for life, then to divide the income
among such of A's children as are from time to time living and at
the death of the last of A's children, to distribute the trust princi-
pal to such one or more of T's then-living lineal descendants as
A's last surviving child by will appoints.
At common law the special testamentary power in CASE-19 is
219. See supra notes 175-180 and accompanying text.
220. 6 A.L.P., supra note 23, at § 24.32; J. GRAY, supra note 22, at §§ 475, 477; J. MoRMs
& W. LEACH, supra note 23, at 141-43; RESTATEmENT OF PROPERTY § 390(2) (1944); L. SInES
& A. SamT, supra note 21, at § 1273.
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void in its inception. The donee of the power might be an
afterborn child of A who would attempt to exercise his testamen-
tary power more than twenty-one years after the death of A and
any children she had at T's death. The result would be the same if
the power was either a special inter vivos or a general testamentary
power. In the former case, the power would be certain to become
exercisable, if at all, within the perpetuities period. There would
not, however, be any certainty that it would terminate in time.
Under chapter 77-23, the power in CASE-19 is not necessarily
invalid. A court will "wait and see" if the donee turns out to be a
life in being. If so, it is valid. If not, it is void.2 1
3. The Validity of Appointments and Related Matters
In applying the Rule Against Perpetuities to interests created by
the exercise of a power of appointment, the critical question con-
cerns when the perpetuities period begins to run. The answer pro-
vided by chapter 77-23 differs greatly from that of prior law.
a. Appointments at Common Law
Prior to chapter 77-23, there was no specific Florida authority
dealing with the question of when the perpetuities period begins
for interests created by appointment. It is believed, however, that
had the issue arisen, Florida courts would have resolved it by ap-
plying the generally accepted principles of the common-law Rule.
Under these principles, the answer depends on the type of power
involved. If the power is presently exercisable and general, the pe-
riod begins when the power is exercised." This is in accord with
the view that these powers are the equivalent of absolute owner-
ship. If, however, the power is either general testamentary or spe-
221. Since invalidity in CASE-19 presupposes the birth of an afterborn child by A, the
fertility presumptions of subsection (5)(d) may make it possible to uphold the power before
the full subsection (2)(a) waiting period expires. See supra notes 185-93 and accompanying
text.
Suppose that after the donee of a special inter vivos power makes a partial exercise, it is
determined that the donee's power is invalid under the "wait and see" rule of subsection
(2)(a). Could the partial exercise of the ultimately invalid power give rise to an action for
rebate? The answer should be no. The theory of "wait and see" is that interests, including
powers, are presumptively valid until such time that it becomes determinable that they will
not be saved by waiting to see. Until such time, actions taken in reliance on the presumptive
validity of interests should not give rise to actions for rebate.
222. 6 A.L.P., supra note 23, at § 24.33; J, GRAY, supra note 22, at § 524; J. MORRIS & W.
LAcH, supra note 23, at 146-47; RESTATEMENr OF PROPERTY § 391 (1944); L. SiMSa & A.
SMITH, supra note 21, at § 1274.
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cial, the operative principle is that the donee of one of these pow-
ers acts as the agent of the donor. As a result, the period begins
when the powers themselves are created, not when they are exer-
cised. 223 Although the analogy is not a perfect one, in effect, the
donee's exercise is read back into the donor's instrument. Then, in
determining compliance with the Rule, courts apply the "second-
look" doctrine.
The "second-look" doctrine is one of only two exceptions to the
common-law requirement that compliance with the Rule must be
determined on the basis of the facts that exist when the perpetu-
ities period begins.2 24 Under this doctrine, courts take a "second-
look" to see what facts exist at the time the appointment is made.
If, after considering those facts, it may be said with certainty that
the appointive interest will vest, if at all, within the perpetuities
period (measured from the creation rather than the exercise of the
power), the interest is valid.22
The "second-look" doctrine has a remedial impact similar to
that of "wait and see." Even so, the application of the common-law
Rule to interests created by the exercise of general testamentary or
special powers involves an added level of complexity that does not
exist for interests created by other means. The complexity is
223. The Rule mentioned in text is applied to interests created by the exercise of special
powers in every jurisdiction. In England and Ireland, however, the period for interests cre-
ated by the exercise of general testamentary powers begins at the time the power is exer-
cised. Rous v. Jackson [18851 29 Ch. D. 521; Re Flower, [1885] 55 L.J. Ch. 200; Stuart v.
Babington, [1891] 27 L.R.Ir. 551. See also Perpetuities and Accumulations Act, 1964, c. 55, §
7 (England). In this country, only Rhode Island accepts this view. Industrial Nat'l Bank of
Rhode Island v. Barret, 220 A.2d 517 (R.I. 1966).
The question whether interests created by the exercise of general testamentary powers
should be read back into the instrument creating the power or whether the period should
commence at the time of exercise was the subject of a historic debate between Professors
Gray and Kales. The latter believed that the English view was correct. Kales, General Pow-
ers and the Rule Against Perpetuities, 26 HARv. L. Rav. 64, 67 (1912). Gray disagreed. He
believed the period should commence at the creation of these powers. Gray, General Testa-
mentary Powers and the Rule Against Perpetuities, 26 HAIv. L. REV. 720 (1913). See also
J. GRAY, supra note 22, at §§ 948-969. Gray's position ultimately won favor in this country
and today, most textwriters agree that it is preferable in principle. See 6 A.L.P., supra note
23, at § 24.34; J. MORRIS & W. LEACH, supra note 23, at 147; L. SIMEs & A. SMITH, supra
note 21, at § 1275. Accord LAW REFORM COMM. REP., supra note 38, at 23-24. But see Ber-
ger, The Rule Against Perpetuities As it Relates to Powers of Appointment, 41 NEB. L.
REV. 583 (1962).
224. The other is the doctrine of split contingencies. See 6 A.L.P., supra note 23, at §
24.54; J. GRAY, supra note 22, at §§ 331-354; J. MoRIms & W. LEACH, supra note 21, at 181-
84; RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 376 comment e (1944); L. SIMES & A. SMITH, supra note 21,
at § 1257.
225. 6 A.L.P., supra note 23, at § 24.35; J. MORRIS & W. LEACH, supra note 23, at 152-54;
RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 392 (1944); L. SIMES & A. SMrrH, supra note 21, at § 1274.
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caused by the fact that the period for appointments begins before
the execution of the instrument in which they are made.
b. Appointments Under Chapter 77-23
The treatment of appointive interests is much simpler under
chapter 77-23. In a radical departure from what is believed to be
the prior law of this state, subsection (2)(b) provides:
(2) BASIS FOR DETERMINING VALIDITY OF
INTEREST.-
(b) For the purposes of the rule against perpetuities, every in-
terest created through the exercise, by will, deed or other instru-
ment, of a power of appointment, irrespective of whether the
power is limited or unlimited as to appointees, the manner in
which the power was created or may be exercised, or whether the
power was created before or after this section takes effect, is con-
sidered to have been created at the time of the exercise, and not
at the time of the creation of the power of appointment. No such
interest is void because of the rule unless the interest would be
void had it been created at the date of the exercise of the power
of appointment otherwise than through the exercise of a power of
appointment, except that no power may be exercised so as to cre-
ate another power, limited as to appointees or as to the manner in
which such second power may be exercised.
Shorn of its technical verbiage, subsection (2)(b) eliminates the
common-law distinction between types of powers. Whether general
or special, inter vivos or testamentary, the initial sentence of the
subsection provides that the creation of interests by appointment
occurs at the exercise of a power, rather than at the earlier date
when the power itself was created. It follows from this that the
period of the statutory Rule begins at the same time.
CASE-20: T leaves the residue of his estate in trust to pay the
income to A for life, then to distribute the trust principal to such
one or more of A's then-living lineal descendants as A by will ap-
points. At his death, A appoints in continuing trust to pay the
income to his eldest child A Jr. for life, then to distribute the
trust principal to A Jr.'s then-living children. A Jr. was born after
T's death.
CASE-20 illustrates just how treacherous the commonlaw Rule
can be when it is applied to interests created by appointment. Nor-
mally the period of the Rule is such that A could validly postpone
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vesting until twenty-one years after the death of any person known
to him. However, this is not true where A creates or funds his trust
through the exercise of a general testamentary or special power. In
such situations, A's appointment is read back into T's will as if T
had left the residue of his estate to A for life, then to A's eldest
child for life, then to that child's then-living children. Taking a
"second-look" at A's death, a court would see that A Jr. was not
alive when T died. Hence, the remainder in A Jr.'s children is void
for remoteness. It will not vest until the death of a person who was
not a life in being at its creation.
Under subsection (2)(b), the treatment of appointive interests is
no more complex than that of other interests; the interest in A
Jr.'s children is valid just as it would be had A created it by trans-
fer. It is certain to vest, if at all, at the death of A Jr., a life in
being. Moreover, even if the remainder interest could remain con-
tingent beyond A Jr.'s death, as would be the case, for example, if
it was conditioned on the children attaining the age of twenty-five,
the subsection (5) rules of construction, the subsection (2)(a) "wait
and see" doctrine and ultimately the subsection (4) age reduction
provision would all be available to save it.2 1 6
Suppose in CASE-20 that A had created the trust for himself
sometime before A Jr. was born. In creating the trust, A reserved
to himself the testamentary power to appoint among his lineal de-
scendants. How would chapter 77-23 apply in this situation?
If A's trust is revocable, subsection (3)(b) would produce the
same result that subsection (2)(b) produced in CASE-20 as origi-
nally formulated. That is, the period of the statutory Rule would
not begin until A's death when his power to revoke terminates. A
Jr. would therefore be a life in being and the interest in his chil-
dren would be certain to vest in time.
Suppose, however, that A's trust was irrevocable. Would the fact
that A retained a testamentary power to appoint the trust property
among his lineal descendants mean that the perpetuities period for
his appointment begins at the time it is made? That is, does sub-
section (2)(b) apply to reserved powers as well as to those created
by someone other than the donor?
The better answer is yes. The exercise of reserved powers
presents the same complexities as other powers. Additionally, there
226. Any possible doubt on this point is eliminated by the first clause of the second
sentence of subsection (2)(b) providing in effect that no appointive interest is invalid under
chapter 77-23 unless it would have been invalid had it been created by transfer instead of
appointment.
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can be no adequate reason for applying one rule if A retains his
own power and another if it is given to him by someone else. Ac-
cordingly, as used in subsection (2)(b), "power of appointment"
should include reserved powers as well as those where the donor
and donee are different persons.22 7
c. The Final Clause-No Perpetual Trusts
If all subsection (2)(b) did was change when the period of the
Rule begins for interests created by the exercise of general testa-
mentary and special powers, the subsection would open the door to
potential abuse. Without more, this change would permit the per-
petual fettering of property through the use of successive exercises
of powers to create what amounts to a perpetual trust. For exam-
ple, assume A in CASE-20 exercises his special testamentary power
by appointing in continuing trust for the benefit of A Jr. for life,
remainder at his death to such of his lineal descendants as he by
will appoints. Assume further that when A Jr. dies, he exercises his
power to create another trust with identical terms for the benefit
of his daughter. Likewise, at the daughter's death, she attempts to
do the same for her child.
At common law, successive exercises of powers in this manner
could not continue forever. Each successive exercise would be read
back into T's original instrument; eventually one of them would
violate the Rule. However, with the change made by the initial
sentence of subsection (2)(b), successive exercises of powers in this
fashion need never violate Florida's statutory Rule. The perpetu-
ities period begins anew with each exercise.
The final clause of subsection (2)(b) eliminates this potential
abuse. The clause prevents the donee of any type of power"2 8 from
exercising it to create another power that is limited as to appoin-
tees (i.e., a special power) or as to the manner in which it may be
exercised (e.g., a testamentary power). Moreover, it seems virtually
certain that the clause will be construed to prohibit augmentations
of pre-existing powers as well. Otherwise, it would be possible for
A to do indirectly what the final clause prohibits him from doing
directly. He could: 1) create a trust with the desired terms, funding
227. The RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY also includes reserved powers within the meaning
of powers of appointment. See RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 318(1). (1940).
228. The inclusion of presently exercisable general powers in the subsection (2)(b) re-
striction is somewhat curious since the exercise of these powers to create additional powers
is no more objectionable than the creation of additional powers by an absolute owner.
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it initially with his own property and then 2) exercise his power to
pour over the appointive property into this pre-existing trust. If
the final clause does not prohibit this, the door would once again
be opened to the creation of perpetual trusts.
d. Gifts in Default of Appointment
Of all the questions left unanswered by chapter 77-23, the least
tractable concerns whether subsection (2)(b) extends to interests
limited to take in default of appointment. If it does, the initial sen-
tence of the subsection will apply to these interests in much the
same manner that it applies to interests created by appointment.
That is, interests limited to take in default of all powers, regardless
of type, will be considered to be created at the time that the power
to which they are appended expires. Correspondingly, the period of
the statutory Rule for these interests will begin at the same time.
If, however, subsection (2)(b) does not apply to default interests,
the common-law treatment of these interests continues in effect,
subject only to the other remedial provisions of chapter 77-23.
The common-law treatment of gifts in default exactly parallels
that of interests created by the exercise of powers. If the power to
which the default interest is appended is presently exercisable and
general, the perpetuities period begins at the time the power ex-
pires-usually at the donee's death-as if the donee had exercised
the power in favor of the takers in default.2 9 This is but another
application of the principle previously referred to that the policies
of the Rule are not offended as long as one person acting alone has
the unrestricted power to secure full ownership for himself. If,
however, the power is testamentary, special or both, the common-
law period begins when the power itself was created.2 30 Again the
appropriate analogy is to an exercise in favor of the takers in
default.
Read literally, subsection (2)(b) does not apply to gifts in de-
fault. The subsection speaks only in terms of interests created by
the "exercise" of powers. However, the issue is not as straightfor-
ward as this wording might suggest. When a donee permits his
power to expire without affirmative exercise, he could be viewed as
229. 6 A.L.P., supra note 23, at § 24.36; J. MORRIS & W. LEACH, supra note 23, at 159-61;
RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 373 comment c (1944); L. Simgs & A. SMITH, supra note 21, at
§ 1252.
230. 6 A.L.P., supra note 23, at § 24.36. This is but another way of saying that testamen-
tary and special powers have no impact on the running of the perpetuities period for inter-
ests subject to them. Hence, the period for these interests begins when they are created.
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making a negative or passive exercise in favor of the takers in de-
fault. Hence, subsection (2)(b) could easily be extended to cover
these interests as well. "Exercise" need only be broadly construed
to include this type of negative or passive exercise. The question is:
Should courts do this?
The argument that they should rests primarily on the generally
accepted view that the expiration of a power without exercise is
the functional equivalent of an exercise in favor of the takers in
default. 31 To this may be added the related argument that if gifts
in default and appointments are not treated identically, illogical
results can occur. The same interest that would be valid if created
by appointment could be invalid if limited initially to takers in de-
fault of appointment. On principle this result would have nothing
to commend it. Indeed the desire to avoid such an anomaly is a
primary reason why the "second-look" doctrine has been applied
to gifts in default. 2 '
231. This view is reflected in the treatment of powers under both the common-law Rule
Against Perpetuities, see 6 A.L.P., supra note 23, at § 24.36, and the Federal transfer tax
laws. See I.R.C. §§ 2041(a)(2), 2613(b)(1) (CCH 1983). Areas where it is not recognized in-
clude the inheritance tax laws of some states under which powers are taxed only if they are
exercised (see, e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 85, § 804 (Smith-Hurd 1969)), and the common-law
rules relating to creditors rights under which a creditor of a donee of a power created other
than by reservation can reach the appointive property only if the power is general and the
donee exercises it. See generally 5 A.L.P., supra note 23, at §§ 23.14-.18; RESTATEMENT OF
PROPERTY §§ 327-330 (1940); L. SIMEs & A. SMITH, supra note 21, at §§ 944-945. Note,
however, that the common-law treatment of creditors has been criticized to the extent it
draws a distinction between exercised and unexercised powers. See, e.g., Berger, The Gen-
eral Power of Appointment as an Interest in Property, 40 NEB. L. REv. 104, 119-20 (1960);
Browder, Future Interest Reform, 35 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1255, 1272 (1960). And many states
have enacted legislation broadening the rights of creditors to reach appointive property. For
a list of statutes, see A.L.P. (Supp. to Vols. I-VII, 1977), supra note 23, at § 23.17 n.5a. See
also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY, Statutory Note to Section 13.2 (Tent. Draft No.
5, 1982).
232. In the case of interests created by appointment, the "second-look" doctrine is justi-
fied on the rationale that courts cannot determine the validity of an appointive interest
until the appointment is made. Since courts must wait that long in any event, it would be
foolish not to let them take into account the facts that are known to exist at that time. In
the case of gifts in default, however, it is not necessary to wait until the power expires to
determine whether the default interests comply with the Rule. Their validity may be deter-
mined as soon as the instrument creating them takes effect. Nevertheless, courts in Massa-
chusetts and Ontario, Canada have applied the "second-look" doctrine to gifts in default.
Sears v. Coolidge, 108 N.E.2d 563 (Mass. 1952); Re Edwards, [1960] 20 D.L.R. 2d 755 (Ont.).
And most text-writers agree that the anomalies that might occur were different rules to be
applied to appointments and gifts in default justify these decisions. See 6 A.L.P., supra note
23, at § 24.36; J. MORRIS & W. LEACH, supra note 23, at 161-63; 5A R. POWELL, supra note
21, at 788[3]. But see L. SIMEs & A. SMITH, supra note 21, at § 1276 (suggesting that the
application of the "second-look" doctrine to gifts in default is subject to the same objections
as the "wait and see" doctrine).
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These problems aside, reasonable arguments can also be ad-
vanced for not applying subsection (2)(b) to default interests.
First, of course, there is the wording of the subsection itself. Sec-
ond, the objective of the subsection is not relevant to these inter-
ests. Gifts in default do not involve a situation where the common-
law period can begin before the instrument containing the terms of
the gift is executed. More importantly, if the initial sentence of
subsection (2)(b) applies to default interests, so will the restriction
contained in the final clause of the subsection. The implications of
this would hardly be favorable.
Recall that the final clause of subsection (2)(b) seeks to preserve
some semblance of perpetuities policy by placing a new restriction
on the exercise of powers. Powers may not be exercised to create
new (or augment pre-existing) special or testamentary powers.
Even if subsection (2)(b) does not apply to gifts in default, the
adverse impact of this restriction will be substantial. There are nu-
merous instances where sound estate planning principles would
call for the exercise of a power to create or augment another
trust.233 While such appointments may be made, the beneficiaries
of the appointive trust cannot have special or testamentary powers
over the appointive property or, if they do, the powers cannot be
validly exercised. 3
This loss of estate planning flexibility is the minimum cost sub-
section (2)(b) exacts for a simplified treatment of appointive inter-
ests.2 "3 The costs increase immeasurably if the subsection also ap-
plies to gifts in default. The situations where special or
testamentary powers are created in default clauses are even more
common than those where they are created by affirmative appoint-
ment. More common still are estate plans where gifts in default are
limited in favor (or provide for the continuation) of a pre-existing
trust, one or more beneficiaries of which have special or testamen-
233. A desire to provide for a child whose spouse is a spendthrift or whose marriage is
failing are two situations which immediately come to mind.
234. A trustee who acquiesces or participates in an exercise of an invalid power may be
liable for a breach of trust. See G. G. -BOGERT & G. T. BOGERT, TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 814
(rev. 2d ed. 1981); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 226 (1957); 3 A. Sco'rr, THE LAW OF
TRUSTS § 226 (3d ed. 1967).
235. Where his power is general, a donee can circumvent the subsection (2)(b) restriction
by first appointing to himself or, if his power is testamentary, to his estate. In the latter
case, it may not be necessary for the donee to actually make the appointment. An appoint-
ment in contravention of subsection (2)(b), conditioned on it being effective, followed by a
secondary appointment in favor of the donee's estate if it is not, would appear to eliminate
the stake anyone might have in contesting the validity of the primary appointment.
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tary powers. If subsection (2)(b) applies to default interests,
neither arrangement would be valid.236
Ultimately, therefore, the issue of whether subsection (2)(b)
should be extended to gifts in default involves a classic Hobson's
choice. One choice, although more consistent with the wording and
purpose of subsection (2)(b), is contrary to common sense and has
the potential for producing anomalous results. The other choice
appreciably increases the "costs" of simplifying the treatment of
appointments under Florida's statutory Rule. On balance, the for-
mer seems the lesser of the two evils.237 However, a third alterna-
tive is better still. Subsection (2)(b) could be repealed.
e. Should Subsection (2)(b) Be Repealed?
Should the Florida Legislature repeal subsection (2)(b)? At least
in this author's opinion, the answer is yes. The sole raison d'etre
for the subsection is that in simplifying the treatment of appoin-
tive interests, the subsection makes it less likely that appointments
will transgress Florida's statutory Rule. Certainly this is a laudable
objective. Nevertheless, laudable objectives are sometimes attained
at too great a cost. The "costs" of subsection (2)(b) are considera-
ble. Consider for example the adverse impact the subsection has on
the Rule's primary function of restricting dead-hand control of
property.
236. By this it is meant that the prohibited special or testamentary power created, aug-
mented or continued in the default clause could not be validly exercised over the original
appointive property.
237. In Florida, a broadly worded power in a trustee to distribute trust principal to the
beneficiaries of the trust includes the authority to make a distribution by creating a second
trust. Phipps v. Palm Beach Trust Co., 196 So. 299 (Fla. 1940). Where this is done, the
application of the Rule Against Perpetuities to the contingent beneficial interests of the
second trust involves the same complexities as the application of the Rule to other interests
created by appointment. Would subsection (2)(b) cover this situation?
It seems clear that subsection (2)(b) cannot apply both to this situation and to gifts in
default of appointment. If it did, a trustee's allocation powers could validly exist under
subsection (3)(a)4 until the perpetuities period ends and incongruously, subsection (2)(b)
would provide that the period does not begin as long as the power exists.
On the other hand, if subsection (2)(b) does not apply to gifts in default, there would be
no anomaly created by applying it to interests created by the exercise of a trustee's discre,
tionary allocation powers. Such a holding, however, would significantly impair the useful-
ness of powers in estate planning. It would mean that the final clause of subsection (2)(b)
would prohibit the creation or augmentation of discretionary trusts by appointment. It
would appear, therefore, that the preferable view would be that the fact that trustee alloca-
tion powers are separately treated in subsection (3)(a)4 manifests a legislative intent that
they not be "powers of appointment" for purposes of subsection (2)(b).
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1) Subsection (2)(b) and Perpetuities Policy
If a donee of a valid special power choses to exercise it, he must
do so within strictures initially determined by the power's donor.
Of course, those strictures are removed if the donee appoints out-
right. However it can never be in his economic self-interest to do
so and a variety of estate planning objectives, including a desire to
minimize taxes, frequently induce donees to appoint in trust.
Where this occurs, the donor's dead-hand control is not abated by
the donee's exercise.238 Moreover, from the time of the donor's
original transfer until the termination of the donee's appointive
trust, there is no person who has unfettered ownership of the trust
property. Hence, it is incorrect in principle to view the donee's ap-
pointment as creating a new trust. It is but a continuation, perhaps
with somewhat modified terms, of the donor's original trust.2 3 9
The premise of the common-law treatment of special powers, a
premise with which everyone without so much as a dissenting voice
agrees, is that a person should not be able to do through the inter-
vention of an agent (i.e., a donee) what he cannot do for himself.
So, from the standpoint of perpetuities policy, the relevant ques-
tions are these: How long into the future can a person validly ex-
tend his control without the use of special powers and how long
can he do so under subsection (2)(b) with their use?
The answer to the first question under both the common-law
and statutory Rules is that a person can extend his control for the
lifetime of persons known to him, then for twenty-one years there-
after, and then, if all interests are vested and all discretionary allo-
cation powers of the trustee are terminated, for the lifetime of per-
sons alive at the end of the twenty-one-year period.
Under subsection (2)(b), however, the period of control is con-
siderably longer. First, it can last for the lifetimes of persons
known to the donor. Then, because the period begins anew at the
exercise of a power, the donor's control (through his donee/agent)
can last for the lifetimes of persons alive at the donee's exercise,
then for an additional period of twenty-one-years and then, assum-
ing again that all interests are vested and the discretionary alloca-
tion powers of the trustee are terminated, for the lifetimes of per-
238. The beneficiaries of the donee's appointive trust are restricted to the objects of his
power. 5 A.L.P., supra note 23, at § 23.52; RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 351 (1940); L. SnMES
& A. SMrrH, supra note 21, at § 981.
239. For a discussion of the effect various types of powers have on the perpetuation of
dead-hand control, see Berger, supra note 223, at 591-94.
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sons alive at the expiration of the twenty-one-year period. Thus,
subsection (2)(b) adds another complete generation to the time
frame during which dead-hand control can endure.
At this point, it may be worth noting that no study of the Rule
has ever advocated this type of fundamental change in perpetuities
policy. And, only one other jurisdiction (Delaware) has done so.
But the Delaware provision, 40 upon which the initial sentence of
subsection (2)(b) is based, has been criticized as unjustifiably de-
feating the social policies of the Rule.2 41 Admittedly, from the
standpoint of perpetuities policy, the Delaware statute is more ob-
jectionable than subsection (2)(b). It does not contain the restric-
tion found in the final sentence of the Florida provision. Even so,
the bottom line is that subsection (2)(b) significantly increases
dead-hand control.
2) An Offsetting Remedial Objective?
In defense of subsection (2)(b), those who would advocate keep-
ing it might contend that there are other portions of chapter 77-23
where orthodox perpetuities policy is compromised in the interest
of reform. The "wait and see" rule of subsection (2)(a) is the pri-
mary example. There are, however, important differences between
"wait and see" and subsection (2)(b). The "wait and see" doctrine
does not allow property owners to do anything they could not al-
ready do through competent drafting under the common-law Rule
in its orthodox form. The same may not be said of subsection
(2)(b). Moreover, the compromise in perpetuities policy effectuated
by "wait and see" is more than offset by the remedial impact the
doctrine has for those who might not have had the benefit of com-
petent counsel.. If this is the underlying premise of subsection
(2)(b) as well, it is suggested that that premise is demonstrably
false.
In the first place, even without subsection (2)(b), the potential
for inadvertant perpetuities violations involving appointments will
be less under chapter 77-23 than at common law. Subsection (4)
240. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 25, § 501 (1975). See also id. tit. 12, § 3535 (1979). Although
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2131.08(D) (Page 1976) could be interpreted as adopting the Dela-
ware treatment of powers, Professor Lynn has indicated that this was not the intent of its
formulators, see Lynn, The Ohio Perpetuities Reform Statute, 29 OHIO ST. L.J. 1, 6-7
(1968), and at least one court has agreed. Dollar Say. & Trust Co. v. First Nat'l Bank of
Boston, 285 N.E.2d 768, 778 (Ohio Ct. App. 1976).
241. 5A R. POwELL, supra note 21, at 788[2]. Accord J. MORRIS & W. LEACH, supra
note 23, at 34.
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will be available to save any violation caused by the use of an ex-
cess age contingency. More importantly, even under the common-
law Rule, the potential was merely that-a potential, not a reality.
The fact is that there is not one instance in Florida where the va-
lidity of an interest created by the exercise of an otherwise valid
power has even been litigated, much less one where an appoint-
ment has been struck for remoteness. That is not to say that viola-
tions have not occured. Some may have escaped notice. A few more
may have been settled out of court. What it does say is that this is
not an area where the reasonable objectives of testators (or donees)
are being frustrated on anywhere near the scale that would justify
subsection (2)(b). To the contrary, the restriction placed on the
exercise of powers by the final clause of the subsection would ap-
pear to have a much g~eater potential for frustrating otherwise rea-
sonable objectives than would the common-law treatment of ap-
pointive interests. The restriction applies to every appointment in
trust. The Rule applies only to the few that involve perpetuities
problems. Thus, on balance, subsection (2)(b) seems well intended
but ill-advised. At some compromise in perpetuities policy, the
subsection makes a change of only marginal remedial utility, and
in the process, the subsection has in all liklihood created many
more problems than it solves.
3) On Repeal
If subsection (2)(b) is repealed,"2 there is one aspect of the sub-
242. If subsection (2)(b) is repealed, two additional issues would be raised regarding the
treatment of appointive interests under the "wait and see" rule of subsection (2)(a). First,
would the objects of a power qualify as measuring lives under that subsection? As mere
objects, the answer would be no. Their inclusion could produce a waiting period that lasted
longer than the termination of preceding valid estates. See supra notes 145-154 and accom-
panying text. However, once the power is exercised, an appointee who otherwise meets the
eligibility requirements as a subsection (2)(a) measuring life should qualify. Accord RE-
STATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY § 1.3 comment g (1983) (Donative Transfers). Compare
Act of Apr. 22, 1983, S.F. 433, 1983 Iowa Legis. Serv. 90 (West) (to be codified at IOWA CODE
§ 558.68(2)(b)(2)) (certain objects of powers are eligible measuring lives).
The second issue is whether the donee of the power is a permissible measuring life. In
most cases, the donee will also be a beneficiary and will be eligible in that capacity. In the
case of collateral powers, however, the donee would not be eligible unless he achieves that
status as donee. Contra REsTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF PROPERTY § 1.3 comment g (1983) (Dona-
tive Transfers); Act of Apr. 22, 1983; S.F. 433, 1983 Iowa Legis. Serv. 90 (West) (to be
codified at IOWA CODE § 558.68(2)(b)(2)). The use of the donee of a collateral power as a
measuring life could result in a waiting period longer than the validity of anterior interests.
Nevertheless, courts must wait until the donee exercises his power before they can deter-
mine the validity of interests created by his exercise. It would seem then that the better
approach would be to say that the donee is not a permissible subsection (2)(a) measuring
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section that should not be repealed along with it. In providing that
interests created by appointment are considered to be created at
the time that the power is exercised, subsection (2)(b) insures that
the remedial provisions of chapter 77-23 extend to appointments
after January 1, 1979, even though the power exercised was created
before that date. This aspect of the subsection should be retained.
In order to do so it is not necessary to retain the rest of the subsec-
tion. Indeed, had subsection (2)(b) not been included in chapter
77-23 in the first place, it is highly likely that Florida courts would
have reached the same result.' But to avoid any implication that
the repeal of subsection (2)(b) was intended to restrict chapter 77-
23 to powers created after its effective date, a provision negating
such an intent would be advisable.
IV. CONCLUSION
Through chapter 77-23, the Florida Legislature sought to reform
and modernize the common-law Rule Against Perpetuities. In the
case of transactions arising in a commercial setting, this objective
has been fully realized. The Rule Against Perpetuities-as distinct
from the Rule Against Unreasonable Restraints on Alienation-is
no longer a concern in this area.
For transactions arising in a donative setting, the results are
more mixed. The exemptions provided for fiduciary powers, the
new rules of construction, and the age contingency reduction provi-
sion are all welcome additions to our law. So too is the acceptance
of the "walt and see" doctrine. Nevertheless, chapter 77-23 may be
criticized on several counts.
The first possible criticism is that chapter 77-23 does not go far
enough. Despite its length, chapter 77-23 is less comprehensive
than many other perpetuities reform measures. This is so both be-
cause no one but a beneficiary can qualify as a measuring life
under the "wait and see" rule of subsection (2)(a) and because
chapter 77-23 does not include a general cy pres authority permit-
ting courts to reform limitations that are not saved by waiting to
see. In both respects, the Florida statute represents a minority po-
sition among "wait and see" jurisdictions in this country.
Apart from the above, there are also other aspects of chapter 77-
life, but that subsection (3)(a)1 and the "second-look" doctrine authorize courts to wait
until the power is exercised.
243. This result has been reached by case decision in other states. See, e.g., In re Pen-
dleton's Estate, 246 N.Y.S.2d 351 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1964).
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23 that are not ideal. The statute fails to deal with the common-
law Rule Against Accumulations; the provision covering the "un-
born widow"-type violation is patently defective and the statute
does not clearly and unambiguously set out the criteria to be used
in the selection of the measuring lives under the "wait and see"
rule of subsection (2)(a). Instead this criteria is provided only by
innuendos discoverable in the language of the subsection and the
sparse legislative history of chapter 77-23.
Yet those who would criticize chapter 77-23 should bear in mind
an observation of Professor Leach. In the midst of the scholarly
debate that engulfed his endorsement of the "wait and see" doc-
trine, Professor Leach noted that while it is one thing to propose
perpetuities reform legislation, it is quite another to get it enacted
into law. At least chapter 77-23 has passed this more difficult hur-
dle. Moreover, with but one exception, the weaknesses of chapter
77-23 are not critical. In its present form chapter 77-23 should suf-
fice to eliminate virtually all inadvertant violations of the Rule; a
more comprehensive statute would be meaningful only in fringe
cases. As for the Rule Against Accumulations, if it wishes, the Flor-
ida Legislature can deal with it in separate legislation. Finally, the
defect in the "unborn widow" provision and the ambiguity, if any,
that exists in the criteria for the selection of the subsection (2)(a)
measuring lives can be resolved by Florida courts. Thus, while
chapter 77-23 may not be perfect, it is clearly preferrable to no
perpetuities reform statute at all. The one exception is the treat-
ment of appointive interests under subsection (2)(b). As I have in-
dicated previously, this provision should be repealed. The restric-
tion it places on the exercise of powers promises to do more harm
than good.
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